4 ms·
It is 2023. The damage of natural disasters can be mitigated. When the San Andreas fault goes it'll probably get an entry on that list with a "why did we build
by roenxi 3y ago
It is 2023. The damage of natural disasters can be mitigated. When the San Andreas fault goes it'll probably get an entry on that list with a "why did we build so much infrastructure on this thing? Why didn't we prepare more for the inevitable?".
And this article is throwing out generic all-weather good sounding platitudes which are tangential to the disasters listed. He drew a comparison between the Challenger disaster and bitrot! Anyone who thinks that is a profound connection should avoid the role of software architect. The link is spurious. Challenger was about catastrophic management and safety practices. Bitrot is neither of those things.
I mean, if we want to learn from Douglas Adams he suggested that we can deduce the nature of all things by studying cupcakes. That is a few steps down the path from this article, but the direction is similar. It is not useful to connect random things in other fields to random things in software. Although I do appreciate the effort the gentleman went to, it is a nice site and the disasters are interesting. Just not relevantly linked to software in a meaningful way.
> We are tied 1:1 to the fate of our star and may well go down with it
I'm just going to claim that is false and live in the smug comfort that when circumstances someday prove you right neither of us will be around to argue about it. And if you can draw lessons from that which apply to practical software development then that is quite impressive.
- krisoft 3y ago> It is 2023. The damage of natural disasters can be mitigated. That is a comforting belief, but it is probably not true. We have no plan for a near-Earth supernova explosion. Not even in theory. Then there are asteroid impacts. In theory we could have plowed all of our resources into planetary defences, but in practice in 2023 we can very easily get sucker punched by a bolide and go the way of the dinosaurs.
- jacquesm 3y ago> It is 2023. So? Mistakes are still being made, every day. Nothing has changed since the stone age except for our ability - and hopefully willingness - to learn from previous mistakes. If we want to. > The damage of natural disasters can be mitigated. You wish. > When the San Andreas fault goes it'll probably get an entry on that list with a "why did we build so much infrastructure on this thing? Why didn't we prepare more for the inevitable?". Excellent questions. And in fairness to the people living on the San Andreas fault - and near volcanoes, in hurricane alley and in countries below sea level - we have an uncanny ability to ignore history. > And this article is throwing out generic all-weather good sounding platitudes which are tangential to the disasters listed. I see these errors all the time in the software world, I don't care what hook he uses to again bring them to attention but they are probably responsible for a very large fraction of all software problems. > He drew a comparison between the Challenger disaster and bitrot! So let's see your article on this subject then that will obviously do a much better job. > Anyone who thinks that is a profound connection should avoid the role of software architect. Do you care? It would be better to say that those that fail to be willing to learn from the mistakes of others should avoid the role of software architect because on balance that's where the problems come from. You seem to have a very narrow viewpoint here: that because you don't like the precision or the links that are being made that you can't appreciate the intent and the subject matter. Of course a better article could have been written and of course you are able to dismiss it entirely because of its perceived shortcomings. But that is exactly the attitude that leads to a lot of software problems: the inability to ingest information when it isn't presented in the recipients preferred form. This throws out the baby with the bath water, the authors intent is to educate you and others on the ways in which software systems break and uses something called a narrative hook to serve as a framework. That these won't match 100% is a given. Spurious connection or not, documentation and actual fact creeping out of spec aka the normalization of deviation in disguise is exactly the lesson from the Challenger disaster and if you don't like the wording I'm looking forward to your improved version. > Challenger was about catastrophic management and safety practices. That was a small but critical part in the whole, I highly recommend reading the entire report on the subject, it makes for fascinating reading, there are a great many lessons to be learned from this. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/pdf/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016.pdf https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/pdf/... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rogers_Commission_Report https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rogers_Commission_Report And many useful and interesting supporting documents. > I mean, if we want to learn from Douglas Adams he suggested that we can deduce the nature of all things by studying cupcakes. That's a complete nonsensical statement. Have you considered that your initial response to the article precludes you from getting any value from it? > It is not useful to connect random things in other fields to random things in software. But they are not random things. The normalization of deviation in whatever guise it comes is the root cause of many, many real world incidents, both in software as well as outside of it. You could argue with the wording, but not with the intent or the connection. > Although I do appreciate the effort the gentleman went to, it is a nice site and the disasters are interesting. Just not relevantly linked to software in a meaningful way. To you. But they are. > > We are tied 1:1 to the fate of our star and may well go down with it > I'm just going to claim that is false and live in the smug comfort that when circumstances someday prove you right neither of us will be around to argue about it. So, you are effectively saying that you persist in being wrong simply because the timescale works to your advantage? > And if you can draw lessons from that which apply to practical software development then that is quite impressive. Well, for starters I would argue that many software developers indeed create work that serves just long enough to hold until they've left the company and that that attitude is an excellent thing to lose and a valuable lesson to draw from this discussion.
- yuliyp 3y agoSo the article had a list of disasters and some useful lessons learned in its left and center columns. It also had lists of truisms about software engineering in the right column. They had nothing fundamental to do with each other. For instance, it tries to draw an equivalence between "Titanic's Captain Edward Smith had shown an "indifference to danger [that] was one of the direct and contributing causes of this unnecessary tragedy." and "Leading during the time of a software crisis (think production database dropped, security vulnerability found, system-wide failures etc.) requires a leader who can stay calm and composed, yet think quickly and ACT." which are completely unrelated: one is a statement about needing to evaluate risks to avoid incidents, another is talking about the type of leadership needed once an incident has already happened. Similarly, the discussion about Chernobyl is also confused: the primary lessons there are about operational hygiene, but the article draws "conclusions" about software testing which is in a completely different lifecycle phase. There are certainly lessons to be learned from past incidents both software and not, but the article linked is a poor place to do so.
- jacquesm 3y agoSo let's take those disasters and list the lessons that you would have learned from them. That's the way to constructively approach an article like this, out-of-hand dismissal is just dumb and unproductive. FWIW I've seen the leaders of software teams all the way up to the CTO run around like headless chickens during (often self inflicted) crisis. I think the biggest lesson from the Titanic is that you're never invulnerable, even when you have been designed to be invulnerable. None of these are exhaustive and all of them are open to interpretation. Good, so let's improve on them. One general takeaway: managing risk is hard, especially when working with a limited budget (which is almost always the case) and just the exercise of assessing and estimating likelihood and impact are already very valuable but plenty of organizations have never done any of that. They simply are utterly blind to the risks their org is exposed to. Case in point: a company that made in-car boxes that could be upgraded OTA. And nobody thought to verify that the vehicle wasn't in motion...
- mrguyorama 3y ago
- stonemetal12 3y agoAn Ariane 5 failed because of bitrot, so the headline comparison of rocket failures makes sense. Not testing software with new performance parameters before launch sounds like catastrophic management to me.