> Also, use scantron style ballots that use computers to automate vote counting but not vote casting, with members of all major political parties monitoring pol

> Also, use scantron style ballots that use computers to automate vote counting but not vote casting, with members of all major political parties monitoring polling stations and vote counting to ensure everything is above board. That's almost the right way to do it. Just add some additional data printed on the ballots in a special ink that is normally invisible, and provide voters with a special marker to fill in the bubbles that reacts with the special ink to make it visible, use some clever cryptographic techniques to figure out what should be printed with that special ink, and you get this [1]. With that, people who just want to vote and trust that others will deal with auditing and counting go into the booth, fill in the bubbles for their candidates, drop the ballot in the collection box, and then just wait for the machine count to see who won, just like now. But after the election all the cast ballots can be published allowing anyone to check the count. Individual voters who noted a code that was on their ballot can check the published ballots and verify that their ballot was counted correctly (but they cannot prove to a third party that they voted for a particular candidate). This system also allows a voter before voting to verify that the ballots have been correctly printed. Voting systems with those properties are called end-to-end (E2E) verifiable voting systems [2], and there have been several proposals for such systems, including many that like Scantegrity do not rely on electronic voting machines. Here is the original paper on this (PDF and HTML), and a paper proving that it is coercion-resistant [3][4][5]: [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scantegrity https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scantegrity [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_sy... [3] https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/evt08/tech/full_papers/chaum/chaum.pdf https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/evt08/tech/full_papers/c... [4] https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/evt08/tech/full_papers/chaum/chaum_html/index.html https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/evt08/tech/full_papers/c... [5] https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/502.pdf https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/502.pdf