Any actual privacy must be equally efficacious to lawful and unlawful users, as being able to discern between them inherently indicates leaked data. I use Prot

Any actual privacy must be equally efficacious to lawful and unlawful users, as being able to discern between them inherently indicates leaked data. I use Proton, and the metadata they do keep unencrypted would only be useful to LE/feds if some other source (ISP, IXP, OS, etc) has given up info, which you certainly can't blame Proton for. The article is bad for trying to insinuate that responding to warrants indicates failed security, when the reality is that what you respond with is what matters, and in this case it appears to be metadata only. Warrant canaries are useless in any jurisdiction that partners with foreign police and courts. At that point, you need an "unencrypted content sharing canary".