Thank you, that was the explanation I was looking for. > awareness of a risk—and even moreso “common knowledge”—is very far from enough to show specific intent

Thank you, that was the explanation I was looking for. > awareness of a risk—and even moreso “common knowledge”—is very far from enough to show specific intent (if it was a recklessness or criminal negligence standard, that'd be more useful.) Can it not be proven that any reasonable person would interpret doxxing, especially when hostile intent by the doxxer can be proven, as intent to have others cause harm? Is the criminal standard of intent that it has to be specific with respect to who would cause harm? Isn't it enough that the victim and hostility are specific and provable? If you yell fire in a crowd for example, you don't know who will panic and stampede over others but the common knowledge that a stampede might happen is enough, you can't just say "it's a prank". That was the line of thinking I had.