> If the user ever needs to switch between the two versions, then the non-App Store version needs access to the App Store version's container. If you resist sa

> If the user ever needs to switch between the two versions, then the non-App Store version needs access to the App Store version's container. If you resist sandboxing, yes, but the idea is to have the non-app store app sandboxed, too. If so, that would (at worst; possibly, the two binaries can be identical) be a one-time dialog, wouldn’t it? > So now there would be a scary dialog every time the main application is launched and needs to access the container of the sub-application. Isn’t that what the sections “Share file access between processes with URL bookmarks” or “Persist access to files with security-scoped URL bookmarks” cover? Launch a subprocess to do the dangerous thing, and have that send back such an url to the main process. TLDR: I may be overlooking something, but I think Apple’s message is that they want all apps to be sandboxed (for what you call fear mongering about security, but I think opinions will differ on that), and are willing to take collateral damage of making non-sandboxed applications harder to use.