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> It seems Everyone is taking for granted the claim that this is about DRM. The claim is that websites (not Google) will use this signal to allow or deny access
by dns_snek 3y ago
> It seems Everyone is taking for granted the claim that this is about DRM. The claim is that websites (not Google) will use this signal to allow or deny access but this is already possible with various means.
How about you offer a reasonable opposing viewpoint? It's hard to see this, at best, as anything other than an extremely naive viewpoint. Every feature that can be used to lock down content and/or spy on users, will be used to do just that. That's true for every single feature that exists today. Claiming otherwise borders on bad faith.
> Google or any other Browser vendor do not have a say on how websites use or misuse features.
That's settled then. Full filesystem, location, camera, and microphone access should therefore come on by default without a permission dialog. Why not bring back Java and Flash while we're at it! It's not the browser vendor's fault that websites are misusing it.
> Many articles are just reapeating the "DRM" claim without explaining how is this different
This is different because any meaningful "attestation about the environment the browser is running in" can only be achieved via a full chain of trust, starting with secure boot, which will allow Google (and websites you visit) to verify that your system is using a Google-approved bootloader to load a Google-approved operating system which only loads Google-approved drivers and Google-approved software (or worse, website-approved software).
- cowl 3y ago> How about you offer a reasonable opposing viewpoint Read the proposal: https://github.com/RupertBenWiser/Web-Environment-Integrity/blob/main/explainer.md https://github.com/RupertBenWiser/Web-Environment-Integrity/... >That's settled then. Full filesystem, location, camera, and microphone access should therefore come on by default without a permission dialog. Why not bring back Java and Flash while we're at it! It's not the browser vendor's fault that websites are misusing it. Now who is arguing in bad faith? if you have read the proposal, it's clear that they are being careful and are upfront about the some potential misuses and the proposed handing of them. > to verify that your system is using a Google-approved bootloader to load a Google-approved operating system which only loads Google-approved drivers and Google-approved software (or worse, website-approved software). again there is no such thing proposed. The "attester" is not specifically Google. anyone can become an "attester". The chain of trust is a chain that trusts tokens not specific "things". if you for example would trust let's say Opera as the attester, Opera would need to trust windows or Linux or Android as the OS attester. The analogy here is the certificate Authorities. You may very well have a "let's encrypt" attester that democratizes the good parts (certification) without the bad parts (too much information) .
- trogdolon 3y ago> if you for example would trust let's say Opera as the attester, Opera would need to trust windows or Linux or Android as the OS attester. But it's not the user ("you") deciding which attesters to trust - it's website operators. And they will choose to trust only attesters that meaningfully (cryptographically) verify the user's client environment, including the secure boot chain, OS, and browser. Otherwise the attestation can be spoofed, in why case why would they bother using the EnvironmentIntegrity API at all?
- meragrin_ 3y ago> But it's not the user ("you") deciding which attesters to trust - it's website operators. You know what? They are already doing it. This just gives them another option. > And they will choose to trust only attesters that meaningfully (cryptographically) verify the user's client environment, including the secure boot chain, OS, and browser. Otherwise the attestation can be spoofed, in why case why would they bother using the EnvironmentIntegrity API at all? You might as well complain that any website requires any sort of authentication or authorization. How is WEI any different from all the other current methods which have not killed the "open web" in the way the hysteria over WEI is claiming?
- zb3 3y agoThose methods didn't kill the open web because they could be bypassed, and that's precisely why WEI was proposed.
- meragrin_ 3y agoReally?? Mind telling me how to access Netflix, Disney+, or any other streaming service without authentication/authorization? I'll take the information on banks too.
- zb3 3y agoWhere did I say you could access these without authentication? Nowhere. But I can still access them with my device being controlled by me, I can create bots/extensions to export and archive content. I can because there's no reliable method to identify whether my device acts in my interest, so they have no choice - they have to restort to methods that can be cracked. WEI is an attempt to introduce that reliable method. Sure, there's EME with Widevine L1, but this is currently limited to providing media content, not apps themselves. That's why WEI is considered the DRM for the web.