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Section 8.2 seems to talk about how you send plaintext email via SMTP to users who aren't using Skiff. But that's not what I'm talking about with respect to en
by tptacek 3y ago
Section 8.2 seems to talk about how you send plaintext email via SMTP to users who aren't using Skiff.
But that's not what I'm talking about with respect to end-to-end encryption. The white paper refers repeatedly to "browser" users. Your server can feed arbitrary Javascript to browsers and subvert encryption in a variety of ways, can't it?
I'm still not clear why you designed a new, simplistic cryptosystem at all here; can't you do everything you're trying to do here on top of Matrix? Again: the cryptography promises you're making only work between users of your system.
- bastawhiz 3y ago> Your server can feed arbitrary Javascript to browsers and subvert encryption in a variety of ways, can't it? That's how literally any website works. How do you encrypt in the browser if the server doesn't send JavaScript to encrypt data? You also trust Signal not to issue an update that sends data in plaintext over the network. Unless you're building an app from source, you implicitly trust the developer to some extent.
- raggi 3y agoSignal doesn’t have a web client. Most of the stores it is distributed through have fairly strong resistance to compel orders.
- dannyobrien 3y agoYep, but Signal is still a potential adversary, and could roll out a backdoor. A couple of things that are easier in a web-delivered tool is deliver a backdoor to a user or group of users (which Skiff can track), or deliver a backdoor over a particular window of time across many users to decrease the chance of detection. I know Skiff uses IPFS in some of parts of their solutions, and there's something they could do with that for the first -- essentially making visiting a particular version of the code part of how it is accessed, but there's some real UI challenges, which maybe they're looking into (it's been a while since I checked them out: they have some great UX in other parts of their suite). The other tactic I've seen is to bundle the page into a browser extension, which moves you closer to Signal's status.
- tptacek 3y agoSignal's servers can't backdoor the Signal Client. From what I understand of Skiff, Skiff's servers are the client.
- josephg 3y agoNot directly. They would have to roll out an update with the backdoor to the App Store. But as a user I’d be none the wiser. I wish there was some way on iOS to prove that some particular version of an app was built from a certain git hash. That way these sort of attacks would be easier to detect.
- progbits 3y agoThat would be ideal. F-Droid on android can do this: https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/ https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/ However there is still one advantage of even appstor: They have to push the backdoored version to everyone (or large set of users). So that drastically increases risk of being caught. Website under their control can backdoor one specific user or even just one session, making detection harder.
- josephg 3y ago> So that drastically increases risk of being caught. Only if someone out there is extracting, decompiling and auditing each version of the Signal iOS app in the app store. But I doubt anyone is doing this. If a backdoor is ever snuck into the signal ios app for a few users for a few weeks, I highly doubt anybody would notice.
- actionfromafar 3y agoxkcd://386 Of course someone is doing this. I’m not sure they are the kind to tell it to the world, though.
- 3y ago
- ignoramous 3y ago> How do you encrypt in the browser if the server doesn't send JavaScript to encrypt data? Meta has done some work along with Cloudflare on this for WhatsApp Web, specifically. In general, JS crypto is always going to be suspect if the threat model involves distrusting the server (like in e2ee protocols like Signal).
- amilich 3y agoJS crypto functions now interface with browser crypto functions for the last decade or so. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Crypto https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Crypto
- tptacek 3y agoWhat difference does this make to the thread model in the previous comment?
- amilich 3y agoBefore this basic cryptography was downloaded via JS files which yields no security and gave web cryptography a bad reputation. That is not true now.
- onereplyac2 3y agoHuh? It is very concerning to hear this from a founder. It is the same exact level of security as it is executing the same code, just at a different level. Really does not matter what crypto lib you are using if at the end of the day the surrounding code dictates all the security. Regardless of all this, your open source crypto library doesn't even use the Web Crypto APIs at all, but rather the dreaded js based crypto you are badmouthing (tweetnacl, stablelib)
- amilich 3y agoThat's just false. Downloading crypto libraries over the web plagued Javascript crypto for years. We use tweetnacl, stablelib, and webcrypto - and tweetnacl also uses webcrypto!
- cracked-behem 3y agoI built something that solves this problem. It uses an open source program installed on the client to encrypt and store data in a way that doesn't allow the website to access the plaintext data. https://redact.ws https://redact.ws
- amilich 3y agoIt would be far more illogical to warp Matrix into an end-to-end encrypted calendar, note-taking product, file storage product, and email platform.
- tptacek 3y agoWhy? You'd use Matrix to distribute keys for encrypted blobs. That's how systems like these work anyways.
- Thorrez 3y agoWhat do you think of Lavabit? I think they operated in the same way, but the US government forced them out of business for refusing to hand over their TLS keys to allow the US to spy on Snowden. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit
- akerl_ 3y agoLavabit is the one that used user passwords to encrypt the messages, thus ensuring that they had access to all the necessary secrets to decrypt user messages any time the user was viewing them? And that had complied previously with US government subpoenas to provide metadata and data for users?
- Thorrez 3y ago>And that had complied previously with US government subpoenas to provide metadata and data for users? Interesting. Link? Are you talking about this article? https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/08/09/lavabits-ladar-levison-if-you-knew-what-i-know-about-email-you-might-not-use-it/?sh=68aaf258648a https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/08/09/lavabits... It seems to be talking about metadata, not data.
- amilich 3y ago+1
- tptacek 3y agoIsn't that what you're Skiff is doing too? It seems like it's just the Lavabit design with a some 2010 cryptography layered on top.
- wishywashy0 3y agoNo. Lavabit had fundamental flaws where passwords were sent to the server so anyone who could decrypt the HTTPS traffic could basically access the content [1]. Skiff's password mechanism actually solves this flaw cryptographically using known, established primitives. We use argon2id to take password and turn it into two cryptographic keys. One key is used for an SRP scheme to prove you have the password in a signing flow that bootstraps session management. The other key is actually the data encryption key. These keys are never sent to Skiff's servers and this generation happens all in the browser. Lavabit really failed fundamentally in having actual end to end encryption because the password was sent to the server. [1] https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/11/op-ed-a-critique-of-lavabit/#:~:text=At%20account%20creation%20time%2C%20the,stored%20it%20on%20the%20server https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/11/op-ed....