Putting boot signing and “OS integrity control” aside, current iteration of TPM devices are not this intrusive. They allow me to generate and/or store keys and

Putting boot signing and “OS integrity control” aside, current iteration of TPM devices are not this intrusive. They allow me to generate and/or store keys and do cryptographic things with these keys securely. They store my information locally, and if implemented right, this data can’t leave that chip. Even OS integrity check is done locally. You can’t ask arbitrary measurements out of it. WEI is different. Rules come from outside. Acceptable parameters are decided by another party. You have no pieces of the system in your possession. You are a Furby forced to tell something with the will of the attester through the filter tuned and configured elsewhere. I can disable TPM or force it to reset itself if I want to. Even Apple’s security processors can be wiped clean of your data. WEI is not like that.