4 ms·

Incompetence and Malfeasance... You clearly believe you know of more effective safety engineering methods. Please enlighten us. I've only used cruise control

• Veserv 3y ago
  A giant teddy bear is not some sort of 5D trick. It is a trivial case that every DMS designed with even the minimum of care should handle. This is a safety-critical system. Avoidable deaths occur when it is designed inappropriately. There have already been 38 deaths using the Tesla ADAS; the majority of which occurred because drivers are lulled into complacency and become chronically inattentive doing actions such as watching a video. A proper DMS could have avoided these deaths caused by ADAS induced complacency. It is completely unacceptable that 5 years after killing a driver watching a video in the drivers seat that it still fails to detect such misuse that is documented to occur and which is easily solved. A proper DMS should only allow ADAS operation with a positively identified attentive driver. It must fail-safe. Such a system would trivially reject a teddy bear in the seat regardless of constant torque on the wheel meant to minimally simulate a driver holding the wheel. An inattentive driver holding the wheel is a strictly harder problem in both facial and wheel detection. This is not a “trick” or a “bypass”, this is a T-ball and Tesla struck out. Any properly designed solution must demonstrate the ability to solve all trivial problems to support the conclusion that all harder problems have been solved robustly. You would not trust a person to do calculus if they can not add. You should not trust a DMS if it can not reject a absent driver even if it sometimes works in harder cases. The lack of awareness needed to fail or not even attempt to solve trivial cases demonstrates systemic incompetence. [1] https://www.tesladeaths.com/ https://www.tesladeaths.com/
  • daly 3y ago
    Your claim is that Tesla's failures are due to incompetence and malfeasance. To judge incompetence you need to be able to show what competent behavior is. Please be specific and clearly show what will, and HOW to, achieve competent behavior in an ADAS system. Tesla's approach to that problem is that the human is always responsible. It says so "right on the can". Write your "competent" code as open source and post it for all to use. As for malfeasance, you need to show mens rea, the intention of wrongdoing, aka a "guilty mind". Please provide specific information you have that anyone at Tesla intended to cause harm. Name names. Be aware that falsely claiming malfeasance by an individual might be legally actionable defamation. Safety critical systems fail. Nuke plants melt down, commercial and military aircraft crash, ... ADAS saves lives, more lives statistically than average but not all lives. You want perfection. You can't have it. It seems wrong to cast aspersions on people at Tesla without showing how "you would do it right". Be sure to include a github link in your next reply so I can download and test your coded solution.
    • Veserv 3y ago
      Literally every single statement you just made is completely antithetical to modern safety processes. 1. Competence is judged in accordance with an acceptance criteria. You do not need to be able to show competent behavior to deem something incompetent. You are not competent to develop a fusion reactor. Nobody can do that, so we know you can not and are thus incompetent. You are not competent to develop a manned lunar space mission. It was done historically, but not now, so we know you can not and are thus incompetent. You are not competent to develop a rocket that can reach GEO. Others can do it, but we know you can not and are thus incompetent. 2. A competent DMS must only allow ADAS operation when it can positively identify a human driver looking at the road in a manner comparable to a attentive driver. Before you go on about some sort of inane tangent demanding I, a non-expert on gaze monitoring, define the exact parameters of what constitutes a "attentive driver" and then seek loopholes in whatever criteria I suggest to declare "victory" over safety, the acceptance criteria I just put forward explicitly does not absolve the manufacturer of any liability for deficiencies in their design whether known or unknown. The use of unproven technology in safety-critical contexts does not get a free pass. It must be deployed with the utmost care until an adequate analysis of its safety properties can be determined. 3. Although I can not speak to what, specifically, constitutes a successful implementation, I can speak to what is an immediate failure. In much the same way that I can not make a rocket that reaches LEO, but can determine that a rocket that explodes on the launchpad is not successful, I can determine what is a clear failure. Allowing the ADAS to operate while there is no human in the driver seat is an immediate, egregious failure. It is completely unacceptable on its face even if there were no known solution. Even worse, human face detection is an undergraduate computer vision project. Basically every phone and camera in the world has human face detection. If a human face is not detected for a certain amount of time then the ADAS should relinquish control. This may cause excessive disengagement if your human face detector is poor, but the reverse fails unsafe which is unacceptable. Literally anybody with even the minimum of safety design training would know that. 4. You demand that I solve Tesla's problem, that their hundreds of paid engineers can not solve, for free and then post it as open source. For some reason you do not demand Tesla, the manufacturer of the product and a nearly trillion dollar company, to release their source code for evaluation before it is allowed to endanger the lives of the public. For that matter, Tesla does not disclose their code even to the regulatory agencies, yet you demand a random member of the public to engage in a more thorough and transparent process than the company with billions of dollars who is attempting to deploy an incomplete safety critical product on the public roadways. The double standard is appalling. 5. It is not necessary to specifically identify individuals to declare malfeasance. I do not know who was in charge of Philip Morris when they deliberately obfuscated evidence linking smoking to lung cancer, but I know that they engaged in malfeasance. 6. The actions of Tesla demonstrate such a disregard for accepted practices in the development of safety-critical products and are such a gross deviation from the normal standard of care and occur with such regularity that it is improbable that the actions are mere criminal recklessness. Either they have no staff who are trained in safety design or they override them to ship product. Both are unacceptable. They are developing a safety-critical product. Their management knows they require qualified safety experts. If they choose to retain no such individuals, then they have intentionally engaged in conduct that will lead to no safety oversight despite knowing that they should. If they have safety experts and override them, it is self-explanatory how that is unacceptable. 7. You demand I specifically name individuals while also declaring that your demand incurs legal consequences on me while accepting no increased burden yourself. Your attempts to raise the standard of proof exclusively on your opponents and then hurl baseless legal threats are anti-social debate tactics. How about you make a notarized statement under penalty of perjury that you know Tesla is following adequate safety procedures, and if they are not then you are intentionally lying to harm the public. If Tesla is following adequate safety procedures, then the second clause has no effect. If Tesla is not following adequate safety procedures, then you are trivially guilty of perjury.