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I’m pretty concerned about what Apple is doing in China, but there’s no evidence at all that Apple is escrowing end-to-end encryption keys to the government. Th

I’m pretty concerned about what Apple is doing in China, but there’s no evidence at all that Apple is escrowing end-to-end encryption keys to the government. There’s also no evidence that the Chinese government is using Apple’s non-E2E keys (held in Apple hardware in a cage at a Chinese hosting provider) for mass surveillance. I’m not saying that it’s impossible: I’m saying if you could come up with that evidence, either through reverse-engineering or a verifiable leak from Apple, it would be the biggest story in tech. You would be famous and (if you knew the right hedge fund) probably very rich.

capableweb 3y ago
That Apple operates iCloud in every single country except China, where GCBD (AIPO Cloud (Guizhou) Technology Co. Ltd) operates iCloud, think I makes pretty clear what's going on.
- graeme 3y ago
  That’s separate from iMessage, which is end to end. Apple used to be able to access iMessages through iCloud backups. They changed their system worldwide, now they can’t. So presumably GCBD also lost access to iMessages in iCloud backups.
  - deleted 3y ago
    [deleted]
  - sneak 3y ago
    Apple can still read ~100% of all iMessages in real-time because iCloud Backup (non e2ee by default) serves as a key escrow backdoor in the e2ee of iMessage. It is thus legitimate to state that iMessage is not e2ee as in practice each iMessage is also encrypted to a key held by Apple (in addition to the endpoints). Even if you turn it (e2ee iCloud Backup) on, it's ineffective, as both parties to a conversation must have turned it on for the conversation to be private. Your beliefs are inaccurate.
    - deleted 3y ago
      [deleted]
    - throwaway290 3y ago
      > iCloud Backup (non e2ee by default) I don't see any option to enable e2ee iCloud Backup on iOS 16.6, does this mean your information is outdated and it's all e2ee now?
      - vages 3y ago
        It’s called “advanced data protection”. You’ll find it hidden deep within the iCloud settings. It’s off by default.
        suumcuique 3y ago
        Wow, thanks for mentioning this. I was also under the impression it was e2ee by default but it was actually disabled for me.
        b112 3y ago
        Interesting. FYI, I'm not an apple user, but no upset that some are. I wonder. Is this an attempt to market? Make it optional, but tout "we do this!', as if it is? It's not a bad marketing position.
        throwaway290 3y ago
        More prosaically it's probably because turning it on means it's easier to lose access to your data if you lose devices/keys. Apple can't help you if they don't have the keys. It's not a bad marketing position.
        Twisell 3y ago
        Actually there is a third option, don't back-up your iMessage to iCloud in the first place. In this configuration you need to transfer your content from device to device using a local backup if you intend to keep your messages. You the have the same level of privacy (if not higher) than with ADP. But with the same drawback, if your recipient does backup to iCloud without ADP then messages can be intercept by apple at rest on your recipient iCloud backup. Incidentally ADP mainly target users that didn't trusted iCloud backup for the lack of e2e encryption at rest.
- cced 3y ago
  They don’t want their data leaving their country? Doesn't GermanyAlso have some privacy laws that require data on Germans to stay within Germany? Isn’t this just an extension of that in a way?
  - capableweb 3y ago
    Is China the only country where this applies you mean? Because Apple runs the iCloud servers in every single country, except China.
motohagiography 3y ago
Regarding the financial impact, what's the trade if they find out China is different? Shorting Apple? I don't think that would be a consequence. Nobody cares that China intercepts everything, we just don't want to live there or in a regime like it. There was a rumor about separate HSMs for device personalization in China, and this would be verifiable by determining whether the Chinese HSMs could verify cryptograms produced by derived keys from a US device, against Apple's personalizaiton endpoints in china. I don't know the protocol off hand, but there is a short list of ways to do it. If Apple uses different root secrets in China from the rest of the world, what further evidence would you need?
- matthewdgreen 3y ago
  Apple has claimed that they don’t allow China to intercept communications using these keys. They’ve said on the record to the WSJ that they don’t do any combination of these things, and they left very little wiggle room in their denials (Google Apple China encryption keys WSJ). If you could show that they were compromising security for the Chinese government but not making any allowances for the FBI, and that their executives were lying about it, it would be a massive political scandal. There would almost certainly be congressional hearings, simply because any one of {Apple, China, tech executives caught lying, tech executives secretly collaborating with foreign governments} is by itself an opportunity for Congresspeople to get their face on TV and this would cover all the bases. Following this there would be huge US government pressure for Apple to (at minimum) cease collaborating with China to surveil its people, or else to offer the same capability to the US government. Potentially Apple’s entire business in China could be jeopardized if it was predicated on secret collaboration, not to mention their whole supply chain would be even more at risk. In the long run Apple might maneuver out of the situation somehow, but in the short run it would certainly affect them very badly.
  - sneak 3y ago
    > Following this there would be huge US government pressure for Apple to (at minimum) cease collaborating with China to surveil its people, or else to offer the same capability to the US government. Congress knows this would only kneecap one of their largest companies (with no fallback option at present). There is no iPhone without China. Apple can and does already provide surveillance of this type domestically to FBI/DHS/et al. Approximately all iMessages are readable by Apple and extension by the USG in real-time, with or without a warrant.
sneak 3y ago
> held in Apple hardware in a cage at a Chinese hosting provider There's also no evidence to support the claim of this architecture, either.
ben_w 3y ago
> You would be famous and (if you knew the right hedge fund) probably very rich. Famous, sure. Rich? Perhaps… but I suspect that annoying a superpower will mean that, like Snowden, one would be somewhat restricted in ability to make use of any such wealth or fame.

capableweb 3y ago

That Apple operates iCloud in every single country except China, where GCBD (AIPO Cloud (Guizhou) Technology Co. Ltd) operates iCloud, think I makes pretty clear what's going on.

graeme 3y ago
That’s separate from iMessage, which is end to end. Apple used to be able to access iMessages through iCloud backups. They changed their system worldwide, now they can’t. So presumably GCBD also lost access to iMessages in iCloud backups.
- deleted 3y ago
  [deleted]
- sneak 3y ago
  Apple can still read ~100% of all iMessages in real-time because iCloud Backup (non e2ee by default) serves as a key escrow backdoor in the e2ee of iMessage. It is thus legitimate to state that iMessage is not e2ee as in practice each iMessage is also encrypted to a key held by Apple (in addition to the endpoints). Even if you turn it (e2ee iCloud Backup) on, it's ineffective, as both parties to a conversation must have turned it on for the conversation to be private. Your beliefs are inaccurate.
  - deleted 3y ago
    [deleted]
  - throwaway290 3y ago
    > iCloud Backup (non e2ee by default) I don't see any option to enable e2ee iCloud Backup on iOS 16.6, does this mean your information is outdated and it's all e2ee now?
    - vages 3y ago
      It’s called “advanced data protection”. You’ll find it hidden deep within the iCloud settings. It’s off by default.
      - suumcuique 3y ago
        Wow, thanks for mentioning this. I was also under the impression it was e2ee by default but it was actually disabled for me.
        b112 3y ago
        Interesting. FYI, I'm not an apple user, but no upset that some are. I wonder. Is this an attempt to market? Make it optional, but tout "we do this!', as if it is? It's not a bad marketing position.
        throwaway290 3y ago
        More prosaically it's probably because turning it on means it's easier to lose access to your data if you lose devices/keys. Apple can't help you if they don't have the keys. It's not a bad marketing position.
        Twisell 3y ago
        Actually there is a third option, don't back-up your iMessage to iCloud in the first place. In this configuration you need to transfer your content from device to device using a local backup if you intend to keep your messages. You the have the same level of privacy (if not higher) than with ADP. But with the same drawback, if your recipient does backup to iCloud without ADP then messages can be intercept by apple at rest on your recipient iCloud backup. Incidentally ADP mainly target users that didn't trusted iCloud backup for the lack of e2e encryption at rest.
cced 3y ago
They don’t want their data leaving their country? Doesn't GermanyAlso have some privacy laws that require data on Germans to stay within Germany? Isn’t this just an extension of that in a way?
- capableweb 3y ago
  Is China the only country where this applies you mean? Because Apple runs the iCloud servers in every single country, except China.

motohagiography 3y ago

Regarding the financial impact, what's the trade if they find out China is different? Shorting Apple? I don't think that would be a consequence. Nobody cares that China intercepts everything, we just don't want to live there or in a regime like it. There was a rumor about separate HSMs for device personalization in China, and this would be verifiable by determining whether the Chinese HSMs could verify cryptograms produced by derived keys from a US device, against Apple's personalizaiton endpoints in china. I don't know the protocol off hand, but there is a short list of ways to do it. If Apple uses different root secrets in China from the rest of the world, what further evidence would you need?

matthewdgreen 3y ago
Apple has claimed that they don’t allow China to intercept communications using these keys. They’ve said on the record to the WSJ that they don’t do any combination of these things, and they left very little wiggle room in their denials (Google Apple China encryption keys WSJ). If you could show that they were compromising security for the Chinese government but not making any allowances for the FBI, and that their executives were lying about it, it would be a massive political scandal. There would almost certainly be congressional hearings, simply because any one of {Apple, China, tech executives caught lying, tech executives secretly collaborating with foreign governments} is by itself an opportunity for Congresspeople to get their face on TV and this would cover all the bases. Following this there would be huge US government pressure for Apple to (at minimum) cease collaborating with China to surveil its people, or else to offer the same capability to the US government. Potentially Apple’s entire business in China could be jeopardized if it was predicated on secret collaboration, not to mention their whole supply chain would be even more at risk. In the long run Apple might maneuver out of the situation somehow, but in the short run it would certainly affect them very badly.
- sneak 3y ago
  > Following this there would be huge US government pressure for Apple to (at minimum) cease collaborating with China to surveil its people, or else to offer the same capability to the US government. Congress knows this would only kneecap one of their largest companies (with no fallback option at present). There is no iPhone without China. Apple can and does already provide surveillance of this type domestically to FBI/DHS/et al. Approximately all iMessages are readable by Apple and extension by the USG in real-time, with or without a warrant.

sneak 3y ago

> held in Apple hardware in a cage at a Chinese hosting provider There's also no evidence to support the claim of this architecture, either.

ben_w 3y ago

> You would be famous and (if you knew the right hedge fund) probably very rich. Famous, sure. Rich? Perhaps… but I suspect that annoying a superpower will mean that, like Snowden, one would be somewhat restricted in ability to make use of any such wealth or fame.