One of the authors responded to correct a Dutch publication about this research [1]. He explains the attack thusly: - Attacker intercepts message that he deci

One of the authors responded to correct a Dutch publication about this research [1]. He explains the attack thusly: - Attacker intercepts message that he decides he wants to decrypt. - Attacker later goes to a location of his choice, and targets a (possibly different) radio with his directional antenna, pretending to be infrastructure. - Attacker plays with the radio's perception of time to discover the keystream used to encrypt the previously intercepted message - Attacker applies keystream to message and obtains decrypted message. The connection between radio and mast is therefore not directly attacked. It is therefore not a man in the middle. At a different time, another connection is set up, whereby that radio then leaks material with which an earlier message (possibly from another radio) can be decrypted. Finally; Even back then, 32 bits were not sufficient to protect confidentiality, especially given the often sensitive use cases of TETRA networks. [1] https://tweakers.net/nieuws/212022/onderzoekers-vinden-kwetsbaarheden-in-radio-encryptiestandaard-van-c2000.html?showReaction=18984890#r_18984890 https://tweakers.net/nieuws/212022/onderzoekers-vinden-kwets...