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I see, it seems your objection is to the ARM PSA document - I'm not familiar with it but it seems that it is targeted towards IoT devices. I also don't want per

I see, it seems your objection is to the ARM PSA document - I'm not familiar with it but it seems that it is targeted towards IoT devices. I also don't want permanent fingerprinting, but I think it is a question orthogonal to remote attestation in general. All the tech is already out there and we can push back on specific uses; for example, the Estonian e-ID provides similar permanent fingerprinting _and association with a human_, but seems to be pretty popular among their citizens. On the other hand, the RATS architecture doc has several reference use cases which are useful and limited: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334.html#name-reference-use-cases https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334.html#name-reference-u... . I think these are worth pursuing.

nobody9999 3y ago
>All the tech is already out there and we can push back on specific uses; Yes, we can. And this proposal has privacy implications big enough to drive a column of tanks through. I have no issue with folks confirming the validity of software installed on devices they own, or of businesses vetting specific configurations for their employees/contractors/partners/cloud instances/device and even customers to access their networked environments, where's that's appropriate. In fact, that's been pretty much de rigeuer in corporate environments for decades, and I've helped implement such systems more than once. The issue I have with this proposal is that given the current surveillance capitalism[0] environment, it's likely that a variety of greedy scum will use the tools provided to deprecate privacy on a broad scale. As I said, securing networked environments is critical in many contexts, and we've been doing so for a long time. But building remote attestation (especially when it's not clear who, exactly, might do such attestation and what properties would make a device "untrustworthy") without clear boundaries in the current environment is a privacy disaster waiting to happen, IMHO. >On the other hand, the RATS architecture doc has several reference use cases which are useful and limited: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334.html#name-reference-use-cases https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334.html#name-reference-u.... I think these are worth pursuing. It's not the architecture per se I object to, rather it's the almost certain abuse (in the absence of any regulation or limitations) of such an architecture that's the problem as I see it. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism Edit: Added the missing link.

nobody9999 3y ago

>All the tech is already out there and we can push back on specific uses; Yes, we can. And this proposal has privacy implications big enough to drive a column of tanks through. I have no issue with folks confirming the validity of software installed on devices they own, or of businesses vetting specific configurations for their employees/contractors/partners/cloud instances/device and even customers to access their networked environments, where's that's appropriate. In fact, that's been pretty much de rigeuer in corporate environments for decades, and I've helped implement such systems more than once. The issue I have with this proposal is that given the current surveillance capitalism[0] environment, it's likely that a variety of greedy scum will use the tools provided to deprecate privacy on a broad scale. As I said, securing networked environments is critical in many contexts, and we've been doing so for a long time. But building remote attestation (especially when it's not clear who, exactly, might do such attestation and what properties would make a device "untrustworthy") without clear boundaries in the current environment is a privacy disaster waiting to happen, IMHO. >On the other hand, the RATS architecture doc has several reference use cases which are useful and limited: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334.html#name-reference-use-cases https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334.html#name-reference-u.... I think these are worth pursuing. It's not the architecture per se I object to, rather it's the almost certain abuse (in the absence of any regulation or limitations) of such an architecture that's the problem as I see it. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism Edit: Added the missing link.