4 ms·
That feature is simply insane. How did MS think this was a good idea? To address the issue they were trying to address (what happens when a mission critical se
by JohnFen 3y ago
That feature is simply insane. How did MS think this was a good idea?
To address the issue they were trying to address (what happens when a mission critical server's RTC malfunctions or the battery dies?), Windows should treat it no differently than any other hardware malfunction in a mission-critical server: raise an alarm so a system operator can take a look and address the issue.
- pmontra 3y agoFrom the article > “The false assumption is that most SSL implementations return the server time,” Simen said. “This was probably true in a Microsoft-only ecosystem back when they implemented it, but at that time [when STS was introduced], OpenSSL was already sending random data instead.” And they link the reason for sending random data at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/_clS-TIIlZUcid_2S4WPej9iMWk/ https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/_clS-TIIlZUcid_2S4... The post starts with > Here's something I wrote about removing a fingerprinting opportunity from the current TLS protocol. So the point is not that it was a bad idea, it is that MS didn't keep up with the world and didn't respond to requests from their customers to fix the problem.
- JohnFen 3y agoYes, I read that. I think that if you're making mission-critical systems rely on nonguaranteed behavior from systems you don't control, then it's a Bad Idea.
- biogene 3y agoThe point is that it was guaranteed behavior before the spec was changed. As an aside, I do find it amusing that the memo was co-authored by a Googler. Google has the best fingerprinting & tracking tech baked into their core products. I guess they don't want competition! :) https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mathewson-no-gmtunixtime-00.txt https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mathewson-no-gmtunixti...
- JohnFen 3y agoAh, right you are. My brain wasn't letting that sink in yesterday.
- rcme 3y agoI mean it still seems like a bad idea
- cratermoon 3y agoYeah, when I read about SSL returning the server time I thought of fingerprinting, and I'm glad to see that it was removed. The reason giving for using it – PRNG completely broken – gave me a WTF moment, too. A broken PRNG is gonna cause a lot more trouble in SSL (TLS) than a non-random random field.
- misnome 3y agoBut, their _starting position_ is that they can't trust the network > “Since the device is not in a state to communicate securely over the network, it cannot obtain time securely over the network as well, unless you choose to ignore network security or at least punch some holes into it by making exceptions.” So, because they can't trust the network, or the time, they instead choose to randomly trust some of the requests over the network. But it's okay because they rely on the certificate from that request to report whether it has been revoked or not.
- gopher_space 3y ago> That feature is simply insane. It really feels like someone's thought experiment that was cargo-culted into production. Timestamps are truthy to begin with, and mission-critical systems are designed to die and be reborn anew like the common Phoenix. Physical issues that might come up are addressed in the spec and logical issues stop everything they touch. At no point have I ever hoped that a third party would start pumping garbage into the problem.
- dismalpedigree 3y agoEver heard of the good idea fairy? Seems like a perfect example.
- tiffanyg 3y agoBaldrick, is that you? https://youtu.be/AsXKS8Nyu8Q https://youtu.be/AsXKS8Nyu8Q (Whatever other representations there are of "The Good Idea Fairy", I can't help but think of Baldrick and his "cunning plans".)