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I fly a desk herding cats, I mean devs, for a living now. But as a Navy-trained aviator, this and the Colgan Air mishap in Buffalo always make me cringe. I ca

I fly a desk herding cats, I mean devs, for a living now. But as a Navy-trained aviator, this and the Colgan Air mishap in Buffalo always make me cringe. I can't entirely judge the crew, because the human mind is a strange thing that has ways of rationalizing truly abnormal situations and behavior. That said, an obvious Crew Resource Management failure compounded the issues here. That said, I believe aerobatics and out-of-control flight training need to be a lot more common in the civilian sector for professional pilots than they are. Awareness of your angle of attack, and knowledge of how an aircraft behaves at high AOA close to (and if possible beyond) stall don't seem to be taught well in the civilian sector, or at least outside the tactical jet community. The idea that a professional pilot can't understand that a deeply stalled aircraft can be nose-up and still have a heinous sink rate is profoundly bothering to me, just like the Colgan Air pilots who couldn't recognize severe wing rock as a sign of a deeply-departed state. Both of these required (if even possible at that point) aggressive nose-down pitch inputs to break the AOA. And even then, the aircraft is going to lose a ridiculous amount of altitude before it gains enough airspeed back to give you enough pitch authority to scoop out of the ensuing dive. Horrible. It also boggles my mind that Airbus didn't think at first to design an aircraft which avoided the split control problem they had. One person and one person only needs to be in control of the aircraft at all times.

molenzwiebel 3y ago
Time and time again we learn that people do stupid things under stress. Consider Transair flight 810 [1], in which a simple engine failure during takeoff results in a complete loss of the aircraft when both pilots mistakenly identify the _wrong_ engine as malfunctioning, despite identifying the failure correctly only minutes earlier. OP has an article on that crash too, actually [2]. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transair_Flight_810 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transair_Flight_810 [2]: https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/dark-waters-of-self-delusion-the-crash-of-transair-flight-810-a4eeb033bc00 https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/dark-waters-of-self-delu...
- psunavy03 3y ago
  Another very common failure mode, and really all you can do is mandate an SOP that the crew member vocalizes which engine they're turning off, and the other crew member verifies that it's the correct engine. The other answer to "people do stupid things under stress" is the common maxim that every emergency procedure in every aircraft starts the same way. Somewhere in the cockpit is probably a standard-issue mechanical 8-day clock, and the first thing you do in any emergency is stop and wind the clock. Not because it does anything to the aircraft, precisely the opposite. It makes you stop for a second or two for the "oh shit" moment to pass. Then you analyze what's actually going on. The other saying that's always briefed is "no fast hands in the cockpit." You may need to be expeditious, but you still vocalize what you're doing with your crew or wingman and methodically go through the emergency procedure. You get in a lot more trouble flipping switches willy-nilly based on what you think you have than if you just stop, breathe, and look at what the aircraft is telling you. I still can recite the steps from memory: - Maintain aircraft control - Analyze the situation - Apply the appropriate emergency procedure(s) - Land when conditions permit
  - logifail 3y ago
    > The other answer to "people do stupid things under stress" is the common maxim that every emergency procedure in every aircraft starts the same way A good friend of mine [UK-based] used to fly fast jets for the RAF a long time ago (we're talking Lightning/Jaguar/Tornado). He recently commented to me that "there were operational deployments where it went from boring to bedlam in the blink of an eye much of the time"... Teaching humans how better to manage going from boring to bedlam is the key, I think.
  - orange_fritter 3y ago
    I see a lot of Navy pilots say "fingers and toes" to ground themselves, prevent white-knuckling, and as a "reality check". I started doing it in moments in life where I recognize that I am getting intense or lost in the moment. I've even used the phrase to calm other people down. Random example: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/kim-kc-campbell_a-10-pilot-recalls-close-call-in-baghdad-activity-7070045440313827329-jfAZ https://www.linkedin.com/posts/kim-kc-campbell_a-10-pilot-re...
turnsout 3y ago
To be fair, it sounds like this crash caused airlines and regulators to demand much more adverse event training, including high-altitude stall recovery. But according to the article, Airbus hasn't addressed the split control issue…
- local_issues 3y ago
  There isn't a "split control issue," the split control setup is fundamental to the way the Airbus control schema works. Changing it would be a non-starter.
  - mholt 3y ago
    According to the author, the split control design mitigated communication between pilots, since one cannot feel what the other is doing. That seems like a crucial functional omission.
  - ericbarrett 3y ago
    It seems like an avionics warning—“conflicting control input” or the like—would go a long way here, and not change anything fundamental. Maybe Airbus implemented that since?
    - cccbbbaaa 3y ago
      There is an audible “dual input”, which was triggered on this flight.
      - ericbarrett 3y ago
        Interesting, thanks! I’ve read a few accounts of this crash and never picked up on that.
        Mawr 3y ago
        Note that hearing is one of the first things that stop working when a human is under stress [1]. [1]: https://youtu.be/Dl-Fl66Jfao?t=1674 https://youtu.be/Dl-Fl66Jfao?t=1674
rwmj 3y ago
Isn't "Upset" training now mandatory for civilian pilots, partly because of AF447? https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/faq/44870 https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/faq/44870
- scarier 3y ago
  In the US, spin recovery training is mandatory for flight instructors. That’s the only requirement I’m aware of, although all pilots do get some relatively basic training in unusual attitude recovery.
- sandworm101 3y ago
  Upset and departure are different things. Some aircraft can seem strait and level, but still be fully departed and falling like a rock. This won't happen in a Cessna trainer. It is normally associated with faster aircraft. The F-16 famously has a deep stall mode that sees it fall like a pancake for many thousand feet, with little hope of recovery at low altitudes.
- sokoloff 3y ago
  Upset Prevention and Recovery Training is mandatory for FAA Part 121 (Air Carriers) flight crew. It is not required for Part 91 (General Aviation/"Private") or Part 135 (Charter) operators. https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_120-111_CHG_1.pdf https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/...
jandrese 3y ago
Maybe not even acrobatic flying training but glider training. Pilots with glider experience are some of the best performers in emergencies.
- quacked 3y ago
  I used to fly hang gliders. For almost every issue (except for flying too fast), when you get into trouble in a glider you lower your AoA and increase speed.
- dreamcompiler 3y ago
  I wish glider training was mandatory for every professional pilot. Nobody really learns to fly until they can fly without an engine.
- whinenot 3y ago
  Sully's 'Miracle on the Hudson' is (largely?) attributed to his skill as a glider pilot.[0] [0]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US_Airways_Flight_1549 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US_Airways_Flight_1549
  - flyinghamster 3y ago
    Also, Air Canada Flight 143, the Gimli Glider. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gimli_Glider https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gimli_Glider
    - Mawr 3y ago
      Also, TACA Flight 110 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TACA_Flight_110 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TACA_Flight_110 Gliding skill highlight: https://youtu.be/H5UUr9RXfTY?t=1312 https://youtu.be/H5UUr9RXfTY?t=1312
- marvin 3y ago
  You certainly learn to pay attention to the aerodynamics. Lots and lots and lots of high-bank turns. Many of them relatively low and close to stalling speed. Some occasionally below stalling speed, if you're high enough to safely reduce margins so much that a gust of tailwind puts you below, which requires you to just calmly follow through with constant angle of attack, descending, rather than force the nose up. Short-field landings in unfamiliar places, requiring judgements of both approach angle and terrain. Moderate to heavy turbulence all day, speed varying from stalling to redline. Retractable landing gear. Flaps if you want that source of mental load too, in all speed regimes. Constant consideration of wind. One shot landings. Mountain flying with constant consideration of where the safe exit is. Consideration of deteriorating weather. Always aware of nearest landing site. It's really non-stop training in all the fundamental parts of flying, minus engine operation, airspace and ATC communication.
ghaff 3y ago
Never been anything especially serious fortunately but I lose track of the number of times when something I've seen just didn't square with my current mental model of the physical world (like what day it was to give a trivial example) and, even though I consciously noted the observance, I've basically deep-sixed it into the "that's weird" can.
- bobbylarrybobby 3y ago
  Holy crap, this. I've been trying to force myself to pay attention to my “that's weird”s but really struggle to do so. Anyone have any tips?
kikokikokiko 3y ago
I have zero flying experience, but man, just by playing Pilotwings on the SNES and Ace Combat on the PSX, it's ingrained in me that when you stall any aircraft, be it a hang glider or a fighter jet, you put your nose down, gain speed and recover your aircraft. I am Brazilian, and since the first time I read the accident report I couldn't believe how a professional pilot could keep pitching the nose up for minutes on end on a stall situation. It made me A LOT less thrusting of the aviation industry capacity to take me safely from point A to point B.
- jstarfish 3y ago
  My lack of credentials are identical to yours (fuck Lance) but this is way too harsh. When you witness a car veer off the side of the road, "what a moron, why didn't they just turn the wheel" is a logical question, but in reality the driver may have thought to do so and been physically unable to correct a power steering failure in time. The SNES controller had 8 buttons and was operated from the safety of your couch. I'd imagine trying to correct this sort of situation is more like playing Microsoft Flight Simulator, while you're on a roller coaster, with random features of the plane not working, hypoxia clouding your judgment, and knowing 100+ lives are at stake if you fuck anything up.
  - kikokikokiko 3y ago
    All of your arguments are pretty valid, but still it DOES NOT excuse Bonin for keeping the damn joystick pointing the nose UP for MINUTES on end. At some point in time you must reflect upon what you are doing. If my hypothetical car needed to do a turn right, and I keep pointing the steering wheel left for many minutes and still do not realize that what I am doing is antithetical to what I want to happen, the blame is on me. I place the blame for this accident 75% on the crew, and 25% on the stupid design decisions made by Airbus. Averaging control inputs is an inexcusable design decision, and not mechanically linking the controls is the cherry on top. If those 2 design decicions weren't made, hundreds of lives wouldn't have been lost that day, even with the amazing level of incompetence shown by Bonin et all. And every Airbus flying nowadays still have this fatal flaw.
7952 3y ago
Although they were not just hand flying. They were hand flying at a moments notice in IMC with faulty instrument data in a highly complex system. That combination of factors does seem to be a huge risk factor for accidents. I wonder if reverting back to pilot control is really the best approach in situations with faulty instruments. Perhaps it would be safer to use algorithms that can deal with bad data in a sane way. A middle ground between blindly trusting bad data (as in 737 max) and reverting to the pilot. Use other data like GPS, accelerometers, strain sensors ,fuel flow rate sensors, to sense check the primary instruments.
polynomial 3y ago
It is profoundly disturbing, but we do live in an age where everything is simulated, including expertise. How much time did Captain Dubois have to save the aircraft once he was on deck? Seems like Bolin had mostly doomed them by then.
deleted 3y ago
[deleted]

molenzwiebel 3y ago

Time and time again we learn that people do stupid things under stress. Consider Transair flight 810 [1], in which a simple engine failure during takeoff results in a complete loss of the aircraft when both pilots mistakenly identify the _wrong_ engine as malfunctioning, despite identifying the failure correctly only minutes earlier. OP has an article on that crash too, actually [2]. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transair_Flight_810 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transair_Flight_810 [2]: https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/dark-waters-of-self-delusion-the-crash-of-transair-flight-810-a4eeb033bc00 https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/dark-waters-of-self-delu...

psunavy03 3y ago
Another very common failure mode, and really all you can do is mandate an SOP that the crew member vocalizes which engine they're turning off, and the other crew member verifies that it's the correct engine. The other answer to "people do stupid things under stress" is the common maxim that every emergency procedure in every aircraft starts the same way. Somewhere in the cockpit is probably a standard-issue mechanical 8-day clock, and the first thing you do in any emergency is stop and wind the clock. Not because it does anything to the aircraft, precisely the opposite. It makes you stop for a second or two for the "oh shit" moment to pass. Then you analyze what's actually going on. The other saying that's always briefed is "no fast hands in the cockpit." You may need to be expeditious, but you still vocalize what you're doing with your crew or wingman and methodically go through the emergency procedure. You get in a lot more trouble flipping switches willy-nilly based on what you think you have than if you just stop, breathe, and look at what the aircraft is telling you. I still can recite the steps from memory: - Maintain aircraft control - Analyze the situation - Apply the appropriate emergency procedure(s) - Land when conditions permit
- logifail 3y ago
  > The other answer to "people do stupid things under stress" is the common maxim that every emergency procedure in every aircraft starts the same way A good friend of mine [UK-based] used to fly fast jets for the RAF a long time ago (we're talking Lightning/Jaguar/Tornado). He recently commented to me that "there were operational deployments where it went from boring to bedlam in the blink of an eye much of the time"... Teaching humans how better to manage going from boring to bedlam is the key, I think.
- orange_fritter 3y ago
  I see a lot of Navy pilots say "fingers and toes" to ground themselves, prevent white-knuckling, and as a "reality check". I started doing it in moments in life where I recognize that I am getting intense or lost in the moment. I've even used the phrase to calm other people down. Random example: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/kim-kc-campbell_a-10-pilot-recalls-close-call-in-baghdad-activity-7070045440313827329-jfAZ https://www.linkedin.com/posts/kim-kc-campbell_a-10-pilot-re...

turnsout 3y ago

To be fair, it sounds like this crash caused airlines and regulators to demand much more adverse event training, including high-altitude stall recovery. But according to the article, Airbus hasn't addressed the split control issue…

local_issues 3y ago
There isn't a "split control issue," the split control setup is fundamental to the way the Airbus control schema works. Changing it would be a non-starter.
- mholt 3y ago
  According to the author, the split control design mitigated communication between pilots, since one cannot feel what the other is doing. That seems like a crucial functional omission.
- ericbarrett 3y ago
  It seems like an avionics warning—“conflicting control input” or the like—would go a long way here, and not change anything fundamental. Maybe Airbus implemented that since?
  - cccbbbaaa 3y ago
    There is an audible “dual input”, which was triggered on this flight.
    - ericbarrett 3y ago
      Interesting, thanks! I’ve read a few accounts of this crash and never picked up on that.
      - Mawr 3y ago
        Note that hearing is one of the first things that stop working when a human is under stress [1]. [1]: https://youtu.be/Dl-Fl66Jfao?t=1674 https://youtu.be/Dl-Fl66Jfao?t=1674

rwmj 3y ago

Isn't "Upset" training now mandatory for civilian pilots, partly because of AF447? https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/faq/44870 https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/faq/44870

scarier 3y ago
In the US, spin recovery training is mandatory for flight instructors. That’s the only requirement I’m aware of, although all pilots do get some relatively basic training in unusual attitude recovery.
sandworm101 3y ago
Upset and departure are different things. Some aircraft can seem strait and level, but still be fully departed and falling like a rock. This won't happen in a Cessna trainer. It is normally associated with faster aircraft. The F-16 famously has a deep stall mode that sees it fall like a pancake for many thousand feet, with little hope of recovery at low altitudes.
sokoloff 3y ago
Upset Prevention and Recovery Training is mandatory for FAA Part 121 (Air Carriers) flight crew. It is not required for Part 91 (General Aviation/"Private") or Part 135 (Charter) operators. https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_120-111_CHG_1.pdf https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/...

jandrese 3y ago

Maybe not even acrobatic flying training but glider training. Pilots with glider experience are some of the best performers in emergencies.

quacked 3y ago
I used to fly hang gliders. For almost every issue (except for flying too fast), when you get into trouble in a glider you lower your AoA and increase speed.
dreamcompiler 3y ago
I wish glider training was mandatory for every professional pilot. Nobody really learns to fly until they can fly without an engine.
whinenot 3y ago
Sully's 'Miracle on the Hudson' is (largely?) attributed to his skill as a glider pilot.[0] [0]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US_Airways_Flight_1549 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US_Airways_Flight_1549
- flyinghamster 3y ago
  Also, Air Canada Flight 143, the Gimli Glider. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gimli_Glider https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gimli_Glider
  - Mawr 3y ago
    Also, TACA Flight 110 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TACA_Flight_110 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TACA_Flight_110 Gliding skill highlight: https://youtu.be/H5UUr9RXfTY?t=1312 https://youtu.be/H5UUr9RXfTY?t=1312
marvin 3y ago
You certainly learn to pay attention to the aerodynamics. Lots and lots and lots of high-bank turns. Many of them relatively low and close to stalling speed. Some occasionally below stalling speed, if you're high enough to safely reduce margins so much that a gust of tailwind puts you below, which requires you to just calmly follow through with constant angle of attack, descending, rather than force the nose up. Short-field landings in unfamiliar places, requiring judgements of both approach angle and terrain. Moderate to heavy turbulence all day, speed varying from stalling to redline. Retractable landing gear. Flaps if you want that source of mental load too, in all speed regimes. Constant consideration of wind. One shot landings. Mountain flying with constant consideration of where the safe exit is. Consideration of deteriorating weather. Always aware of nearest landing site. It's really non-stop training in all the fundamental parts of flying, minus engine operation, airspace and ATC communication.

ghaff 3y ago

Never been anything especially serious fortunately but I lose track of the number of times when something I've seen just didn't square with my current mental model of the physical world (like what day it was to give a trivial example) and, even though I consciously noted the observance, I've basically deep-sixed it into the "that's weird" can.

bobbylarrybobby 3y ago
Holy crap, this. I've been trying to force myself to pay attention to my “that's weird”s but really struggle to do so. Anyone have any tips?

kikokikokiko 3y ago

I have zero flying experience, but man, just by playing Pilotwings on the SNES and Ace Combat on the PSX, it's ingrained in me that when you stall any aircraft, be it a hang glider or a fighter jet, you put your nose down, gain speed and recover your aircraft. I am Brazilian, and since the first time I read the accident report I couldn't believe how a professional pilot could keep pitching the nose up for minutes on end on a stall situation. It made me A LOT less thrusting of the aviation industry capacity to take me safely from point A to point B.

jstarfish 3y ago
My lack of credentials are identical to yours (fuck Lance) but this is way too harsh. When you witness a car veer off the side of the road, "what a moron, why didn't they just turn the wheel" is a logical question, but in reality the driver may have thought to do so and been physically unable to correct a power steering failure in time. The SNES controller had 8 buttons and was operated from the safety of your couch. I'd imagine trying to correct this sort of situation is more like playing Microsoft Flight Simulator, while you're on a roller coaster, with random features of the plane not working, hypoxia clouding your judgment, and knowing 100+ lives are at stake if you fuck anything up.
- kikokikokiko 3y ago
  All of your arguments are pretty valid, but still it DOES NOT excuse Bonin for keeping the damn joystick pointing the nose UP for MINUTES on end. At some point in time you must reflect upon what you are doing. If my hypothetical car needed to do a turn right, and I keep pointing the steering wheel left for many minutes and still do not realize that what I am doing is antithetical to what I want to happen, the blame is on me. I place the blame for this accident 75% on the crew, and 25% on the stupid design decisions made by Airbus. Averaging control inputs is an inexcusable design decision, and not mechanically linking the controls is the cherry on top. If those 2 design decicions weren't made, hundreds of lives wouldn't have been lost that day, even with the amazing level of incompetence shown by Bonin et all. And every Airbus flying nowadays still have this fatal flaw.

7952 3y ago

Although they were not just hand flying. They were hand flying at a moments notice in IMC with faulty instrument data in a highly complex system. That combination of factors does seem to be a huge risk factor for accidents. I wonder if reverting back to pilot control is really the best approach in situations with faulty instruments. Perhaps it would be safer to use algorithms that can deal with bad data in a sane way. A middle ground between blindly trusting bad data (as in 737 max) and reverting to the pilot. Use other data like GPS, accelerometers, strain sensors ,fuel flow rate sensors, to sense check the primary instruments.

polynomial 3y ago

It is profoundly disturbing, but we do live in an age where everything is simulated, including expertise. How much time did Captain Dubois have to save the aircraft once he was on deck? Seems like Bolin had mostly doomed them by then.

deleted 3y ago

[deleted]