While I don't disagree that it's a long time, the lack of further incidents in 2019 suggests it was well mitigated early on, and the lack of incidents at other

While I don't disagree that it's a long time, the lack of further incidents in 2019 suggests it was well mitigated early on, and the lack of incidents at other airports suggests there wasn't an imminent threat to flight safety. So the primary purpose of the investigation and report is as a learning exercise for improving future safety. For pilots there isn't a lot to learn here, since the possibility of failing to capture the LOC is already known, trained for and monitored for during flight (which is why the incidents didn't result in flying into a mountain), and the reason for the failure to capture the LOC doesn't really change the actions taken in response. For software implementors, there is plenty to learn [0], but given the relatively small number of organisations implementing autoflight software for transport category aircraft, it's likely they were already well aware of what went on here. So the final report is then to some extent just ticking a regulatory box (and informing the public). [0] I'm actually somewhat surprised they don't have automated tests that simulate every single STAR leading to every single approach at every single major airport worldwide. Or maybe they do, but the simulation lacked the accuracy to simulate this aspect.