4 ms·
"However, a stubborn 5-10% of traffic has remained on HTTP, allowing attackers to eavesdrop on or change that data." How do we stop Google from eavsedropping o
by 1vuio0pswjnm7 3y ago
"However, a stubborn 5-10% of traffic has remained on HTTP, allowing attackers to eavesdrop on or change that data."
How do we stop Google from eavsedropping on us via data exfiltration.
Unfortunately, whether intentional or not, HTTPS assists so-called "tech" companies with exfiltration of data from computer users, which they perform on a mass scale. It inhibits computers users from monitoring the traffic, traffic that is initiated by so-called "tech" companies not the users themselves, from their computers to these so-called "tech" companies such as Google. That's a potential problem for computer users but it's an advantage for Google and other so-called "tech" companies that rely on surveillance and data collection in order to profit from online advertising services.
Many companies MiTM TLS in order to monitor data exfiltration. Today, many employees work from home. Computer users at home should be allowed to monitor the traffic leaving their home computers and travelling over their home networks.
Of the alleged 5-10% of traffic that has remained HTTP it would be useful to know how much is actually being eavesdropped on or changed. How large is this problem in comparison to the problem of data exfiltration.
The only example I know of is the case of an ISP injecting online advertising into web pages. When an ISP attempted to inject ads into HTTP, the public responded. The ISP was caught out, immediately. However with data exfiltration protected from public scrutiny via HTTPS, Google can continue to avoid such public objection.
Whether it is an ISP injecting ads or Google collecting data to provide services to others who want to inject "personalised" ads, the goal is the same: to profit from annoying users with online ads.
Unlike speculative problems of eavesdropping and data manipulation associated with 5-10% of Chrome traffic using HTTP, the amount of useful commercial surveillance data being exiltrated from Chrome is a real and daily occurrence for hundreds of millions of computer users.
Chrome's TLS roadblocks and warnings to prevent any and all computer users from acting as their own certificate authorities in order to monitor the traffic from their computers via Chrome are especially dubious.
Please do not misinterpret this comment. I am not against TLS or HTTPS. I am in favour of respecting the choice of some users to act as their own CAs in certain situations, for certain purposes. I am against "forced delegation of trust". Everyone has a right to trust themselves as opposed to completely delegating all trust to Google and the commercial CA business. This should be a choice made by the computer user, not Google. Trust is a two-way street. If computer users "trust" Google, then Google must trust computer users.
- agwa 3y agoJust a couple weeks ago I wanted to inspect some of the HTTPS traffic that Chrome was sending to Google. All I had to do was set the SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable, and Chrome wrote the TLS session keys to this file. I told Wireshark the location of this file, and then sniffing the traffic was just as easy as sniffing unencrypted traffic. It's also possible to add your own CA to Chrome's trust store and MitM the HTTPS traffic from Chrome. I don't know what these "TLS roadblocks and warnings to prevent any and all computer users from acting as their own certificate authorities" are. It's simply not true that Chrome is erecting roadblocks to monitoring your own traffic. Rather, they're trying to make sure that your traffic cannot be monitored without your consent. If you're in favor of user choice, you should be in favor of this.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- saurik 3y agoIn a world with WebDRM (aka the Web Environment Integrity BS) if you are modifying the environment like that it should fail the attestation and the web app that wants to exfiltrate data would just refuse you service.
- 1vuio0pswjnm7 3y agoFurther reading: https://httptoolkit.tech/blog/chrome-android-certificate-transparency/ https://httptoolkit.tech/blog/chrome-android-certificate-tra... https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31341997 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31341997