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> Examine TikTok’s U.S. facilities, records, equipment and servers with minimal or no notice, > Block changes to the app’s U.S. terms of service, moderation po

> Examine TikTok’s U.S. facilities, records, equipment and servers with minimal or no notice, > Block changes to the app’s U.S. terms of service, moderation policies and privacy policy, > Veto the hiring of any executive involved in leading TikTok’s U.S. Data Security org, > Order TikTok and ByteDance to pay for and subject themselves to various audits, assessments and other reports on the security of TikTok’s U.S. functions, and, > In some circumstances, require ByteDance to temporarily stop TikTok from functioning in the United States. Knowing that TikTok keeps lying about CCP ties and data security this seems like a way to keep them honest? This doesn't list any domestic spying features.

JumpCrisscross 3y ago
The “agreement would let agencies examine TikTok’s US facilities, records, and servers.” That’s broad enough to warrant abuse of search privileges.
- 2OEH8eoCRo0 3y ago
  How else does one prove that TikTok is true to their word about data safety and separating their data from China? What makes you think that the ability to examine their facilities sidesteps the need for courts and warrants? I'm not buying the alarmist angle here.
  - JumpCrisscross 3y ago
    > What makes you think that the ability to examine their facilities sidesteps the need for courts and warrants? Nothing sidesteps the legal need. But I’m seeing no evidence that these agreements contemplate any oversight. If the agent doing the examining decides to simultaneously look up an American’s TikTok account, nothing would stop them. (I agree the tone of this discussion is alarmist.)
    - mrguyorama 3y ago
      >If the agent doing the examining decides to simultaneously look up an American’s TikTok account, nothing would stop them. And this is a concern because? They already have everything tiktok could give them. They shouldn't, but they do.
- cryptonector 3y ago
  Presumably Byte Dance is already required to respond to NSLs and warrants. LEOs don't want to have to sift through raw dumps of raw data -- they want nice search interfaces. Intel agencies, on the other hand, almost certainly want raw data, but would prefer continuing feeds over one-time or occasional dumps, so getting to "examine TikTok’s US facilities, records, and servers" doesn't seem all that interesting. So my take is that “agreement would let agencies examine TikTok’s US facilities, records, and servers” is specifically to enable the audits also mentioned in TFA.
  - JumpCrisscross 3y ago
    > Presumably Byte Dance is already required to respond to NSLs and warrants There is a legitimate concern about ByteDance honestly responding to said orders. Wanting to double check first hand isn't a ridiculous ask. What seems an overstep is wanting to do so with zero oversight.
    - cryptonector 3y ago
      > What seems an overstep is wanting to do so with zero oversight. Huh? Congress can do its oversight duty anytime it wants to.
      - JumpCrisscross 3y ago
        > Congress can do its oversight duty anytime it wants to This is a terrible mode of executive oversight, particularly when it comes to something like warrantless search. Congressional oversight pertains to entire frameworks, not particulars of specific searches.

JumpCrisscross 3y ago

The “agreement would let agencies examine TikTok’s US facilities, records, and servers.” That’s broad enough to warrant abuse of search privileges.

2OEH8eoCRo0 3y ago
How else does one prove that TikTok is true to their word about data safety and separating their data from China? What makes you think that the ability to examine their facilities sidesteps the need for courts and warrants? I'm not buying the alarmist angle here.
- JumpCrisscross 3y ago
  > What makes you think that the ability to examine their facilities sidesteps the need for courts and warrants? Nothing sidesteps the legal need. But I’m seeing no evidence that these agreements contemplate any oversight. If the agent doing the examining decides to simultaneously look up an American’s TikTok account, nothing would stop them. (I agree the tone of this discussion is alarmist.)
  - mrguyorama 3y ago
    >If the agent doing the examining decides to simultaneously look up an American’s TikTok account, nothing would stop them. And this is a concern because? They already have everything tiktok could give them. They shouldn't, but they do.
cryptonector 3y ago
Presumably Byte Dance is already required to respond to NSLs and warrants. LEOs don't want to have to sift through raw dumps of raw data -- they want nice search interfaces. Intel agencies, on the other hand, almost certainly want raw data, but would prefer continuing feeds over one-time or occasional dumps, so getting to "examine TikTok’s US facilities, records, and servers" doesn't seem all that interesting. So my take is that “agreement would let agencies examine TikTok’s US facilities, records, and servers” is specifically to enable the audits also mentioned in TFA.
- JumpCrisscross 3y ago
  > Presumably Byte Dance is already required to respond to NSLs and warrants There is a legitimate concern about ByteDance honestly responding to said orders. Wanting to double check first hand isn't a ridiculous ask. What seems an overstep is wanting to do so with zero oversight.
  - cryptonector 3y ago
    > What seems an overstep is wanting to do so with zero oversight. Huh? Congress can do its oversight duty anytime it wants to.
    - JumpCrisscross 3y ago
      > Congress can do its oversight duty anytime it wants to This is a terrible mode of executive oversight, particularly when it comes to something like warrantless search. Congressional oversight pertains to entire frameworks, not particulars of specific searches.