7 ms·

Agree with the general point. It’s one of few subfields which is about reducing “interop”, or what is allowed to be done within a system. Auth(n,z) are also in

by klabb3 3y ago

Agree with the general point. It’s one of few subfields which is about reducing “interop”, or what is allowed to be done within a system. Auth(n,z) are also in that domain, yet perhaps not academic fields in their own right. Interestingly, this is also true for DRM, which is also political but does not protect individuals, generally. So restricting what “can be done” as a political expression depends on the “for who?”, even if the tech itself is inanimate and neutral.

PerryCox 3y ago
This is a very realistic take on the subject. From an academic perspective it is a tool to be used as any other and gaining knowledge on how to better protect data is worthwhile and provides value to humanity as a whole. DRM is one use that does not favor consumers, on the other hand we have encryption being used in apps like Signal to provide the same high quality software to every day consumers. I'm very interested in quantum computers, specifically ones powerful enough to break AES and other types of modern encryption. What will that mean for humanity and individuals?
- thiagoharry 3y ago
  As far as I know, there are no known quantum attacks that break the security of AES. It is unknown if they are able to turn AES insecure, like they do to RSA and discrete logarithm problems. And there are several post-quantum candidate alternatives to replace RSA and crypto algorithms that would break under quantum attacks. Quantum computers break several security assumptions. But not all of them and we usually can replace the broken assumptions. Discovering that P=NP, or that one-way functions do not exist, on the other hand, would imply that several secure cryptographic constructions that we want to use are in fact impossible and would be a much scarier discovery.
  - js8 3y ago
    Practical P=NP is a very real possibility (I am just testing a new algorithm) and (IMHO) not that scary. I am of the opinion that the advantages of P=NP far outweigh the disadvantages. People tend to focus on the latter, because that's the world we currently live in. Even if we focus on crypto only, from the perspective of people being oppressed around the world, it would be far better for them to be able to see what is being done by the powerful publicly rather than not. This is essential for transparency, which is essential for democracy. I don't reject the ideals of e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Declaration_of_the_Independence_of_Cyberspace https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Declaration_of_the_Independe..., but I believe that the technological solution through cryptography is not tenable, and if we got rid of cryptography, it would actually level the playing field.
    - GTP 3y ago
      I'm not sure whether I agree or not, as without cryptography the only way to have a private discussion with someone, which I think is equally important to transparency, as people usually are "transparent" about personal stuff with close friends/family members only under the condition that other people don't have access to the information, would be to have such conversation in person behind closed doors. Which it isn't always easy, think people living far apart. Consider also that having no cryptography isn't by itself enough to have a transparent government: they can still lock important documents in a physically secure place and have a long jail sentence as a deterrent for people thinking about leaking them.
      - js8 3y ago
        > Consider also that having no cryptography isn't by itself enough to have a transparent government: they can still lock important documents in a physically secure place and have a long jail sentence as a deterrent for people thinking about leaking them. But here you say that: Security can depend on social contract and not technology. But the same argument can be applied to your original objection. We can mandate (in the social contract) that people have the right to privacy. (And there are some analogs where we do that, for example, we could have Gattaca-like dystopia where people's access to health care is based on genetics, yet all developed countries have a ban on such discrimination.) I think it's far more dangerous that the government or adversary is technologically capable of being non-transparent than if ordinary people don't have capability to be non-transparent. It's because I believe power ultimately thrives on information asymetry, and the encryption only amplifies this asymetry.
        red1reaper 3y ago
        I am going to be pedantic as i am perfectly aware that you do not mean it this way but here we go: > Security can depend on social contract and not technology. Social contracts are technology, laws are technology, law as a concept is technology, Society is technology.
        3y ago
  - tialaramex 3y ago
    Grover's Algorithm gets you effectively a square root difficulty improvement. So, AES 256 is "only" as strong as a 128-bit symmetric encryption if you have equivalently cheap quantum computers. Even ignoring that we don't currently have any usable quantum computers and there's no reason to believe they would be affordable, let alone cheap, this mean AES-256 is fine.
    - less_less 3y ago
      Grover's algorithm is not quite as powerful as popularly described. In particular, it (roughly) divides the number of times you need to run AES by the number of times you run it sequentially. So it effectively square-roots the time requirement rather than the difficulty, and those are very different if the attack is parallel. Eg if you were planning on breaking AES-128 by running 2^30 cores for 2^98 AES calls, it now only takes about 2^49 calls per core (2^79 total effort) plus the overhead of Grover's algorithm itself. There are also huge overheads from running everything on a quantum computer, some of which are theoretically avoidable (100x cost for error correction; gates take one clock cycle) and some of which are probably not (you must rewrite AES so that all computations are reversible). So breaking AES-128 might eventually be feasible, but AES-192 probably would not be. There is a theoretical barrier against efficiently parallelizing Grover: all generic quantum brute-force algorithms (the kind that would work against a random function in a black box) require Omega(searchspace / depth) queries, at least for some model that may not quite match reality. (Edit: Omega and not O, since it's a lower bound) Of course, AES isn't a random function in a black box, so there may be better attacks against it, but I'm not aware of any.
matheusmoreira 3y ago
Remote attestation is another example of cryptography favoring corporations at our expense. It provides cryptographic proof to corporations that their user hostile software has not been defeated or otherwise tampered with.
- klabb3 3y ago
  Yes I should maybe have included it. But to me, that just seems like newspeak for DRM that poses as security.
  - matheusmoreira 3y ago
    Attestation can be considered a good security feature if we own the keys to the machine. Some PCs let us use our own keys in secure boot. For the people who use it, this absolutely enhances security without sacrificing any freedom. What's unacceptable is corporations using the same technology to protect themselves from the users of the computers.
- ntrebius 3y ago
  Don't forget that you can also remotely attest a server... in which case you can get guarantees on how a corporation is manipulating your data. For instance, you could make sure that your data is reasonably secured and not shared with third parties. So I don't believe remote attestation in itself favors corporation, it really depends on how and where you make use of it. Sadly the adoption of "trusted computing" on the server side has been slower than expected. Maybe because of lack of user pressure? Also my guess is that most companies prefer not to be too transparent regarding how they process our data...
  - matheusmoreira 3y ago
    > So I don't believe remote attestation in itself favors corporation, it really depends on how and where you make use of it. This is true but also ultimately irrelevant. The truth is these corporations have all the leverage and they use it to force us to accept those terms. If you can get a business to give up its limitless power over their servers via remote attestation, you're probably a business with leverage yourself. We mere mortals don't enjoy such privileges. To them, we're cattle to be herded and monetized. These days apps will not even start up if they detect anything out of the ordinary. I can't exactly choose not to use my bank's app and it refuses to run even if I so much as enable developer mode on my phone. I used to be able to hack these things and use them on my own terms if I cared enough. Now the remote service will refuse to interoperate unless they get cryptographic proof their hostile software is running unmodified. It's all about who owns the keys to the system. If we do, it's good. If they do, it's bad. The paper explains it really well: "Cryptography rearranges power: it configures who can do what, from what." These corporations are using it to systematically reduce our power and increase their own. The reverse should happen: they should be completely powerless and we should be omnipotent.
dirkc 3y ago
> even if the tech itself is inanimate and neutral I've come to believe that no tech is neutral. Some tech allows more variety in the politics surrounding it, while other tech has a very narrow range or politics - like DRM.
- hiatus 3y ago
  Interesting, could you expand on your view about the range of politics afforded by technologies? Specifically, your mention of DRM was intriguing. While I personally dislike DRM applied to consumer devices and content, I think there are applications of digital rights that are less objectionable, like ensuring the integrity of medical device firmware deployed in a hospital.
  - dirkc 3y ago
    It depends on the technology in question, but most development has some agenda that drives it or that is enabled by it. Simply engaging in the development of tech is already pushing an agenda - the notion that we should pursue technological advancement. For me the important realization is that I'm not being neutral when creating something - at best/worst I'm being ignorant. I'd like to reflect more on my motivations for building things and be more explicit on my motivations for doing so.
- BSEdlMMldESB 3y ago
  but is DRM a 'technology' or is it something more specific? if computers are a technology, then DRM is an specific application of it??? ugh, I just destroyed my own understanding
- Nasrudith 3y ago
  I've come to a view that is an antonym personally whose difference is oddly semantic. The tech is neutral in itself but people can make absolutely anything political. There are no real constraints on sanity. They can make needing to eat and drink to survive political because admitting the obvious contradicts 'great leader'.
- klabb3 3y ago

by klabb3 3y ago

PerryCox 3y ago

This is a very realistic take on the subject. From an academic perspective it is a tool to be used as any other and gaining knowledge on how to better protect data is worthwhile and provides value to humanity as a whole. DRM is one use that does not favor consumers, on the other hand we have encryption being used in apps like Signal to provide the same high quality software to every day consumers. I'm very interested in quantum computers, specifically ones powerful enough to break AES and other types of modern encryption. What will that mean for humanity and individuals?

thiagoharry 3y ago
As far as I know, there are no known quantum attacks that break the security of AES. It is unknown if they are able to turn AES insecure, like they do to RSA and discrete logarithm problems. And there are several post-quantum candidate alternatives to replace RSA and crypto algorithms that would break under quantum attacks. Quantum computers break several security assumptions. But not all of them and we usually can replace the broken assumptions. Discovering that P=NP, or that one-way functions do not exist, on the other hand, would imply that several secure cryptographic constructions that we want to use are in fact impossible and would be a much scarier discovery.
- js8 3y ago
  Practical P=NP is a very real possibility (I am just testing a new algorithm) and (IMHO) not that scary. I am of the opinion that the advantages of P=NP far outweigh the disadvantages. People tend to focus on the latter, because that's the world we currently live in. Even if we focus on crypto only, from the perspective of people being oppressed around the world, it would be far better for them to be able to see what is being done by the powerful publicly rather than not. This is essential for transparency, which is essential for democracy. I don't reject the ideals of e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Declaration_of_the_Independence_of_Cyberspace https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Declaration_of_the_Independe..., but I believe that the technological solution through cryptography is not tenable, and if we got rid of cryptography, it would actually level the playing field.
  - GTP 3y ago
    I'm not sure whether I agree or not, as without cryptography the only way to have a private discussion with someone, which I think is equally important to transparency, as people usually are "transparent" about personal stuff with close friends/family members only under the condition that other people don't have access to the information, would be to have such conversation in person behind closed doors. Which it isn't always easy, think people living far apart. Consider also that having no cryptography isn't by itself enough to have a transparent government: they can still lock important documents in a physically secure place and have a long jail sentence as a deterrent for people thinking about leaking them.
    - js8 3y ago
      > Consider also that having no cryptography isn't by itself enough to have a transparent government: they can still lock important documents in a physically secure place and have a long jail sentence as a deterrent for people thinking about leaking them. But here you say that: Security can depend on social contract and not technology. But the same argument can be applied to your original objection. We can mandate (in the social contract) that people have the right to privacy. (And there are some analogs where we do that, for example, we could have Gattaca-like dystopia where people's access to health care is based on genetics, yet all developed countries have a ban on such discrimination.) I think it's far more dangerous that the government or adversary is technologically capable of being non-transparent than if ordinary people don't have capability to be non-transparent. It's because I believe power ultimately thrives on information asymetry, and the encryption only amplifies this asymetry.
      - red1reaper 3y ago
        I am going to be pedantic as i am perfectly aware that you do not mean it this way but here we go: > Security can depend on social contract and not technology. Social contracts are technology, laws are technology, law as a concept is technology, Society is technology.
        3y ago
- tialaramex 3y ago
  Grover's Algorithm gets you effectively a square root difficulty improvement. So, AES 256 is "only" as strong as a 128-bit symmetric encryption if you have equivalently cheap quantum computers. Even ignoring that we don't currently have any usable quantum computers and there's no reason to believe they would be affordable, let alone cheap, this mean AES-256 is fine.
  - less_less 3y ago
    Grover's algorithm is not quite as powerful as popularly described. In particular, it (roughly) divides the number of times you need to run AES by the number of times you run it sequentially. So it effectively square-roots the time requirement rather than the difficulty, and those are very different if the attack is parallel. Eg if you were planning on breaking AES-128 by running 2^30 cores for 2^98 AES calls, it now only takes about 2^49 calls per core (2^79 total effort) plus the overhead of Grover's algorithm itself. There are also huge overheads from running everything on a quantum computer, some of which are theoretically avoidable (100x cost for error correction; gates take one clock cycle) and some of which are probably not (you must rewrite AES so that all computations are reversible). So breaking AES-128 might eventually be feasible, but AES-192 probably would not be. There is a theoretical barrier against efficiently parallelizing Grover: all generic quantum brute-force algorithms (the kind that would work against a random function in a black box) require Omega(searchspace / depth) queries, at least for some model that may not quite match reality. (Edit: Omega and not O, since it's a lower bound) Of course, AES isn't a random function in a black box, so there may be better attacks against it, but I'm not aware of any.

matheusmoreira 3y ago

Remote attestation is another example of cryptography favoring corporations at our expense. It provides cryptographic proof to corporations that their user hostile software has not been defeated or otherwise tampered with.

klabb3 3y ago
Yes I should maybe have included it. But to me, that just seems like newspeak for DRM that poses as security.
- matheusmoreira 3y ago
  Attestation can be considered a good security feature if we own the keys to the machine. Some PCs let us use our own keys in secure boot. For the people who use it, this absolutely enhances security without sacrificing any freedom. What's unacceptable is corporations using the same technology to protect themselves from the users of the computers.
ntrebius 3y ago
Don't forget that you can also remotely attest a server... in which case you can get guarantees on how a corporation is manipulating your data. For instance, you could make sure that your data is reasonably secured and not shared with third parties. So I don't believe remote attestation in itself favors corporation, it really depends on how and where you make use of it. Sadly the adoption of "trusted computing" on the server side has been slower than expected. Maybe because of lack of user pressure? Also my guess is that most companies prefer not to be too transparent regarding how they process our data...
- matheusmoreira 3y ago
  > So I don't believe remote attestation in itself favors corporation, it really depends on how and where you make use of it. This is true but also ultimately irrelevant. The truth is these corporations have all the leverage and they use it to force us to accept those terms. If you can get a business to give up its limitless power over their servers via remote attestation, you're probably a business with leverage yourself. We mere mortals don't enjoy such privileges. To them, we're cattle to be herded and monetized. These days apps will not even start up if they detect anything out of the ordinary. I can't exactly choose not to use my bank's app and it refuses to run even if I so much as enable developer mode on my phone. I used to be able to hack these things and use them on my own terms if I cared enough. Now the remote service will refuse to interoperate unless they get cryptographic proof their hostile software is running unmodified. It's all about who owns the keys to the system. If we do, it's good. If they do, it's bad. The paper explains it really well: "Cryptography rearranges power: it configures who can do what, from what." These corporations are using it to systematically reduce our power and increase their own. The reverse should happen: they should be completely powerless and we should be omnipotent.

dirkc 3y ago

> even if the tech itself is inanimate and neutral I've come to believe that no tech is neutral. Some tech allows more variety in the politics surrounding it, while other tech has a very narrow range or politics - like DRM.

hiatus 3y ago
Interesting, could you expand on your view about the range of politics afforded by technologies? Specifically, your mention of DRM was intriguing. While I personally dislike DRM applied to consumer devices and content, I think there are applications of digital rights that are less objectionable, like ensuring the integrity of medical device firmware deployed in a hospital.
- dirkc 3y ago
  It depends on the technology in question, but most development has some agenda that drives it or that is enabled by it. Simply engaging in the development of tech is already pushing an agenda - the notion that we should pursue technological advancement. For me the important realization is that I'm not being neutral when creating something - at best/worst I'm being ignorant. I'd like to reflect more on my motivations for building things and be more explicit on my motivations for doing so.
BSEdlMMldESB 3y ago
but is DRM a 'technology' or is it something more specific? if computers are a technology, then DRM is an specific application of it??? ugh, I just destroyed my own understanding
Nasrudith 3y ago
I've come to a view that is an antonym personally whose difference is oddly semantic. The tech is neutral in itself but people can make absolutely anything political. There are no real constraints on sanity. They can make needing to eat and drink to survive political because admitting the obvious contradicts 'great leader'.
klabb3 3y ago