According to ETSI who have been busy reading their thesaurus to redefine negative sounding words, it wasn't a "backdoor" they specified into TEA1, rather, it's

According to ETSI who have been busy reading their thesaurus to redefine negative sounding words, it wasn't a "backdoor" they specified into TEA1, rather, it's just a necessary application of export control regulations. "The TETRA security standards have been specified together with national security agencies and are designed for and subject to export control regulations which determine the strength of the encryption. These regulations apply to all available encryption technologies. As the designer of the TETRA security algorithms, ETSI does not consider that this constitutes a “backdoor”.[1] ETSI also completely bullshits this claim: "We are pleased that this research affirmed the overall strength of the TETRA standard, finding no weaknesses in the TEA2 and TEA3 algorithms following extensive analysis."[1] Which directly conflicts with the researchers who found[2] and demonstrated[3] the highest severity problems directly impact users of TEA2 and TEA3 algorithms: "The issues of most immediate concern, especially to law enforcement and military users, are the decryption oracle and malleability attacks (CVE-2022-24401 and CVE-2022-24404) which allow for interception and malicious message injection against all non-E2EE protected traffic regardless of which TEA cipher is used. This could allow high-end adversaries to intercept or manipulate law enforcement and military radio communications." This claim from ETSI is a bit like saying that disk encryption software standard that specifies use of AES in ECB mode (note: very insecure) is strong because the underlying AES standard has no identified weaknesses. ETSI are responsible for the TETRA standards that vendors implement, and could have made it mandatory for vendors to implement features such as authenticated encryption, and/or could have developed test standards for vendors to use to verify their products are correctly implemented. ETSI released TEA5, TEA6 and TEA7 encryption schemes at the end of 2022, likely in response to this security research. TEA5 is for European Union states and TEA6 and TEA7 users are supposedly kept secret.[4] [1] https://www.etsi.org/newsroom/news/2260-etsi-and-tcca-statement-to-tetra-security-algorithms-research-findings-publication-on-24-july-2023 https://www.etsi.org/newsroom/news/2260-etsi-and-tcca-statem... [2] https://tetraburst.com/ https://tetraburst.com/ [3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oJjTiO6C9xs https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oJjTiO6C9xs (demonstration of CVE-2022-24401 being used to break into radio networks using TEA2 and TEA3 algorithms in under 10 minutes) [4] https://cdn.standards.iteh.ai/samples/63125/8392cdca31d74030be682782da2d9f29/ETSI-TS-101-053-5-V1-1-1-2022-12-.pdf https://cdn.standards.iteh.ai/samples/63125/8392cdca31d74030...