3 ms·
Hmm, so essentially it's sampling times from different servers it thinks are unlikely to be conspiring, and those times are not as reliable as expected. Since
by Terr_ 3y ago
Hmm, so essentially it's sampling times from different servers it thinks are unlikely to be conspiring, and those times are not as reliable as expected.
Since it's fun to imagine (and then find flaws in proposals) here's an idea for y'all:
1. If the device reaches out to a dozen servers at different usually-trustable domains (e.g. microsoft.com, nist.gov) and they _all_ have "expired" certificates, that becomes a sign that My Local Time Is Unreliable. (Or that the machine is being booted up by an attacker who has connected it to a fake micro-internet.)
2. The Windows device contains a cert or public key which does not auto-expire based on clock-time, but is only replaced as a side-effect of OS patches. This cert/key exists for one specific purpose, allowing it to securely get a time from an MS time fallback server. Such a server would not normally be queried, and can have very relaxed performance/accuracy/uptime requirements. It could literally just be a GET call returning a epoch integer.
3. This way the client system can bootstrap up to something close-enough-to-current that the regular NTP process can be completed for a more-precise time.
Obviously this can fail if the attacker injects a fake cert/key into the machine... but at that point isn't it Game Over anyway? The same attacker could just put in their own certificate authority for any service.
It may not work for computers that are left unplugged and unpatched for a few years, but it sounds like the real issue are live servers, or ones that just suffered some power-supply hiccup.