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>e.g. anti-circumvention laws that prohibit a competitor from achieving compatibility by bypassing remote attestation I have a feeling you are misunderstanding
by charcircuit 3y ago
>e.g. anti-circumvention laws that prohibit a competitor from achieving compatibility by bypassing remote attestation
I have a feeling you are misunderstanding remote attestation. Unless you are suggesting an Android competitor should harvest the keys from Play certified android phones and inject them into their own phones. Remote attestation does not affect the compatibility of software running on the system. It affects the ability of a third party server from being able to tell if your phone is running software the server trusts. If an app chooses to support only Play certified devices you will need to convince them that is worth supporting your phones too and you may need to provide your own remote attestation API. Perhaps support can be made easier if there was an intermediate API that wrapped a bunch of other remote attestation APIs and made it easier for apps to decide which they trust as opposed to needing to spend extra engineering time in adding support.
- mschuster91 3y agoWe should have laws that ban mandatory (i.e. something gets disabled if not present) remote attestation and secure boot for consumer and most business devices and software, period. The only place where RA should be allowed is purely business oriented embedded devices like bank ATMs that actually need the security guarantees.
- AnthonyMouse 3y agoIn general it should just be smashed into smithereens by a thousand hammers, because it can't be trusted with anything important anyway. Can you imagine what would happen if a bank actually trusted a client device and then somebody broke the attestation? That's not how ATMs work. You make a deposit and the funds are not available the same day, and it's not because their computers are too slow. The only thing it's good for is anti-competitive prohibitions on interoperability, which only works if the law makes it illegal for competitors to extract the keys and use them.
- charcircuit 3y ago>Can you imagine what would happen if a bank actually trusted a client device and then somebody broke the attestation? Security isn't binary. Attestation makes the attack more expensive to carry out and less likely to happen. Businesses want to minimize risk. They understand that risk always will exist.
- AnthonyMouse 3y agoAttestation has a minimal effect on risk because the probability of a device being compromised is high and scales with the value of compromising the device. It isn't necessary when the value is low and it isn't sufficient when the value is high. There is no place for it.
- charcircuit 3y agoThen you might as well give up on all security then if you are going to assume any security will be bypassed. Breaking attestation is not easy to do and increases the cost of a successful attack.
- AnthonyMouse 3y agoRemote attestation has a track record of being bypassed, unlike e.g. AES. To the point that Intel abandoned SGX in Core processors because it just kept getting broken. There are security models that actually work. Alice and Bob want to communicate over a non-private channel, Alice encrypts her data with a key she shares with Bob, Eve has to do an infeasible amount of computation to decipher it because she doesn't have the key. Alice wants to encrypt her hard drive so when she turns off her computer no one who steals it can read it because they don't have the key which exists only in her own head. Attestation is when Eve has Alice locked in her basement under 24 hour surveillance and can go at her with battery leads and MRI scans forever until she gives up the key. It gets broken again and again, because you're trying to prevent Eve from getting a key out of something she has in her possession, and "Eve" is everyone in the world because phones are commercially available to the public. The chances of that being broken are so high that you can't rely on it not happening for anything important. The chances of AES being broken in the next couple of years, or at all, aren't nearly as high. Conversely, if you need to trust a remote device, you do it by providing physical security. This is why banks have vaults and guards and ATMs are encased in hardened steel and bolted to the ground and contain surveillance cameras with remote recordings. This is why the bank's servers, which actually are trusted by all the ATMs to identify who should be able to withdraw cash, are kept under 24 hour guard. The amount remote attestation adds to these things is negligible because of the high probability of it being bypassed. It's snake oil. The only thing it does is trigger bad laws that prohibit honest competitors from bypassing it for benevolent reasons. Because the technology doesn't work, and the law only works against people who aren't willing to break the law. Which is why such laws are pure negative. In the case were someone is trying to commit fraud or some other crime, there is already a law against that and a redundant law against bypassing attestation adds nothing. So all a law against bypassing attestation can do is prohibit legitimate otherwise-lawful activity.
- AnthonyMouse 3y ago> Remote attestation does not affect the compatibility of software running on the system. It affects the ability of a third party server from being able to tell if your phone is running software the server trusts. In other words, it affects the compatibility of software running on the system, because you can't get software that runs on their system to run on your system, because the third party server has been deputized as a monopoly enforcement agent. > If an app chooses to support only Play certified devices you will need to convince them that is worth supporting your phones too and you may need to provide your own remote attestation API. You can provide the exact same API, but if it doesn't sign the same code it won't be accepted until you have market share, which you can't get when your phone can't run people's apps. You have to be able to make it run the existing apps, as they are, without modification. > Unless you are suggesting an Android competitor should harvest the keys from Play certified android phones and inject them into their own phones. That is exactly what I am suggesting. Or find and publish exploits that allow users to extract the keys from their own devices and install alternate systems on them or port them to other systems. If this anti-competitive edifice is not to be banned outright then at a minimum, maintaining it should have no support from the state.
- charcircuit 3y ago>In other words, it affects the compatibility of software running on the system Any app that targets AOSP will be compatible. >because you can't get software that runs on their system to run on your system Server side code is completely separate from an Android app. It would never run on your system. >but if it doesn't sign the same code it won't be accepted until you have market share, which you can't get when your phone can't run people's apps. Then bootstrap this process with as many apps as you can afford to work with. As you grow your platform you can onboard more apps and you won't have to pay as much money to get them to support your OS. >That is exactly what I am suggesting. Promoting breaking device security is a shady business practice and if found out the keys would be blacklisted.
- AnthonyMouse 3y ago> Any app that targets AOSP will be compatible. You can only get keys to put in your device to do the attestation from Google, who then imposes restrictions on what your device can do. > Server side code is completely separate from an Android app. It would never run on your system. You obviously need the apps that run on your system to be able to access the server for that app. > Then bootstrap this process with as many apps as you can afford to work with. As you grow your platform you can onboard more apps and you won't have to pay as much money to get them to support your OS. There are no examples of this working. Microsoft even tried it and it did not work. It's also clearly unavailable to Mozilla or Debian or anyone else without an existing monopoly to extract rents from in order to operate at a loss for an extended period of time. > Promoting breaking device security is a shady business practice and if found out the keys would be blacklisted. You don't tell them which keys they are. And if they blacklist entire device models then they'll hit lots of their own customers and make it hard for apps to rely on the attestation, which is great.