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Australia exports a huge amount of iron ore and coal [0]. Out of all Australian exports, about 1/3 go to China. I'd assume even higher for the bulk materials.

by ethbr0 3y ago

Australia exports a huge amount of iron ore and coal [0]. Out of all Australian exports, about 1/3 go to China. I'd assume even higher for the bulk materials. Australia has a lot of the world's iron ore deposits [1]. Russia and Brazil are the other options, but each with about half Australia's size. And China with half Russia and Brazil's size. China needs steel. Which means China needs iron ore. Which means China needs Australia / Russia / Brazil. Which means if Australia avoids overtly antagonizing China, they'll most likely look the other way to avoid disrupting supply. What would upset Australia's power is a breakdown of freedom of navigation by commercial shipping in the Pacific. Historically, the US has been supportive of this. China is much less inclined to do so, absent benefit to itself. Cue AUKUS opportunity. Principly focused on the type of assets that would allow Australia to credibly make sea denial costly for China. > Australia is paying the US to build their own shipyards in the hopes that they get the right to share OLD submarines with the UK. Australia gets US and UK nuclear submarine technology. And 3 new-build US Virginia-class attack submarines, with an option for a further 2. And help updating their port facilities to enable servicing nuclear submarines, which potentially means additional US SSN/SSBN visits. In addition to closer cooperation on drone and other programs. If Australia can keep China unhappy, but shy of angry, it's a good deal for Australia. [0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_exports_of_Australia https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_exports_of_Australia [1] https://www.statista.com/statistics/267381/world-reserves-of-iron-ore-by-country/ https://www.statista.com/statistics/267381/world-reserves-of...

dirtyid 3y ago
PRC is MORE supportive of commercial shipping since most of shipping goes to PRC, not unconstrained military FONAP under guise of civilian maritime research. Historically US has seized/disrupted much more merchant shipping than PRC because US likes their sanctions against adversaries. AUKUS subs to disrupt PRC shipping is highly questionable, not least because there's only a few of them, and they won't be available for 30+ years if ever, by which time PRC subsurface will dramatically out number them, not to mention their survivability / detectability against PRC ASW / subsurface detector infra. The tactic / strategic value of the subs are questionable on short/medium/long term timelines. The real and immediate value of AUKUS was forward positioning more US assets in west AU (bombers / subs), which announement also happened essentially concurrently with AUKUS announcement. The complexities of the nuke boats, not the subs themselves, is the glue that politically bind AU with said US posture for decades. The subs themselves, IMO will do little in terms of force balance/deterrance in 30+ years, or half that considering how much long range strikes PRC will be building to make west AU and most of US infra in AU unsurvivable.
- ethbr0 3y ago
  The PRC has only had a blue water navy in the last couple decades. We see what their first impulse to do with that is in the militarization and claiming of the South China Sea. We'll see what their use of naval power is in the next few decades. If you're betting on "Use it to enforce rules based international order," then I'll gladly take the "Politics by other means" opposite side of that bet. Do you believe if given a credible naval force that could rival the US Navy, China wouldn't blockade Taiwan tomorrow? > AUKUS subs to disrupt PRC shipping is highly questionable That wasn't my suggestion. It was AUKUS subs to deter interdiction and threatening of commercial shipping by PRC naval forces, in support of PRC political goals.
  - dirtyid 3y ago
    PRC has had a blue enough water navy to reach SCS since the 60s - it's their backyard not the gulf of Aden. See Paracel island skirmish in 74 and Johnson Reef in 88 against Vietnam. Obviously not enough to deter the USN but the US was neutral on the SCS dispute until recently for obvious geopolitical reasons. Latest round of SCS drama and reclamation around the 2010s also started by Vietnam who spurred every other claimant to improve features, including PRC who btw was second last to reclaim and militarize out of 6 claimants. Brunei is good boi. TLDR is PRC impulse will obviously use the navy (really coastguard/scs militia) to assert sovereignty rights (as do other claimants) but has not actually interrupted commercial shipping despite having decades to counter the narrative. Even when PRC had good reason to i.e. ROC/TW attempted to blockade PRC via port closure policy until the 90s. Entire narrative PRC will disrupt SCS SLOCs is fabricated by the US to rationalize increased naval/coast guard presence in SCS considering shipping could be routed around SCS - study in the 00s pegged rerouting premium at 10% to circumvent SCS, basically trivial. Yes, PRC disrupting commercial shipping is a valid strategic concern but the hypotheticals of it don't actually make much sense given where force balance is heading. PRC trend towards mainland based long range fires = PRC doesn't need navy to blockade TW (and increasingly US assets in 1st island chain including SCS). Real work is credibly deterring the US from intervening at all by expanding strikes to disrupting 2/3IC and even AU/CONUS. I think people, especially those brought up in the US military talking points, fixate too hard over the naval component in IndoPac for both sides but signs are pointing to increasing irrelevance of naval projection - large reason for B21 and NGAD and trying to get JP/PH/AU to expand basing is to plug loss of fires from diminishing role of naval power which US says is important to rectify while inaction to reform US ship building and acquisitions suggest it's not. They see which way the next potential war is heading. Ultimately what makes more sense is the threat narrative of PRC disrupting SCS shipping is useful to rationalize US forward deployment just like AUKUS subs are about getting US bombers in west AU. Which circles back to AUKUS subs, the consensus criticism is deterrence value for a few nuke boats is minimal especially in 30 years it will take to get subs online and especially in SCS which is borderline PRC lake at this point given state trend of PRC ASW and subsea monitoring expansion. That's without mentioning PRC's own nuke sub procurement that will reach if not exceed parity of US+AUKUS with post reveal that initial batch of AUKUS subs will be redirecting hulls from USN. Criticism of AUKUS subs deterrence value is explicitly about how little deterrence it offers relative to cost and how it will bind AU defense to US interests and erode long term AU sovereignty. The latter being the primary strategic logic of AUKUS.

by ethbr0 3y ago

dirtyid 3y ago

PRC is MORE supportive of commercial shipping since most of shipping goes to PRC, not unconstrained military FONAP under guise of civilian maritime research. Historically US has seized/disrupted much more merchant shipping than PRC because US likes their sanctions against adversaries. AUKUS subs to disrupt PRC shipping is highly questionable, not least because there's only a few of them, and they won't be available for 30+ years if ever, by which time PRC subsurface will dramatically out number them, not to mention their survivability / detectability against PRC ASW / subsurface detector infra. The tactic / strategic value of the subs are questionable on short/medium/long term timelines. The real and immediate value of AUKUS was forward positioning more US assets in west AU (bombers / subs), which announement also happened essentially concurrently with AUKUS announcement. The complexities of the nuke boats, not the subs themselves, is the glue that politically bind AU with said US posture for decades. The subs themselves, IMO will do little in terms of force balance/deterrance in 30+ years, or half that considering how much long range strikes PRC will be building to make west AU and most of US infra in AU unsurvivable.

ethbr0 3y ago
The PRC has only had a blue water navy in the last couple decades. We see what their first impulse to do with that is in the militarization and claiming of the South China Sea. We'll see what their use of naval power is in the next few decades. If you're betting on "Use it to enforce rules based international order," then I'll gladly take the "Politics by other means" opposite side of that bet. Do you believe if given a credible naval force that could rival the US Navy, China wouldn't blockade Taiwan tomorrow? > AUKUS subs to disrupt PRC shipping is highly questionable That wasn't my suggestion. It was AUKUS subs to deter interdiction and threatening of commercial shipping by PRC naval forces, in support of PRC political goals.
- dirtyid 3y ago
  PRC has had a blue enough water navy to reach SCS since the 60s - it's their backyard not the gulf of Aden. See Paracel island skirmish in 74 and Johnson Reef in 88 against Vietnam. Obviously not enough to deter the USN but the US was neutral on the SCS dispute until recently for obvious geopolitical reasons. Latest round of SCS drama and reclamation around the 2010s also started by Vietnam who spurred every other claimant to improve features, including PRC who btw was second last to reclaim and militarize out of 6 claimants. Brunei is good boi. TLDR is PRC impulse will obviously use the navy (really coastguard/scs militia) to assert sovereignty rights (as do other claimants) but has not actually interrupted commercial shipping despite having decades to counter the narrative. Even when PRC had good reason to i.e. ROC/TW attempted to blockade PRC via port closure policy until the 90s. Entire narrative PRC will disrupt SCS SLOCs is fabricated by the US to rationalize increased naval/coast guard presence in SCS considering shipping could be routed around SCS - study in the 00s pegged rerouting premium at 10% to circumvent SCS, basically trivial. Yes, PRC disrupting commercial shipping is a valid strategic concern but the hypotheticals of it don't actually make much sense given where force balance is heading. PRC trend towards mainland based long range fires = PRC doesn't need navy to blockade TW (and increasingly US assets in 1st island chain including SCS). Real work is credibly deterring the US from intervening at all by expanding strikes to disrupting 2/3IC and even AU/CONUS. I think people, especially those brought up in the US military talking points, fixate too hard over the naval component in IndoPac for both sides but signs are pointing to increasing irrelevance of naval projection - large reason for B21 and NGAD and trying to get JP/PH/AU to expand basing is to plug loss of fires from diminishing role of naval power which US says is important to rectify while inaction to reform US ship building and acquisitions suggest it's not. They see which way the next potential war is heading. Ultimately what makes more sense is the threat narrative of PRC disrupting SCS shipping is useful to rationalize US forward deployment just like AUKUS subs are about getting US bombers in west AU. Which circles back to AUKUS subs, the consensus criticism is deterrence value for a few nuke boats is minimal especially in 30 years it will take to get subs online and especially in SCS which is borderline PRC lake at this point given state trend of PRC ASW and subsea monitoring expansion. That's without mentioning PRC's own nuke sub procurement that will reach if not exceed parity of US+AUKUS with post reveal that initial batch of AUKUS subs will be redirecting hulls from USN. Criticism of AUKUS subs deterrence value is explicitly about how little deterrence it offers relative to cost and how it will bind AU defense to US interests and erode long term AU sovereignty. The latter being the primary strategic logic of AUKUS.