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Do not do this. It's just crappy security practice. Password managers give you versions & history (you need to rotate passwords occasionally), a TOTP generator

Do not do this. It's just crappy security practice. Password managers give you versions & history (you need to rotate passwords occasionally), a TOTP generator+seed store, configurable password generator using a schemes of characters (some websites only allow specific characters), is encrypted at rest & in memory so it's more secure than a piece of paper in your wallet, is backed up online, and of course you only have to memorize one master password. (use BitWarden or 1Password, the rest have downsides/limitations) Besides, as XKCD made popular, long phrases of words are easier to remember than random passwords and contain plenty of entropy. Also, people aren't "good at securing their wallet". I'm sure as hell not gonna write my bank account password in my wallet and then walk around Barcelona, Athens, Paris or Rome.

_Algernon_ 3y ago
>Do not do this. It's just crappy security practice. >Password managers give you versions & history (you need to rotate passwords occasionally), a TOTP generator+seed store, configurable password generator using a schemes of characters (some websites only allow specific characters), is encrypted at rest & in memory so it's more secure than a piece of paper in your wallet, is backed up online, and of course you only have to memorize one master password. (use BitWarden or 1Password, the rest have downsides/limitations) This depends a lot on your threat model. You basically have three options for password managin, paper, cloud (eg. bitwarden), local (eg. keepass). Paper is mainly vulnerable to people in your life, government, etc. But your passwords can is safe from malware, digital exploits and so on. The vulnerabilities can be reduced by using a second factor that must be combined with the information in the notebook. The biggest problem with the paper approach is probably accidental loss. It's much more difficult to make backups. Cloud password managers have plenty of issues. I'll let the LastPass security incident section on Wikipedia speak for itself[0] Local password managers work, but there are plenty of potential vulnerabilities: Rogue developers, attacks on the development supply chain, local malware, etc. Some of this could be reduced by accessing passwords only in sandboxed OSes. However, nobody does that. In the end most people end up relying on not being a big target. These methods all work for most people, as long as they aren't the target of a nation state or other big actor. [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LastPass#Security_incidents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LastPass#Security_incidents
- 0xbadcafebee 3y ago
  Regardless of the threat model, a password manager is better, period. It addresses more threats, provides better security, is more reliable. > your passwords can is safe from malware, digital exploits and so on No they're not. They can still be compromised by malware and digital exploits when you type them into your device. If you have malware you're largely just fucked. That's why people have been trying to get rid of passwords forever, because they still are vulnerable to a number of attacks in various circumstances. > The vulnerabilities can be reduced by using a second factor that must be combined with the information in the notebook This is the same threat model as a password manager. Always use a second factor regardless of the primary method. > The biggest problem with the paper approach is probably accidental loss No, the biggest problem with the paper method is you should never leave your password unencrypted at rest, including some clunky matrix map that could be decoded by a clever person even in the 16th century. There are many other problems with paper method that password manager makes obsolete. > Cloud password managers have plenty of issues Only shitty ones. Security researchers were raising the alarm about LastPass long ago. 1Password and BitWarden are perfectly fine, secure and reliable. They all use zero-knowledge so as long as your master password is long and complex, there's no risk to your vaults. > Local password managers work, but there are plenty of potential vulnerabilities For the shitty ones. They're certainly better than no manager at all, if you use them correctly and they aren't designed terribly. > In the end most people end up relying on not being a big target It's not about being a target, it's about the entire security practice contributing to better outcomes as a whole. The features of a password manager add up to overall much better security. The only circumstance in which writing down a password is better than a password manager is when you have no computing device at all with which to run the password manager. No computer, no tablet, no phone, no internet cafe, nothing. And actually, even then memorization is better than writing it down. Come up with a mnemonic for a long password phrase and some memory tricks to remember the phrase in case you forget it.
  - _Algernon_ 3y ago
    >No they're not. They can still be compromised by malware and digital exploits when you type them into your device. If you have malware you're largely just fucked. That's why people have been trying to get rid of passwords forever, because they still are vulnerable to a number of attacks in various circumstances. With the notebook you have a single password compromised which has the chance of serving as a canary to detect the compromise. With a password manager potentially every password is instantly compromised. >This is the same threat model as a password manager. Always use a second factor regardless of the primary method. No it's not. I'm not talking about 2fa; I'm talking about using passwords that eg. are a combination of a notebook part, and a secret only you know, thereby having a unique password for each service, while not having to remember 200 unique passwords. >Only shitty ones. Security researchers were raising the alarm about LastPass long ago. 1Password and BitWarden are perfectly fine, secure and reliable. They all use zero-knowledge so as long as your master password is long and complex, there's no risk to your vaults. If you have to pay attention to security researches to use a package manager it is already impractical for the wast portion of the population. All auditing of previous versions also ceases to be meaningful the moment a new version is released, or you are unable to actually verify the running version (which cloud software always has). You also have to trust the client software which is vulnerable to the same issues as local password managers. >And actually, even then memorization is better than writing it down. Come up with a mnemonic for a long password phrase and some memory tricks to remember the phrase in case you forget it. This would be great if people just needed a single password. People these days have hundreds of accounts. I have 239 and I'm reasonably conservative with creating new accounts. Remembering 239 secure passwords, even with a mnemonic is a fulltime job. It's not in any way realistic. In the end, if you consider the intended audience for the advice of using paper password management it is the people who currently use a single password for every service they use. For those people any step-up is an improvement.
0xbadcafebee 3y ago
The people downvoting this don't understand security. Do not believe whatever you read on HN just because it's upvoted. Listen to real security professionals.

_Algernon_ 3y ago

>Do not do this. It's just crappy security practice. >Password managers give you versions & history (you need to rotate passwords occasionally), a TOTP generator+seed store, configurable password generator using a schemes of characters (some websites only allow specific characters), is encrypted at rest & in memory so it's more secure than a piece of paper in your wallet, is backed up online, and of course you only have to memorize one master password. (use BitWarden or 1Password, the rest have downsides/limitations) This depends a lot on your threat model. You basically have three options for password managin, paper, cloud (eg. bitwarden), local (eg. keepass). Paper is mainly vulnerable to people in your life, government, etc. But your passwords can is safe from malware, digital exploits and so on. The vulnerabilities can be reduced by using a second factor that must be combined with the information in the notebook. The biggest problem with the paper approach is probably accidental loss. It's much more difficult to make backups. Cloud password managers have plenty of issues. I'll let the LastPass security incident section on Wikipedia speak for itself[0] Local password managers work, but there are plenty of potential vulnerabilities: Rogue developers, attacks on the development supply chain, local malware, etc. Some of this could be reduced by accessing passwords only in sandboxed OSes. However, nobody does that. In the end most people end up relying on not being a big target. These methods all work for most people, as long as they aren't the target of a nation state or other big actor. [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LastPass#Security_incidents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LastPass#Security_incidents

0xbadcafebee 3y ago
Regardless of the threat model, a password manager is better, period. It addresses more threats, provides better security, is more reliable. > your passwords can is safe from malware, digital exploits and so on No they're not. They can still be compromised by malware and digital exploits when you type them into your device. If you have malware you're largely just fucked. That's why people have been trying to get rid of passwords forever, because they still are vulnerable to a number of attacks in various circumstances. > The vulnerabilities can be reduced by using a second factor that must be combined with the information in the notebook This is the same threat model as a password manager. Always use a second factor regardless of the primary method. > The biggest problem with the paper approach is probably accidental loss No, the biggest problem with the paper method is you should never leave your password unencrypted at rest, including some clunky matrix map that could be decoded by a clever person even in the 16th century. There are many other problems with paper method that password manager makes obsolete. > Cloud password managers have plenty of issues Only shitty ones. Security researchers were raising the alarm about LastPass long ago. 1Password and BitWarden are perfectly fine, secure and reliable. They all use zero-knowledge so as long as your master password is long and complex, there's no risk to your vaults. > Local password managers work, but there are plenty of potential vulnerabilities For the shitty ones. They're certainly better than no manager at all, if you use them correctly and they aren't designed terribly. > In the end most people end up relying on not being a big target It's not about being a target, it's about the entire security practice contributing to better outcomes as a whole. The features of a password manager add up to overall much better security. The only circumstance in which writing down a password is better than a password manager is when you have no computing device at all with which to run the password manager. No computer, no tablet, no phone, no internet cafe, nothing. And actually, even then memorization is better than writing it down. Come up with a mnemonic for a long password phrase and some memory tricks to remember the phrase in case you forget it.
- _Algernon_ 3y ago
  >No they're not. They can still be compromised by malware and digital exploits when you type them into your device. If you have malware you're largely just fucked. That's why people have been trying to get rid of passwords forever, because they still are vulnerable to a number of attacks in various circumstances. With the notebook you have a single password compromised which has the chance of serving as a canary to detect the compromise. With a password manager potentially every password is instantly compromised. >This is the same threat model as a password manager. Always use a second factor regardless of the primary method. No it's not. I'm not talking about 2fa; I'm talking about using passwords that eg. are a combination of a notebook part, and a secret only you know, thereby having a unique password for each service, while not having to remember 200 unique passwords. >Only shitty ones. Security researchers were raising the alarm about LastPass long ago. 1Password and BitWarden are perfectly fine, secure and reliable. They all use zero-knowledge so as long as your master password is long and complex, there's no risk to your vaults. If you have to pay attention to security researches to use a package manager it is already impractical for the wast portion of the population. All auditing of previous versions also ceases to be meaningful the moment a new version is released, or you are unable to actually verify the running version (which cloud software always has). You also have to trust the client software which is vulnerable to the same issues as local password managers. >And actually, even then memorization is better than writing it down. Come up with a mnemonic for a long password phrase and some memory tricks to remember the phrase in case you forget it. This would be great if people just needed a single password. People these days have hundreds of accounts. I have 239 and I'm reasonably conservative with creating new accounts. Remembering 239 secure passwords, even with a mnemonic is a fulltime job. It's not in any way realistic. In the end, if you consider the intended audience for the advice of using paper password management it is the people who currently use a single password for every service they use. For those people any step-up is an improvement.

0xbadcafebee 3y ago

The people downvoting this don't understand security. Do not believe whatever you read on HN just because it's upvoted. Listen to real security professionals.