3 ms·

>Then you initiate a rendezvous request in HSDir to request a contact with the hidden service. >The hidden service noticed the HSDir updated, then arranges a To

>Then you initiate a rendezvous request in HSDir to request a contact with the hidden service. >The hidden service noticed the HSDir updated, then arranges a Tor circuit (of arbitrary length) and then write back to HSDir to tell the requesters to contact via that new circuit which this information will ultimately be signed with the hidden service's private key as a proof of identity so MITM is impossible (like bootleg TLS, or a mock PKI actually) this sounds wrong. As far as I know the HS picks some nodes as introduction points and builds long losting circuits to them abd publishes them in ita descriptor. when a client wants to connect it fetches the list of IPs, it picks a random node as rendezvous and, via the IP, tells the HS about it which connects to it to allow communication (basically you -> rendezvous <- HS (+ a bunch of other nodes that blindly carry traffic for anonimization as is customs with tor))

stevefan1999 3y ago
ah, looks like we got a Tor expert here. I realize I flipped the rendezvous relationship. Well, I got into Tor 5 years ago as a freshmen trying to replicate Tor in Rust, and I got to say my details are murky now.
- pluto_modadic 3y ago
  https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/overview/ https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/overview/ onion service picks nodes which will act as introduction points, signs them and uploads the descriptor to the DHT client finds that record on the DHT, picks a random node (from all of Tor) and gives it a secret, then encrypts a message to the hidden service (via one of those introduction points) with the key hidden service makes its own circuit to the random node the person picked, tells the node the passphrase, and then the client & service do some E2EE communication (though, at the rendezvous point it's just the single handshake / one layer of encryption... so being a rendezvous node is a big job, just like HSdirs or guards)

stevefan1999 3y ago

ah, looks like we got a Tor expert here. I realize I flipped the rendezvous relationship. Well, I got into Tor 5 years ago as a freshmen trying to replicate Tor in Rust, and I got to say my details are murky now.

pluto_modadic 3y ago
https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/overview/ https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/overview/ onion service picks nodes which will act as introduction points, signs them and uploads the descriptor to the DHT client finds that record on the DHT, picks a random node (from all of Tor) and gives it a secret, then encrypts a message to the hidden service (via one of those introduction points) with the key hidden service makes its own circuit to the random node the person picked, tells the node the passphrase, and then the client & service do some E2EE communication (though, at the rendezvous point it's just the single handshake / one layer of encryption... so being a rendezvous node is a big job, just like HSdirs or guards)