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From the white paper, it appears as if this system requires its users to trust the server. That's not end-to-end encryption. What do I have wrong here? Further
by tptacek 3y ago
From the white paper, it appears as if this system requires its users to trust the server. That's not end-to-end encryption. What do I have wrong here?
Further, it looks like the email encryption provided by this system only works between users of Skiff. At that point, why use email at all? Why not use a real secure messenger? Instead of building an "encrypted email service", you could literally just build an email-flavored frontend to Matrix; either way, you're proxying to SMTP, not speaking it directly.
- wishywashy0 3y agoFounding engineer at Skiff here. >From the white paper, it appears as if this system requires its users to trust the server. That's not end-to-end encryption. What do I have wrong here? It doesn't. All data is encrypted client side across all apps - Skiff Mail, Drive, Pages, and Calendar. For sending external, the whitepaper is very clear how this case is handled in section 8.2 as securely as possible (without having PGP in place. Though this is something we are looking at based on community feedback). >Further, it looks like the email encryption provided by this system only works between users of Skiff. At that point, why use email at all? Why not use a real secure messenger? Instead of building an "encrypted email service", you could literally just build an email-flavored frontend to Matrix; either way, you're proxying to SMTP, not speaking it directly. Lots of folks are sick of getting sold their data sold based on their email. Even corporations are sick of largely giving more information about their customers to Google even notoriously Amazon that stopped sending purchase receipts via email. So even if not end to end encrypted, we do encrypt the emails with the recipient's keys ensuring that only the recipient can access this data. This is a strong privacy guarantee not just backed by a flimsy privacy policy but actual cryptography.
- tptacek 3y agoSection 8.2 seems to talk about how you send plaintext email via SMTP to users who aren't using Skiff. But that's not what I'm talking about with respect to end-to-end encryption. The white paper refers repeatedly to "browser" users. Your server can feed arbitrary Javascript to browsers and subvert encryption in a variety of ways, can't it? I'm still not clear why you designed a new, simplistic cryptosystem at all here; can't you do everything you're trying to do here on top of Matrix? Again: the cryptography promises you're making only work between users of your system.
- bastawhiz 3y ago> Your server can feed arbitrary Javascript to browsers and subvert encryption in a variety of ways, can't it? That's how literally any website works. How do you encrypt in the browser if the server doesn't send JavaScript to encrypt data? You also trust Signal not to issue an update that sends data in plaintext over the network. Unless you're building an app from source, you implicitly trust the developer to some extent.
- raggi 3y agoSignal doesn’t have a web client. Most of the stores it is distributed through have fairly strong resistance to compel orders.
- dannyobrien 3y agoYep, but Signal is still a potential adversary, and could roll out a backdoor. A couple of things that are easier in a web-delivered tool is deliver a backdoor to a user or group of users (which Skiff can track), or deliver a backdoor over a particular window of time across many users to decrease the chance of detection. I know Skiff uses IPFS in some of parts of their solutions, and there's something they could do with that for the first -- essentially making visiting a particular version of the code part of how it is accessed, but there's some real UI challenges, which maybe they're looking into (it's been a while since I checked them out: they have some great UX in other parts of their suite). The other tactic I've seen is to bundle the page into a browser extension, which moves you closer to Signal's status.
- tptacek 3y agoSignal's servers can't backdoor the Signal Client. From what I understand of Skiff, Skiff's servers are the client.
- josephg 3y agoNot directly. They would have to roll out an update with the backdoor to the App Store. But as a user I’d be none the wiser. I wish there was some way on iOS to prove that some particular version of an app was built from a certain git hash. That way these sort of attacks would be easier to detect.
- onereplyac 3y agoIt really is not backed by cryptographic security at all. Since your server has access to plaintext emails when sending and recieving (99.99999% of email addresses would be outside skiff), which completely subverts the whole point of encryption. A vulnerability on the server could leak all user emails, without needing their keys.... This is a solution theoretically only as strong as encryption at rest.
- i_play_stax 3y agoBro, did we read the same comment? The encryption is handled client side; the cyphertext is the only thing the server sees.
- onereplyac 3y agoThe encryption happens after the server recieves the plaintext email and passes it to the client...
- amilich 3y agoNo, this is done with public-key encryption which does not require the client.
- onereplyac2 3y agoAgain, only between users with skiff emails, which is a negligible portion of all emails. This needs to be made clear as it is very misleading to the average user who probably thinks all emails are end to end encrypted.
- amilich 3y agoNo: Skiff does not have access to a single email stored on our platform, including ones received externally. All are public-key encrypted, including subjects and content.
- mgraczyk 3y agoWorth noting that Google does not do what you're describing. Google has never literally "sold" data from Gmail and stopped using it for their own ads ~6 years ago.
- ginsbergjason 3y agoSo gmail was making money off of personal emails as recently 2017. Why trust them? There is no good reason they shouldn’t e2ee that data.
- onereplyac 3y agoExcept there is a reason. Encrypting email has very little to no benefit, since it is transmitted in plaintext and usually stored in plaintext on the recipient's side, your emails almost always exist in unencrypted form. On top of that it has major usability drawbacks, for example you cant ask the server to search emails for you anymore - all emails have to be downloaded on all your devices to be able to search - which is what skiff does. It will be okay at the start, and progressively get slower and use more space on your drive the more you use it.
- em-bee 3y agoi have 2.5 million emails in a 32GB datastore. no mailprovider is going to allow me to store that much mail, and search is actually quite fast. if it isn't for you, then get a better mail client.
- mgraczyk 3y agoGoogle's cheapest paid plan ($6/month) gives you 30GB. The $12/month plan is 2TB of storage. I currently have over 30GB of email in Gmail and everything works fine.
- mediumsmart 3y agoI have around 17GB of pop3fetchallnokeep in the mail folder and the backup is somewhere in the btreeflatfile heap in that UtahDataCenter free of charge training darkgpt 5.8
- ignoramous 3y ago> That's not end-to-end encryption. What do I have wrong here? Apparently, email may not their main e2ee usecase. The CEO at Skiff wrote this on PrivacyGuides forums: Our solution for external sharing was not intended for email. It is much more powerful to share E2EE real-time collaborative docs/files with subpages, embedded E2EE files, and so much more. Curiously, in the same thread, there's is a mention of Trail of Bits auditing their codebase twice. https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/skiff-mail-email-provider/11411/20 https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/skiff-mail-email-provide...
- amilich 3y agoSee https://skiff.com/transparency https://skiff.com/transparency, Trail of Bits has performed 2 audits, Cure53 1 audit, and we had an additional audit 2.5 years ago.
- nicce 3y agoIt is misleading to tell about audits in this context. Your transparency statement clearly says that Security audits. This is different than privacy audits. You cannot audit privacy, since you can intentionally change the functionality of your software right after the audit. For the same reason, you cannot share open-source version of your software and say that it respects privacy. That can be only said if you use reproducible builds, and for client software only. Both security audits and sharing your software as open, is about security, not the privacy. Open-source software and security audits help to reduce unintentional issues. And in this context it means a lot.