6 ms·
>In summary, this is fundamentally different because it takes away your control of your own device. No, it allows a business to deny to you if you can't attest
by charcircuit 3y ago
>In summary, this is fundamentally different because it takes away your control of your own device.
No, it allows a business to deny to you if you can't attest to the security of your device. You are still free to do whatever you want on your own device.
If a business had an office that required you to unlock a door, but it also had a pickable lock that wouldn't be great security. It allows people to lie about having a badge by letting them pick the lock to get in. If a business increased security by making the lock no longer printable that seems like a good thing to me.
>LineageOS is a good example of this; they have their own Safetynet implementation which has very little buy-in.
Have they actually approached apps and offered compensation for them to implemented it? Or are they hoping apps just randomly decide to adopt it?
- wzdd 3y agoI'm sorry, but the idea that it's about allowing me to attest to the security of my device is not correct. I can make all the attestations I like about the security of my device, but if they're not backed by a confirmation from Google then it's quite likely that nobody will care. The issue is that making modifications to anything in the chain of trust requires approval from a trusted third party.
- charcircuit 3y ago>the idea that it's about allowing me to attest to the security of my device is not correct I was oversimplifying. A service doesn't have to trust every attestation and a service does not need to do anything with the attestation if it doesn't want to. >The issue is that making modifications to anything in the chain of trust requires approval from a trusted third party. That is by design because it means untrusted people can't make changes while remaining trusted.
- wzdd 3y agoYes, you are correct that preventing users from making modifications to anything in the chain of trust without being approved by an already-trusted third party, likely the company who certified the device, is by design.
- zb3 3y agoThe problem is that the owner of the device is considered "untrusted" here. While that sometimes makes sense (for law enforcement purposes), using this for business purposes is anticompetitive. It shouldn't be possible for companies to do whatever they want.
- charcircuit 3y ago>using this for business purposes is anticompetitive Businesses not trusting every random person is not anticompetitive. Doing that is how businesses make bad deals, get hacked, or make bad decisions.
- zb3 3y agoOf course it is anticompetitive, if a given service (which is defacto mandatory) strikes a deal with select few hardware vendors to artificially make it impossible to access the service using different hardware (for purely business reasons), then it obviously is anticompetitive.
- charcircuit 3y ago>strikes a deal with select few hardware vendors That isn't what is happening. Anyone can become a manufacturer for Windows PCs or Android certified phones.
- daurentius523 3y agoRight because Microsoft and Google don't mandate what can and cannot be installed by manufacturer… oh wait.
- charcircuit 3y agoThe whole point of Android certification is that you are following Google's rules. If you make something that is not certified you can not get play services.