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The issue is the "sufficiently anonymized" part. Given a large enough number of dimensions, you may be able to identify students well enough. For example, if y
by giovannibonetti 3y ago
The issue is the "sufficiently anonymized" part. Given a large enough number of dimensions, you may be able to identify students well enough.
For example, if you take all students that took course A at time X, course B at time Y, course C at time Z and so on, eventually you might be able to narrow it down to a very small group, perhaps to even a single student.
- chaps 3y agoCorrect. I've done a fair amount of de-obfuscation work and it's frighteningly trivial sometimes.
- godelski 3y agoThis will also probably follow a power series too. So it isn't unlikely that you could deanonymize someone given just 2 courses. Not much information is needed to encode a lot of things.
- mrangle 3y agoYou're attempting to make an argument against any anonymized data being used in research. You'd have to do better than a hypothetical to make headway with it. Moreover, the logic would have to carry over to the very common practice of anonymizing data in professional communications (like training). Which would have HIPAA implications for some students. The common anonymizing practices have been utilized for decades without privacy breaches of note. That track record is also what your argument would have to defeat.
- chaps 3y agoWhat's being discussed is the release of information directly to the public, not strictly to researchers.