15 ms·
> Can you imagine what would happen if a bank actually trusted a client device and then somebody broke the attestation? That's not how ATMs work. I was more th
by mschuster91 3y ago
> Can you imagine what would happen if a bank actually trusted a client device and then somebody broke the attestation? That's not how ATMs work.
I was more thinking about insider attacks aka maintenance people (or thieves with a good drill) inserting a malware-loaded USB stick that instructs the ATM to dump out money [1]. RA could be used as an additional safeguard here.
[1] https://www.hackread.com/security-expert-hacks-atm-by-drilling-a-hole/ https://www.hackread.com/security-expert-hacks-atm-by-drilli...
- AnthonyMouse 3y agoSo the thieves have physical access to the ATM, and power tools. Why do they need the computer to do anything? Drill into the thing and supply power to the actuators that spit out the money. Not only that, what is remote attestation supposed to do against a purely local attack like that? The attacker doesn't have to prove anything to the server. The local machine they've compromised is the one that directly controls dispensing the cash.
- mschuster91 3y ago> So the thieves have physical access to the ATM, and power tools. Why do they need the computer to do anything? It's easier to hack into the computer using an exposed USB port than to drill up the safe - its control electronics are usually well defended which means you have to spend way more time which may raise suspicion. > Not only that, what is remote attestation supposed to do against a purely local attack like that? The attacker doesn't have to prove anything to the server. RA could be used to verify what exactly is running on the computer, if done correctly.