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> More important than the namespace is who published the package. I'm more inclined to trust an individual I know who takes security than a namespace that may c
by lelanthran 3y ago
> More important than the namespace is who published the package. I'm more inclined to trust an individual I know who takes security than a namespace that may change hands.
Doesn't matter if you trust them; can you trust the 100+ dependencies they pull in? If it's a large package, you can be certain that they aren't verifying their deps.
- lmm 3y agoSo write a tool that checks the authors of all your transitive dependencies against your trusted list. (Or, more likely, pull one in, I'm sure someone's written that already). Are you a programmer or not? The amount of pearl-clutching over numbers of dependencies is something I'll never understand.
- lelanthran 3y agoIt works nicely in your theory, in practice no one does this because you always have a chain in which some dep is not trusted. Always. It's a poor ecosystem, dominated by untrustworthy participants. There's no digital identity verification of participants or their packages. anyone can claim to be whoever they want to. Pointing this out is not pearl clutching, and if it was easy to solve it would have been done so by now. The only way to trust a package is to verify the authors identity and verify that that identity generated that package. But tying packages to domain names means that all these low effort two line package authors have to put in non-minimal effort (acquire a domain, maintain the cert) which is not going to happen.
- lmm 3y ago> It works nicely in your theory, in practice no one does this because you always have a chain in which some dep is not trusted. It works fine in practice; I've seen at least one big company do it. It doesn't happen in the public ecosystem only because people don't care enough. > It's a poor ecosystem, dominated by untrustworthy participants. There's no digital identity verification of participants or their packages. anyone can claim to be whoever they want to. Fixing that isn't hard. The Java/Maven ecosystem already enforces OpenPGP signing of all package uploads; NPM could do the same if they wanted.