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CRLs are incredibly expensive to serve, and OCSP isn’t great either. Having short lived certificates makes it cheaper for let’s encrypt to serve the internet si
by Operyl 3y ago
CRLs are incredibly expensive to serve, and OCSP isn’t great either. Having short lived certificates makes it cheaper for let’s encrypt to serve the internet since the CRLs don’t need to be as large (you don’t need to maintain a list of compromised expired certificates in your CRL for example).
- alwaysbeconsing 3y agoHas anyone explored using a technique like a Bloom filter or partial hash matching (like haveibeenpwned does) as a preliminary step for CRL lookups? You could do a cheap initial query, and if you get a negative, you're good. You only have to do the full expensive one if you get a positive, to ensure that it's a true positive. Which should be rare since most certs that are presented won't be revoked.
- Operyl 3y agoHonestly? I don't think it makes sense for us to continue down the path where the clients connect to the CA to verify status. While I trust most CAs (like LE), the less information a client has to expose to one the better.
- coffee-- 3y agohttps://blog.mozilla.org/security/2020/01/09/crlite-part-1-all-web-pki-revocations-compressed/ https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2020/01/09/crlite-part-1-a...