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Only the ip address holder can sign a valid ROA. It specifies the acceptable prefix lengths the origin AS can advertise. The BGP speakers placed under a require
by ggm 3y ago
Only the ip address holder can sign a valid ROA. It specifies the acceptable prefix lengths the origin AS can advertise. The BGP speakers placed under a requirement to hijack either had to specify a shorter path to origin or only hijacked against people who didn't filter BGP against a validated ROA hierarchy.
ROA can't defend against attack on path hence the possibility they kept origin AS unaltered but advertised reachability to it as a lie. Since some people say ROA protected them that tends to suggest they faked origin to more specific prefices or simply asserted a bad origin AS
My guess is it was like YouTube hijack in PK: wrong side of a box got affected: they only care about BGP speakers inside Iran.
Maybe NANOG list will say more, or the RIPE NCC blog and RIPE labs
- toast0 3y agoSince you seem knoweldgeable... can I ask a potentially dumb question? Does anything stop a rogue network from adding a BGP peer configured with the AS number that's listed in the ROA and then propigating those anouncements how they want? Maybe prefix or path filters on the rogue's upstreams, but my (weak) understanding of RPKI says if the destination ASN matches, it's an acceptable route, and I don't see anything to validate that the announcer actually is the AS owner? Overall BGP is built based on a high assumption of trust, and RPKI seems to be very helpful for accidental hijacks, but might not help for intentional ones. OTOH, if Iran only wants to hijack within the country, they might just effectively require networks within their purview to accept the hijacking announcements without regard to RPKI (and the external networks who enforce RPKI would ignore those announcements by default, if they leak)
- ggm 3y agoThe scenario you declare depends on the mutual trust between BGP speakers. It's a weak wall of defence. All public BGP is under continuous scrutiny so this kind of thing is detected but that's post hoc remediation. AS holders need to use BGP detection systems to see rogue instances of their AS and within an "island" of border a large number of AS could be made to see a rogue and occlude it from others. Additional signed states in BGPsec and in emerging ASPA would make this much harder but with 80,000 AS its a large job to both compute and share the adjacency information, and largely BGP path security is a work in progress. What you say about Iran is substantively true for any economy which wants to control its borders.