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Iraq Blocks Telegram, Leaks Blackhole BGP Routes
- sieabahlpark 3y ago[dead]
- 0xDEF 3y ago>disruption was minimized by Telegram’s use of RPKI Telegram has spread their hosting across the three big cloud providers; AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud. It is most likely the cloud providers who have enabled RPKI as a default.
- tiernano 3y agoLooks like Telegram has its own asn (https://bgp.he.net/AS62041 https://bgp.he.net/AS62041) so they are announcing the space through the cloud providers. So they would announce their space to was, hcp, azure, etc with the rpki.
- Osiris 3y agoFor those of us unfamiliar with the term, can you explain RPKI and how it helps?
- sschueller 3y agoI didn't know either but I found this little snippet: Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a security framework by which network owners can validate and secure the critical route updates or Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) announcements between public Internet networks. BGP is essentially the central nervous system of the Internet and one of its fundamental building blocks. The main function of BGP is to facilitate efficient routing between Autonomous Systems (AS), by building and maintaining the Internet routing table. The Internet routing table is effectively the navigation system of the Internet and without it, traffic would be unable to flow between its constituent networks. Unfortunately, routing equipment alone cannot distinguish between legitimate and malicious routing announcements, but network operators who implement RPKI validation and filtering can choose to reject announcements from networks not authorized to advertise those resources. In other words, RPKI is essentially a secure identification system for the BGP route information between autonomous systems.
- chaz6 3y agoBefore RPKI, any network on the internet could announce any prefix (e.g. 2001:630::/32) to any neighbour, whether they had the right to or not. With RPKI, the owner of the prefix has to authorize a network to announce the route, so this helps to prevent networks from hijacking prefixes. One caveat is that it depends upon networks checking the RPKI database when receiving prefixes from neighbours, but pretty much all the major networks do this now. For more information, there is a good article here: https://phoenixnap.com/kb/rpki https://phoenixnap.com/kb/rpki
- icedchai 3y agoMore than 50% of prefixes still don't use RPKI. See https://rpki-monitor.antd.nist.gov/ https://rpki-monitor.antd.nist.gov/ Many will likely never use it. ARIN, for example, does not allow "legacy" networks to use RPKI unless they sign a registration agreement (and start paying for the privilege.)
- almost_usual 3y agoSimilar to CAs on the web in RPKI a TA (Trust Anchor) will sign a ROA (Route Origin Authorization X.509 certificate) to certify an ASN can originate routes within an address space. There are five TAs which are RIRs (Regional Internet Registries) AFRINIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC, and RIPE. So similar to how your web browser can determine a website is valid or not by checking the certificate is signed by a CA. A network can determine a route is valid or not by checking the ROA is signed by a TA.
- salawat 3y agohttps://www.arin.net/resources/manage/rpki/ https://www.arin.net/resources/manage/rpki/ Basically, RPKI is to BGP as things like DKIM are to email, or DNSSEC is to the DNS system. Different AS's announce route prefix's to attract packets from other AS's. Orgs like ARIN and such act as trust anchors (CA's, in Web of Trust parlance) for Network operators who use RPKI clients to validate incoming BGP announcements cryptographically against the trust anchor list. The idea would be that an Iraqi telco could announce they terminate a prefix they don't, blackholing the traffic originating from within their network to those prefixes, but they wouldn't get the cryptographic vouch by their RIR, so other AS's would ignore altering their routing tables. Insulating the damage to essentially inside the network that was making the fraudulent announcement. It could even still be worked around by people internal to that network as long as they cross into another AS's routing domain, say by VPN, which would then allow traffic to route as normal. There is the argument to be made that RPKI is only as useful as the numbering authorities are capable of maintaining a strict position of neutrality. Thus is the way of all of all Trust. It is alas, the best we have.
- technocratius 3y agoSounds interesting! Can someone explain a bit in simple terms what happened here and why it's noteworthy? Thanks :)
- meltyness 3y agoPresumably whichever government is trying to identify users accessing the service, or prevent the spread of information or something.
- dilyevsky 3y agoThe way routing works on the internet very simply is a network (like an ISP or connectivity provider) will announce IP prefix and "the origin" - where to send packets matching the prefix. This mechanism is also frequently used by national ISPs to block specific destinations (like Telegram nodes) - they will announce Telegram IP prefixes to be sent to them and then will just toss the packets or try to snoop on sessions. This is known as the "BGP hijack". These announcement typically only intended for downstream providers (regional Iraqi ISPs in this case) but sometimes "leak" upstream - erroneously announced to the open internet which sometimes cause outages for the whole world. This is what famously happened with YouTube when Pakistan tried to do the same thing in 2008. In this case the routes "leaked" upstream again like what happened before but seems like outage was mostly prevented by something called RPKI which is basically a technology to attest who really owns which prefix.
- explaininjs 3y agoIs this directly at odds with the whole “the internet interprets censorship as damage and routes around it” motif?
- dilyevsky 3y agoThe internet doesn't interpret anything - it's a just a bunch of networks and technologies to pass packets around with some level of redundancy (originally to withstand nuclear strikes on the comms centers).
- PicassoCTs 3y agoOnce a ISP goes hostile, all that remains is mesh networking, and navigating data- by having encrypted packages, jump from phone to phone, based upon the wifi location the phone has been near in recent history. Then you need a zero-day, install software that turns almost all phones into nodes and there is nothing any authority can do to prevent communication ever.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- zakki 3y agoAs long as there is no phone/device in that network outside Iraq that will not work for Internet. If there is, the ISP/Government can fingerprint the traffic and block the IP of any device outside Iraq. Just like how China FW block VPN traffic. edit: Adding China FW
- PicassoCTs 3y agoWell, you don't send it in.. you just bring it in? Like something smuggled physically? Its slow, admitted, but better having that data come in on some truck driver-smuggled-ssd and reach you by hopping from phone to phone, then not at all.
- WJW 3y agoHow does that work across oceans? There's a severe lack of mesh nodes on the high seas and all high-bandwidth links across the ocean highly centralized in just a couple of companies. Also, most people would definitely not appreciate their personal devices being hijacked as a mesh network for their neighbors teen watching tiktoks or whatever. Any such zero day exploit would be patched pretty quickly.
- PicassoCTs 3y agoWell aiport traveling nodes connect across the oceans regularly. You can even predict that travel and make it a sort of routing announcement. Example: Guy living in NY on the regular, traveling once a year to cuba and back. So somebody with a message to cuba, passes it along - it rides to the airport, and hops from a employee cellphone to the guy boarding his holiday plane. Add the transmission software being a virus for plausible deniability..
- mjfl 3y agoI wonder if it’s the pro-west faction or the pro-Iran faction doing this. I could see it going both ways…