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I love on the one side that Google takes security serious. On macOS, Windows and Linux I can easily set up a device in a way that makes it (a decent passphrase
by mschuster91 3y ago
I love on the one side that Google takes security serious. On macOS, Windows and Linux I can easily set up a device in a way that makes it (a decent passphrase required) all but impossible for any attacker to retrieve the data on the device or modify the OS if the device is at rest. LUKS/Bitlocker/FileVault encryption and UEFI Secure Boot (x86)/SIP (Apple) make sure of that.
The problem is that way too many mobile applications these days take extraordinary difficult steps to make sure it's impossible to exercise the freedoms granted by the GPL in practice. If you "root" your phone, it's a constant game of whack-a-mole to keep banking, Netflix, Google Pay and other applications running.
On top of that it's impossible to put a new root of trust in place... I don't want a secure boot warning message if a firmware is running that I flashed on the device, I want it visible when someone else placed a manipulated firmware on it. And that point applies to Apple just as well.
- Waterluvian 3y agoPart of the issue there is that they’re focused on the 99% of users who aren’t flashing firmware onto their phones.
- JohnFen 3y agoThis is probably the largest (but far from the only) reason why I'm ditching smartphones entirely.
- sznio 3y agoIt's the corporations that get to trust your device. You get nothing.
- londons_explore 3y ago> I don't want a secure boot warning message if a firmware is running that I flashed on the device, I want it visible when someone else placed a manipulated firmware on it. And how exactly do you propose achieving that, when that someone else might have tampered with the phone before you got it? The goal of Google's security architecture is that a dodgy phone seller/repair shop can't pre-root the phone and siphon all your private data to Mr Evil unless they have access to a silicon fab to remake the main CPU with a new trust root.
- figmert 3y ago> Mr Evil Erm, it's Dr. Evil to you sir.
- mschuster91 3y ago> And how exactly do you propose achieving that, when that someone else might have tampered with the phone before you got it? Wipe the device as a condition of unlocking the bootloader root trust keyset. Easy, and more secure than any classic x86 UEFI bootloader. That gets rid of the threat of dodgy repair shops. The only issue will be manipulating devices before they're sold the first time, but tamper-proof packaging resolves that.
- canttestthis 3y agoTamper-proof packaging is a poor replacement for a first-time boot replacement warning. Not to mention the sheer impracticality of properly implementing tamper proof packaging (the factory would have to cover the packaging in shiny nail polish or something, encrypt and send a high-res picture of that somehow to the final buyer across the supply chain, at which point the final buyer makes sure the glitters align). Much better to do it the way it's currently done
- vlakreeh 3y agoIf a repair shops wipes someone's phone they'll be pissed, but they aren't going to throw out the phone. As soon as they get back that phone they'll reinstall all their apps and log back into all their accounts and any malicious firmware added by that repair shop will wreak havoc. I 100% agree that we should have ways of getting rid of these warnings on our own devices, but this isn't a simple problem.
- devit 3y agoOn Google Pixel devices you can load your own verified boot key into the "avb_custom_key" partition and then it will only boot OSes signed by it (it will also say that you are running a different operating system in the boot screen). GrapheneOS for instance uses this mechanism. Unfortunately you can only register one key and you have to wipe the device to change it, but that's still fine for most use cases.
- DistractionRect 3y agoSome devices allow you sign your own images and relock the bootloader [0]. This allows you to modify your image, sign it, flash it and relock your bootloader. If you have the infrastructure in place, future updates could be rolled out as OTA updates for your custom rom. You'll still fail hardware attestation and afaik whatever api that returns the boot status differentiates between a vendor signed and a custom signed image. So not perfect, but you lose the bootloader unlocked nag. [0] https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/pie-release/README.md#Device-Specific-Notes https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/pie...
- folmar 3y agoSadly those devices are only Google and Nexus, so expensive.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]