3 ms·

Quicklisp doesn’t use TLS or signatures? How have I not heard this before? That would be unbelievably irresponsible. Has this really not been addressed by the

Quicklisp doesn’t use TLS or signatures? How have I not heard this before? That would be unbelievably irresponsible. Has this really not been addressed by the CL community? Edit: here’s the issue: https://github.com/quicklisp/quicklisp-client/issues/167 https://github.com/quicklisp/quicklisp-client/issues/167 Thanks for bringing this up!

koito17 3y ago
The reason for this is quite simple: portability. Quicklisp also uses plain TAR files to distribute dists. Why? Because quicklisp has a built-in TAR extractor written in 100% standard/portable CL. This allows Quicklisp to run on just about everything, from your computer to real LispMs and operating systems like Mezzano. TLS comes up every time someone discusses Quicklisp, but nobody bothers to go ahead and actually implement it portably (and even if they did, have fun with performance and side channel attacks, both of which require you to break portability to implement well for every platform you want to target). If you would like a more stereotypical package manager, consider using CLPM. Though one of the big reasons to use CLPM is not encryption IMO, but versioning. ASDF supports locking versions of dependencies, but Quicklisp doesnt ever use this and instead constantly pushes latest of everything from git repositories. This IMO sucks a lot more than using plain HTTP given that this actually breaks code, whereas some MITM from plain HTTP connection to Quicklisp would require so much coordination (and specificity of target) that it's just not in my threat model at all.
- schemescape 3y ago
  > Quicklisp doesnt ever use this and instead constantly pushes latest of everything from git repositories Yeah, I didn't recall off hand, but this was one of my main complaints with Quicklisp vs. other package managers I've used (for other ecosystems--not CL). > whereas some MITM from plain HTTP connection to Quicklisp would require so much coordination (and specificity of target) that it's just not in my threat model at all I hope you're right, but it still seems like an unnecessary risk. Even if I can't imagine a scenario where someone is able to MITM me (or, more likely, a server I'm deploying code to), there's still the lingering feeling that it's possible. I certainly wouldn't download an executable over HTTP and run it, and downloading library code is fairly similar (although easier to inspect, at least).
- deleted 3y ago
  [deleted]
- ristos 3y ago
  This does keep coming up, and it's a few years old now. I think Quicklisp can easily still support https while supporting the older packages that are tar+http, which could easily be mirrored in a git repo. Quicklisp has unfortunately taken over the entire ecosystem, making it hard to use anything else, and you often need to depend on it to use a lot of tools in the ecosystem. It sort of reminds me of Systemd in that way. I agree on the version pinning being a worse situation, and also not having something like "node_modules" for lisp. I haven't tried CLPM since a while back, it was kind of hard to setup back then. I have a little package manager thing, cl-micropm, that just uses Quicklisp to fetch everything via docker (should probably support podman too), and an .envrc file to tell ASDF to look in the project directory (a project-local node_modules-like folder called "lisp-systems") for systems. That way I can pin my deps manually by picking the commits + git submodule in lisp-systems/, and it's isolated to my local project. I looked into using the Docker container to rewrite the requests to use https, bypassing whatever Quicklisp is doing, but I never got around to that. I'm looking to switch it to something even simpler/explicit though, cl-pm, that'll only optionally need/use Quicklisp via podman _only_ to figure out what the dependencies are, and then just have a function that uses wget/curl/git-pull to conveniently explicitly pull them in on request. That way you can decide to add a git mirror for an old http library, or pin a specific version, etc. It's slightly more manual than Quicklisp or CLPM, not a big deal, but very easy for anyone with just a little bit of lisp knowledge to understand the whole thing in under an hour.
  - aidenn0 3y ago
    > Quicklisp has unfortunately taken over the entire ecosystem, making it hard to use anything else, and you often need to depend on it to use a lot of tools in the ecosystem. It sort of reminds me of Systemd in that way. This is a strange statement. What requires QL to work? In the "bad old days" you had to manually download the sources and drop them somewhere ASDF could find them[1]. This still works. You can blithely live as if QL does not exist and get that same experience. 1: Yes, there was asdf-install, but I think I managed to get that to work once with about half-a-dozen tries?
    - ristos 3y ago
- eadmund 3y ago
  Quicklisp doesn’t need to support TLS, but it does need to support authentication of some sort. Signing files would be good enough.
  - joe-user 3y ago
    Are you proposing authentication over an insecure connection? If so, then the credentials could be compromised by a middle man. The same would be true for the signatures.
- chlorion 3y ago
  I don't really buy this argument at all. There is no technical reason why quicklisp couldn't use the systems libcurl and openssl when its available and fallback to fetching with its portable http implementation when they aren't available. Every other languages package manager has managed to solve this issue! If the issue is that nobody has actually had time to work on it, that's fair, but I don't believe that optionally supporting libcurl would cause QL to be less portable.
atgreen 3y ago
Try ocicl instead of quicklisp. System tarballs are hosted in an OCI registry, and are downloaded via TLS connections (obeying proxies). Tarballs are signed and signatures are stored in the sigstore rekor transparency log for later inspection. https://github.com/ocicl/ocicl https://github.com/ocicl/ocicl
- schemescape 3y ago
  Just wanted to say I did see your other comment and am intrigued by ocicl. Thanks!

koito17 3y ago

The reason for this is quite simple: portability. Quicklisp also uses plain TAR files to distribute dists. Why? Because quicklisp has a built-in TAR extractor written in 100% standard/portable CL. This allows Quicklisp to run on just about everything, from your computer to real LispMs and operating systems like Mezzano. TLS comes up every time someone discusses Quicklisp, but nobody bothers to go ahead and actually implement it portably (and even if they did, have fun with performance and side channel attacks, both of which require you to break portability to implement well for every platform you want to target). If you would like a more stereotypical package manager, consider using CLPM. Though one of the big reasons to use CLPM is not encryption IMO, but versioning. ASDF supports locking versions of dependencies, but Quicklisp doesnt ever use this and instead constantly pushes latest of everything from git repositories. This IMO sucks a lot more than using plain HTTP given that this actually breaks code, whereas some MITM from plain HTTP connection to Quicklisp would require so much coordination (and specificity of target) that it's just not in my threat model at all.

schemescape 3y ago
> Quicklisp doesnt ever use this and instead constantly pushes latest of everything from git repositories Yeah, I didn't recall off hand, but this was one of my main complaints with Quicklisp vs. other package managers I've used (for other ecosystems--not CL). > whereas some MITM from plain HTTP connection to Quicklisp would require so much coordination (and specificity of target) that it's just not in my threat model at all I hope you're right, but it still seems like an unnecessary risk. Even if I can't imagine a scenario where someone is able to MITM me (or, more likely, a server I'm deploying code to), there's still the lingering feeling that it's possible. I certainly wouldn't download an executable over HTTP and run it, and downloading library code is fairly similar (although easier to inspect, at least).
deleted 3y ago
[deleted]
ristos 3y ago
This does keep coming up, and it's a few years old now. I think Quicklisp can easily still support https while supporting the older packages that are tar+http, which could easily be mirrored in a git repo. Quicklisp has unfortunately taken over the entire ecosystem, making it hard to use anything else, and you often need to depend on it to use a lot of tools in the ecosystem. It sort of reminds me of Systemd in that way. I agree on the version pinning being a worse situation, and also not having something like "node_modules" for lisp. I haven't tried CLPM since a while back, it was kind of hard to setup back then. I have a little package manager thing, cl-micropm, that just uses Quicklisp to fetch everything via docker (should probably support podman too), and an .envrc file to tell ASDF to look in the project directory (a project-local node_modules-like folder called "lisp-systems") for systems. That way I can pin my deps manually by picking the commits + git submodule in lisp-systems/, and it's isolated to my local project. I looked into using the Docker container to rewrite the requests to use https, bypassing whatever Quicklisp is doing, but I never got around to that. I'm looking to switch it to something even simpler/explicit though, cl-pm, that'll only optionally need/use Quicklisp via podman _only_ to figure out what the dependencies are, and then just have a function that uses wget/curl/git-pull to conveniently explicitly pull them in on request. That way you can decide to add a git mirror for an old http library, or pin a specific version, etc. It's slightly more manual than Quicklisp or CLPM, not a big deal, but very easy for anyone with just a little bit of lisp knowledge to understand the whole thing in under an hour.
- aidenn0 3y ago
  > Quicklisp has unfortunately taken over the entire ecosystem, making it hard to use anything else, and you often need to depend on it to use a lot of tools in the ecosystem. It sort of reminds me of Systemd in that way. This is a strange statement. What requires QL to work? In the "bad old days" you had to manually download the sources and drop them somewhere ASDF could find them[1]. This still works. You can blithely live as if QL does not exist and get that same experience. 1: Yes, there was asdf-install, but I think I managed to get that to work once with about half-a-dozen tries?
  - ristos 3y ago
eadmund 3y ago
Quicklisp doesn’t need to support TLS, but it does need to support authentication of some sort. Signing files would be good enough.
- joe-user 3y ago
  Are you proposing authentication over an insecure connection? If so, then the credentials could be compromised by a middle man. The same would be true for the signatures.
chlorion 3y ago
I don't really buy this argument at all. There is no technical reason why quicklisp couldn't use the systems libcurl and openssl when its available and fallback to fetching with its portable http implementation when they aren't available. Every other languages package manager has managed to solve this issue! If the issue is that nobody has actually had time to work on it, that's fair, but I don't believe that optionally supporting libcurl would cause QL to be less portable.

atgreen 3y ago

Try ocicl instead of quicklisp. System tarballs are hosted in an OCI registry, and are downloaded via TLS connections (obeying proxies). Tarballs are signed and signatures are stored in the sigstore rekor transparency log for later inspection. https://github.com/ocicl/ocicl https://github.com/ocicl/ocicl

schemescape 3y ago
Just wanted to say I did see your other comment and am intrigued by ocicl. Thanks!