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Alas, that's fraught with a lot of ideology that would be a hornet's nest to stir up. A big part of why historically banking has been so fragile in the US were
by eru 3y ago
Alas, that's fraught with a lot of ideology that would be a hornet's nest to stir up.
A big part of why historically banking has been so fragile in the US were their asinine bans on branch banking. Until fairly recently, banks were only allowed a single office in a single city. If that city was hit by hard times, the bank was also badly affected.
Compare that with eg Canada's nationwide chains, and their superior financial stability.
See https://www.alt-m.org/2015/07/29/there-was-no-place-like-canada/ https://www.alt-m.org/2015/07/29/there-was-no-place-like-can... for more.
- OO000oo 3y agoA big part of why big American banks appear financially stable is the ruling class will bail them out with taxpayer money.
- eru 3y agoBail outs and (quasi) government run deposit insurance are indeed a problem. They misprice risk.
- HWR_14 3y agoThey don't misprice risk. The shareholders of a bank are wiped out when deposit insurance is used. It's the account holders who are bailed out.
- AnthonyMouse 3y agoThat's mispricing risk. Now the depositors have no reason to care whether their bank is creditworthy or well-managed, so the bank has the incentive to gamble with their deposits as much as possible. If they get lucky they get to keep the winnings, if they go belly up the FDIC eats the cost.
- trepanne 3y agoYou guys are familiar with how we arrived at this particular regime of mispricing risk, right? It’s preferable to the alternative. This is why banks are tightly (but imperfectly) regulated. Similar observations apply to that more fundamental instrument of mispriced risk - limited liability business entities. The worst possible arrangement, except for all the others. Personally I prefer to tilt at the windmill of the asymmetrical payoff diagram of US CEO compensation structures. While it’s still the case that nobody much cares about my opinions on the subject, this one at least has less of an aspect of battle-tested socioeconomic optimality.
- eru 3y agoYou should check your history. Americans didn't arrive at this particular set of institutional arrangements by some rational process that weighed the alternatives properly. Really, have a look at eg https://www.cato.org/blog/there-was-no-place-canada https://www.cato.org/blog/there-was-no-place-canada for a comparison between American finance and Canadian finance. The Canadian arrangements were much superior to the old and new American system. > Similar observations apply to that more fundamental instrument of mispriced risk - limited liability business entities. The worst possible arrangement, except for all the others. I don't see what's wrong with it? In most countries you can form both limited liability business entities as well as unlimited liability business entities. When you do business as a company you (typically) have to clearly declare what kind of business you are, and your counter-parties can decide whether they want to deal with you based on that information. (At least for the most part. If a limited liability contractor paves my driveway, and they damage my neighbour's roses while they are at it, my neighbour never got a choice.) > Personally I prefer to tilt at the windmill of the asymmetrical payoff diagram of US CEO compensation structures. While it’s still the case that nobody much cares about my opinions on the subject, this one at least has less of an aspect of battle-tested socioeconomic optimality. Related: In the years after the big financial crisis of 2008, Credit Suisse paid their bankers' bonuses in the form of 'toxic assets'. See eg https://archive.is/x3GKl https://archive.is/x3GKl That make got the 'toxic assets' off Credit Suisse's balance sheet. It was also popular with the general public. And, the best part, over time those ostensibly toxic assets actually mostly paid off in full, so the bankers got a much better bonus than if they had gotten straight up cash. The windmill I like to tilt at is the different tax treatment of equity vs debt in many tax systems around the world. Both shareholders and creditors demand a return on their capital. But when your business pays creditors, via interest and return of principal, that's usually with money that's less taxed ('pre-tax money') than when they pay dividends or do share buybacks ('post-tax money'). Most people agree that an economy with less leverage, ie less debt and more equity, is more stable and less prone to crises. But then we have tax systems that prefer debt. We should at least treat them equally, or even better, tax debt higher than equity, to nudge company's in the direction of more equity. (And, of course, there's also the big, big windmill of land value taxes being superior to almost every other form of taxation. But almost no one uses them.)
- eru 3y agoThat still misprices risks. Shares in a bank essentially behave like call options on the assets of the bank, where the strike price is the sum of debt and other liabilities of the bank. When you are pricing an option ahead of time, you can still misprice them; even if it turns out that at the end of the day, the option turned out to expire out-of-the-money (ie the bank's shareholders get wiped out). https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36953459 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36953459 probably gave a cleaner description.
- HWR_14 3y agoBy "until recently" you mean "almost 100 years ago"?
- eru 3y agoNo. One example from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Branch_(banking)#Legal_restrictions_in_the_United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Branch_(banking)#Legal_restric... > Some states have also had restrictive bank branch laws; for example, Illinois outlawed branches (other than the main office) until 1967, and did not allow an unlimited number until 1993.
- HWR_14 3y agoHuh, I was misinformed. Thanks.
- eru 3y agoNo worries. Though I should have been a bit more precise in my original statement. Branch banking was almost universally forbidden in the US from the start of the country, then over the course of the 20th century, most restrictions were gradually lifted. That process was essentially completed in the 1990s. The anti-branch-banking restrictions were (mostly) done at the state level; so it's hard to generalise over the whole union.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- pbourke 3y agoThat stability comes from having a handful of banks declared too big to fail, and holding oligopoly power. Canadians enjoy some of the highest retail banking fees when compared with peer nations.
- eru 3y agoCanadian banks in the 19th century did not enjoy any 'too big to fail' protection. You might be right about the current Canadian banking industry, I don't know that much about what they did in the last few decades.