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Good. And I think watermarking AI output is also a dead end. Better that we simply assume that all content is fake unless proven otherwise. To the extent tha

Good. And I think watermarking AI output is also a dead end. Better that we simply assume that all content is fake unless proven otherwise. To the extent that we need trustworthy photos, it seems like a better idea to cryptographically sign images at the hardware level when the photo is taken. Voluntarily watermarking AI content is completely pointless.

sebzim4500 3y ago
I can see that working for specialized equipment like police body cameras, but if every camera manufacturer in the world needs to manage keys and install them securely into their sensors then there will be leaked keys within weeks.
- tudorw 3y ago
  Makes fake image, hold it in front of camera, click, verified image...
  - Wingy 3y ago
    The signed timestamp and location would give that away, but those would have to become not configurable by the user.
    - cwkoss 3y ago
      clocks and gps sensors can be hacked, there is no fundamental source of truth to fall back on here. its as Sisyphean a task as AI detection.
- ummonk 3y ago
  Just use a certificate chain. The manufacturer can provide each camera its own private key, signed by the manufacturer.
  - explaininjs 3y ago
    And when the sensor bus is hijacked to directly feed “trusted” data into the processor?
    - ummonk 3y ago
      Then you can examine the specific camera and try to prove it has been tampered with. At least you know exactly which camera to look at.
cwkoss 3y ago
Cryptography cant save us here, people will figure out how to send AI images to the crypto hardware to get it signed in months. Just would be another similar layer of false security.
- baby_souffle 3y ago
  > Cryptography cant save us here, people will figure out how to send AI images to the crypto hardware to get it signed in months. Possibly (who am I kidding. *PROBABLY*!) will use chatGPT to help them design the method :)
- malfist 3y ago
  That's not how cryptographic signing works. Cryptographic signing means "I wrote this" or "I created this". Sure you could sign an AI generated image as yourself. But you could not sign an image as being created by Getty or NYT
  - esclerofilo 3y ago
    I believe that's not what they're saying. It's signing hardware, like a camera that signs every picture you take, so not even you can tamper with it without invalidating that signature. Naively, then, a signed picture would be proof that it was a real picture taken of a real thing. What GP is saying is that people would inevitably get the keys from the cameras, and then the whole thing would be pointless.
    - cwkoss 3y ago
      Yep. A chain of trust is one way to solve this problem. Chains of trust aren't perfect, but they can work. But if you're going to build a chain of trust that relies on humans to certify they used a non-tampered-with crypto camera, why not just let them use plain ol cameras. Adding cryptosigning hardware just adds a false sense of security that grifter salespeople will lie and say is 'impossible to break', and non-technical decision makers wont understand the threat model.
    - deleted 3y ago
      [deleted]

sebzim4500 3y ago

I can see that working for specialized equipment like police body cameras, but if every camera manufacturer in the world needs to manage keys and install them securely into their sensors then there will be leaked keys within weeks.

tudorw 3y ago
Makes fake image, hold it in front of camera, click, verified image...
- Wingy 3y ago
  The signed timestamp and location would give that away, but those would have to become not configurable by the user.
  - cwkoss 3y ago
    clocks and gps sensors can be hacked, there is no fundamental source of truth to fall back on here. its as Sisyphean a task as AI detection.
ummonk 3y ago
Just use a certificate chain. The manufacturer can provide each camera its own private key, signed by the manufacturer.
- explaininjs 3y ago
  And when the sensor bus is hijacked to directly feed “trusted” data into the processor?
  - ummonk 3y ago
    Then you can examine the specific camera and try to prove it has been tampered with. At least you know exactly which camera to look at.

cwkoss 3y ago

Cryptography cant save us here, people will figure out how to send AI images to the crypto hardware to get it signed in months. Just would be another similar layer of false security.

baby_souffle 3y ago
> Cryptography cant save us here, people will figure out how to send AI images to the crypto hardware to get it signed in months. Possibly (who am I kidding. *PROBABLY*!) will use chatGPT to help them design the method :)
malfist 3y ago
That's not how cryptographic signing works. Cryptographic signing means "I wrote this" or "I created this". Sure you could sign an AI generated image as yourself. But you could not sign an image as being created by Getty or NYT
- esclerofilo 3y ago
  I believe that's not what they're saying. It's signing hardware, like a camera that signs every picture you take, so not even you can tamper with it without invalidating that signature. Naively, then, a signed picture would be proof that it was a real picture taken of a real thing. What GP is saying is that people would inevitably get the keys from the cameras, and then the whole thing would be pointless.
  - cwkoss 3y ago
    Yep. A chain of trust is one way to solve this problem. Chains of trust aren't perfect, but they can work. But if you're going to build a chain of trust that relies on humans to certify they used a non-tampered-with crypto camera, why not just let them use plain ol cameras. Adding cryptosigning hardware just adds a false sense of security that grifter salespeople will lie and say is 'impossible to break', and non-technical decision makers wont understand the threat model.
  - deleted 3y ago
    [deleted]