4 ms·
> The most an attacker might be able to view is the addresses of the sites you are connecting to. With TLS 1.2 or earlier the attacker can almost certainly dis
by tialaramex 3y ago
> The most an attacker might be able to view is the addresses of the sites you are connecting to.
With TLS 1.2 or earlier the attacker can almost certainly discern the real DNS name of the site you're connecting to, in TLS 1.3 this is merely likely (and ECH might some day largely eliminate this risk) but not certain depending on how you connect.
In practice your client hates wasting bandwidth and so precise size measurements are also surprisingly effective. If six people who I'm snooping watch movies from the Fast & Furious franchise on a streaming service and one watches "The Imitation Game" I can tell them apart with more or less 100% reliability. If they all read Wikipedia, six looking at stuff about dinosaurs and one reading about the Senate Intelligence Committee report on CIA torture, I can tell again.
Clients (e.g. your web browser) could do more to hamper this, but they do almost nothing. For example, suppose I'm sending an encrypted HTTP request with some data in it, and it'll fit easily into 4 Ethernet packets. I could pad that last packet so it's always full, and have the decryption step remove that padding for free but clients don't bother, so a bad guy can measure how long my data is to within maybe 16 bytes.