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In this case - the plane was rapidly descending, and the pilots were completely failing to do anything to fix the situation. Maybe at some point it became clea
by skissane 3y ago
In this case - the plane was rapidly descending, and the pilots were completely failing to do anything to fix the situation.
Maybe at some point it became clear that the pilots were doing nothing to actually save the plane, and then the computer could have been justified in ignoring them, and trying to solve the problem itself?
> If you say 'The computer', I'll have to ask you: How well did that work out for the 346 people killed by Boeing's MCAS, which, thanks to a faulty sensor, was utterly convinced that the 737 was too nose-up, and happily flew the damn thing right into the ground.
Because the programming of that computer was criminally stupid. It continued making an assumption despite the fact that the other evidence it had available to it was sufficient to conclude the assumption was false, but it wasn’t programmed to consider any of that other evidence. That a computer with crap software kills people is a problem with that crap software (and the failed regulatory system that allowed it), and not evidence against any proposal not involving such software
- vkou 3y agoAnd maybe in JT 610 and ET 302, the pilots should have been justified in ignoring the Boeing computer, which was making bad decisions based on a faulty sensor reading, and was trying its damn hardest to fly the plane into the ground (And succeeded, killing everyone on board, despite the best efforts of the pilots). How about we let the system whose sensors are functioning ultimately be in charge?
- bombcar 3y agoAt some point you have to have "disconnect everything, I'm going to fly this by hand" situations where the pilot can kill everyone (intentionally or no). The goal is to reduce those as far as possible, and we may be at or close to the point where any further improvements in one area cause problems in others. But I still think this particular situation could have been helped somehow. Maybe planes need emergency deployable pitot tubes like they have emergency backup ram air turbines for power.
- vkou 3y agoA million different things would have helped in this particular situation. A stall warning that doesn't suddenly cut out when the plane exceeds a particular angle of attack [1] (That's an automation failure!). Emergency pilot tubes (That prevents the plane from dropping out of normal law!). Better pilot tubes (That prevents the plane from dropping out of normal law!) A pilot that actually received proper training (That's a human failure!). Not averaging control inputs between the pilot and the copilot (That's a design failure!). I don't think the takeaway from this is 'In an emergency situation, where the plane knows that it can't make good decisions, it should lock the pilots out and try to fly itself.' By definition, if the plane knew how to fly itself, it wouldn't be an emergency situation! ---- [1] If the plane is so confused that it can't even detect that its in a stall[2], I can't trust it to fly itself. [2] The stall alarm would turn off when the plane was stalling, and would turn on when it was recovering from a stall!
- bombcar 3y agoYeah, any crash has any number of things that would have prevented it, and Airbus has had issues with the computer knowing better before (the famous airshow crash, for example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_296Q https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_296Q - the pilot wasn't allowed to stall the plane and it crashed; however if he HAD been allowed to stall the plane it probably would have crashed in a slightly different way).
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- skissane 3y agoAs I said, MCAS was badly designed software - the computer would have had information from other sensors from which it would have been able to infer that it was crashing the plane, but it wasn’t programmed to consider them. Badly designed software is not an argument against computers, it is an argument against badly designed software