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> cryptographic proof backed by the hardware that the machine you're talking to is indeed running that software Assuming both the software and hardware are sec
by zb3 3y ago
> cryptographic proof backed by the hardware that the machine you're talking to is indeed running that software
Assuming both the software and hardware are secure, where hardware security includes resistance for attacks like fault injection and so on. This is fascinating for me, because it's like you could break the system if you were able to flip one single bit (load?) somewhere inside the SoC. So I guess this topic is about to get more popular.
- xenocratus 3y agoYes, assuming some degree of security of the full TCB (both the software and hardware). Of course, no system is bulletproof, but it's slowly going in the right direction - and hopefully since Spectre/Meltdown people are taking more care :) At the end of the day, it doesn't have to be perfect, just another layer in the Swiss cheese model. > able to flip one single bit (load?) somewhere inside the SoC TBH, capabilities at that level (i.e., within the SoC) are fairly difficult to pull off, so probably not in most threat models.
- zb3 3y agoYes, but I just wanted to highlight that here we have a completely new attack surface - hardware-level hacking, which is not the same as hacking hardware via software (like Spectre/Meltdown) :)
- xenocratus 3y agoTrue! Advanced systems already have some degree of fault tolerance built-in, and the encryption of enclave memory is there against cold boot attacks and such.