5 ms·

From the page: The vulnerability in the TEA1 cipher (CVE-2022-24402) is obviously the result of intentional weakning. While the cipher itself does not seem to

by Rygian 3y ago

From the page: The vulnerability in the TEA1 cipher (CVE-2022-24402) is obviously the result of intentional weakning. While the cipher itself does not seem to be a terribly weak design, there is a computational step which serves no other purpose than to reduce the key's effective entropy. Similar weakened cryptography has played a part in flaws in GSM (A5/1, A5/2), GMR (GMR-1), GPRS (GEA-1), DMR ('Basic' and 'Enhanced' encryption), and P25 (ADP) and mostly results from export control practices (See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars#PC_era https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars#PC_era) at the time of design. Unfortunately, in the decades that have passed since then, this cipher has remained in use both inside and outside Europe without loud and clear warnings being issued about its actual security posture.

lazide 3y ago
It seems similar to the locks you buy in typical hardware stores. While not sold that way (rather the opposite!), they have widely known weaknesses that allow compromise by any motivated actor with minimal work, while providing the illusion of security. And no one is interested in ‘fixing’ it near as I can tell, because it seems to work well enough most of the time, and is convenient for a number of parties. Weird huh?
- hardware2win 3y ago
  Yes, weird, because we must require higher standards for comp. sec.
  - lazide 3y ago
    Interestingly, I think you'll find that many folks disagree. [https://therecord.media/senate-dea-bill-targets-end-to-end-encryption-requires-companies-to-report-drugs https://therecord.media/senate-dea-bill-targets-end-to-end-e...]
- lokar 3y ago
  Except here the key was weakened to satisfy export requirements, without telling users. So they advertise an 80bit key, but secretly and intentionally use something much weaker. A back door
  - lazide 3y ago
    Should I not mention Masterlocks 'high security' line, which can usually be picked in seconds by anyone with a paperclip and 15 minutes to an hour of training? Or the numerous 'high security' locks with trivial bypasses?
    - dylan604 3y ago
      now do TSA locks
      - lazide 3y ago
        My favorite part of TSA locks is there are only 7 different keys. So if you lose your key in the airport, if you have more than a handful of people near you, you don't even need to know how to pick or break it. Someone has your key already! [https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/27/security-experts-have-cloned-all-seven-tsa-master-keys/ https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/27/security-experts-have-clon...] Or, just buy the replacement on amazon I guess [https://www.amazon.com/tsa-key/s?k=tsa+key https://www.amazon.com/tsa-key/s?k=tsa+key] Frankly, it's probably better to just use a random re-usable zip-tie. At least then you won't figure out you lost your 'key' somewhere inconvenient.
        dylan604 3y ago
        a TSA lock is nothing better than a fancy zip tie. except, when the TSA inspects your back, they will not use a new zip tie after cutting yours off. so you're SOL if you were hoping the zippers would stay together, but they will at least re-lock the TSA lock so the zippers will stay together.
        sneak 3y ago
- astrange 3y ago
  There's no reason to fix those locks because 1. if they were actually unpickable you could drill them out or cut them off and 2. you can replace the core yourself if you want to. It's harder than LPL makes it look though.
  - lazide 3y ago
    Kinda. I'm well aware of the why - I first learned to pick locks long before LPL went into law school, and have taught a lot of other folks how to pick too. Drilling and cutting shows signs of entry. Picking usually doesn't (at least not unambiguously or in a way a typical person will notice). Despite the old detective novels claiming otherwise. And replacing the core (which I often do!) requires knowledge and (minor) capital outlay that most folks just don't have. Notably, out of the box in the US, the locks generally 'work'. Everything is low density, there are alternative means of defending oneself against day to day criminal acts (guns), and generally a gov't that ignores folks - until they come down with unstoppable force on specific targets. There is not (yet) pervasive oppression like a Stasi/East Germany, China/Hong Kong, Gestapo/Reich Era Germany, Franco/Spain, etc. Notably, European and Asian residences have dramatically higher lock standards and stronger doors. Both regions are denser, and also have significant history of gov't unrest and a history of much more, shall we say, 'uncomfortable' relations between the gov't and the population. Doing a 'no knock raid' on a residence in any European or Asian city is going to look a lot more like this [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wqN7KpcpBLU https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wqN7KpcpBLU] for instance than in the US where it's a solid kick and they're in. (random click-baity youtube video, you've been warned!) I suspect both regions have real, practical security concerns + the population is willing to pay for them because culturally they've learned. Most American ones at the moment, haven't/don't have those concerns yet. And that is convenient for many parties.
    - mrguyorama 3y ago
      Americans also have a stupid amount of faith in the words on the box. Every lock says it is secure, so most people buying locks think they are secure. There's no real legal definition that contradicts the "secure" on the box, because Masterlock can very well deem "Pickable by a novice and drillable in seconds" as "secure"
- FreshStart 3y ago
  Never Says Anybody : Never roll your own crypto, as a large org.
- pravus 3y ago
  No, this is different. What you are talking about are things like bump keys which exploit known physical limitations in those types of locks in general. There is no way to fix this other than switching to an entirely different internal mechanism. What is being discussed here is the intentional disabling of existing security features within a locking mechanism which further reduces its effectiveness. This is regardless of the effectiveness of the class of lock overall. An example would be going to the hardware store and buying a 7-pin tumbler lock but only 5-pins are installed. Yes, all tumbler locks are vulnerable to bump keys but an additional hidden (and fraudulent) act was performed which further compromised my wishes for a "more secure" tumbler lock. In the case of cryptography, the locks are much stronger and there is vastly more at stake so it's important not to be too casual with the analysis. The 'fix' is to remove all doubt that any such malfeasance ever took place.
  - lazide 3y ago
    Eh. I'm not sure it's so different. For instance, security pins are inexpensive and dramatically increase picking difficulty while not impacting costs by more than a few cents/unit (at most!) or maintenance concerns by any noticable amount. The all plastic logout/tagout masterlock [https://www.amazon.com/Government-Safety-Lockout-Padlock-Zenex/dp/B00192092C/ref=sr_1_1?crid=PCAE426Z5GIB&keywords=masterlock%2Blockout%2Btagout%2Block&qid=1690218938&sprefix=masterlock%2Blockout%2Btagout%2Bloc%2Caps%2C135&sr=8-1&th=1 https://www.amazon.com/Government-Safety-Lockout-Padlock-Zen...] for instance has all security pins and is a real challenge to pick for most folks (including myself!), and makes it much harder to bump too. It isn't sold as high security. It's cheap, but also has a brass core and brass security pins, etc. so it's not like the core is skimping on things, or could be a major cost. The total (retail!) cost of the lock is a fraction of the 'high security' locks, even though those locks are much much easier to pick and bypass. The masterlock 'high security' pro series locks didn't have any security pins at ALL and were super easy to pick (or bump, likely) up until VERY recently. By very recently, I mean I just saw it when I checked out their current lineup - and a year or two ago they definitely did not have it!. It looks to have a SINGLE spool pin in it. They're now heavily promoting it as 'bumpstop' tech. I'm guessing LPL or similar finally made some sort of impact, or maybe word of mouth after contractors have all their shit stolen. Similar locks sold by the 'American Lock' brand (same ownership now) has always had at least one security pin, usually 3 in even their most basic padlocks for as long as they've existed I believe. 100 years? And that isn't even talking about bypasses which maybe fit what you're describing better. Many of the common commercial and residential locks sold today still have trivial bypasses or decoding that can be done with some practice in seconds by tools sold online. Such as this bad boy [https://www.amazon.com/Master-Lock-M40EURDNUM-Combination-M40EURDNUM-Best/dp/B00HUWZRS6/ref=sr_1_5?crid=2Q3JM32Z9LT96&keywords=masterlock+combination+lock+high+security&qid=1690219317&sprefix=masterlock+combination+lock+high+securit%2Caps%2C126&sr=8-5 https://www.amazon.com/Master-Lock-M40EURDNUM-Combination-M4...] And that is just the tip of the iceberg. Is it fraudulent? Eh... there is no real concrete definition for 'high security'! And fraud doesn't include 'mere fluffery' either. Masterlock certainly isn't claiming TR/TL-30 ratings on any of their stuff! These issues however have been widely known about in some cases for 50-100 years or more. For instance, doing some random googling I ran across this patent [https://patents.google.com/patent/US917365A/en https://patents.google.com/patent/US917365A/en] for pin within sleeve technology to work around that whole basic pin-tumbler picking issue (from 1908!), and at least according to this random website, spool pins were invented in 1865 by Yale himself, shortly after the first pin/tumbler locks were invented [https://www.art-of-lockpicking.com/security-pins/ https://www.art-of-lockpicking.com/security-pins/]! The patent expired so long ago, it is absolutely laughable to not use them, and it's definitely ridiculous for a pin-tumbler lock to not have at least ONE! If not have all but one of them spool or similar! I have a hard time seeing how that is any different than selling a secure system with an 80 bit crypto key where the 'secret algorithm' nukes all but a handful of the bits in a predictable way. Or like in the case of well known lock bypass exploits, where there isn't a way to poke the low level protocol to get it to set a known key value and let you take over. I think what you're getting at cryptography wise, is that unlike most physical locks, the vast majority of cryptographic usage is for data that there is no plausible way to have any confidence the cyphertext wasn't read by some unknown (and actively malicious) party. Bits can be copied perfectly, and stored essentially indefinitely without degradation and at low cost. And often, where the data is even public (or public like - with no way to control access). And no plausible way to have confidence that it hasn't been copied and someone isn't working on it right now. And no plausible way to have confidence that this wasn't being done on a massive scale, to nearly everyone, all at once. Even if someone picks a lock to an ATM, for instance, someone has to physically be there and spend actual time when they are at risk to pick it. And there are security cameras and usually some kind of guard or bystanders that can visually identify when something weird might be happening and intervene. That dramatically changes the actual risk profile and ability to extract value. The majority of situations tech wise, there is no equivalent. It's relatively easy to splice into an underground fiber link going into/out of a datacenter with no one noticing and 'pick' every lock going by and extract whatever you want from it with no one being able to tell for years. If ever. Frankly, there are also many reasons to be suspicious (or even know for sure!) that is actually being done, right now, by many parties. Some of which definitely don't have the data's 'owners' interests in mind. Most/All, if we're being honest, at least for them as individuals. Luckily, most of us don't seem to have anything worth stealing (individually), though in aggregate is another matter. And it would be a VERY tempting and VERY difficult to pass up target to not 'steal' all the interesting secrets from Congress and other powerful parties 'in the interest of national security' for instance. Especially the things not on official government computers. So I guess what I'm saying is - yes, it is absolutely critical to have good crypto. And yes, unlike a padlock guarding a shed, it has dramatically higher risks if it isn't actually a good lock - especially as we use it for banking, commerce, gov't, identity, etc). Especially since we need to be sure it will be good for the foreseeable future, because unlike a cheap padlock we decide to swap out when we figure out it's shit, someone can attack it and get what it was protecting potentially years or decades in the future. It's also in many parties interests to come up with reasons why people shouldn't have it (at least unless they're friendly/they like them), and there are a lot of market reasons why people won't notice or won't care until the problem is impossible to ignore and the damage is already occurring.
mcpackieh 3y ago
> #PC_era That section of the wikipedia page mainly concerns the US, but TEA came out of Cambridge. This section seems more relevant: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars#Export_of_cryptography_from_Britain https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars#Export_of_cryptogr...

by Rygian 3y ago

lazide 3y ago

It seems similar to the locks you buy in typical hardware stores. While not sold that way (rather the opposite!), they have widely known weaknesses that allow compromise by any motivated actor with minimal work, while providing the illusion of security. And no one is interested in ‘fixing’ it near as I can tell, because it seems to work well enough most of the time, and is convenient for a number of parties. Weird huh?

hardware2win 3y ago
Yes, weird, because we must require higher standards for comp. sec.
- lazide 3y ago
  Interestingly, I think you'll find that many folks disagree. [https://therecord.media/senate-dea-bill-targets-end-to-end-encryption-requires-companies-to-report-drugs https://therecord.media/senate-dea-bill-targets-end-to-end-e...]
lokar 3y ago
Except here the key was weakened to satisfy export requirements, without telling users. So they advertise an 80bit key, but secretly and intentionally use something much weaker. A back door
- lazide 3y ago
  Should I not mention Masterlocks 'high security' line, which can usually be picked in seconds by anyone with a paperclip and 15 minutes to an hour of training? Or the numerous 'high security' locks with trivial bypasses?
  - dylan604 3y ago
    now do TSA locks
    - lazide 3y ago
      My favorite part of TSA locks is there are only 7 different keys. So if you lose your key in the airport, if you have more than a handful of people near you, you don't even need to know how to pick or break it. Someone has your key already! [https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/27/security-experts-have-cloned-all-seven-tsa-master-keys/ https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/27/security-experts-have-clon...] Or, just buy the replacement on amazon I guess [https://www.amazon.com/tsa-key/s?k=tsa+key https://www.amazon.com/tsa-key/s?k=tsa+key] Frankly, it's probably better to just use a random re-usable zip-tie. At least then you won't figure out you lost your 'key' somewhere inconvenient.
      - dylan604 3y ago
        a TSA lock is nothing better than a fancy zip tie. except, when the TSA inspects your back, they will not use a new zip tie after cutting yours off. so you're SOL if you were hoping the zippers would stay together, but they will at least re-lock the TSA lock so the zippers will stay together.
      - sneak 3y ago
astrange 3y ago
There's no reason to fix those locks because 1. if they were actually unpickable you could drill them out or cut them off and 2. you can replace the core yourself if you want to. It's harder than LPL makes it look though.
- lazide 3y ago
  Kinda. I'm well aware of the why - I first learned to pick locks long before LPL went into law school, and have taught a lot of other folks how to pick too. Drilling and cutting shows signs of entry. Picking usually doesn't (at least not unambiguously or in a way a typical person will notice). Despite the old detective novels claiming otherwise. And replacing the core (which I often do!) requires knowledge and (minor) capital outlay that most folks just don't have. Notably, out of the box in the US, the locks generally 'work'. Everything is low density, there are alternative means of defending oneself against day to day criminal acts (guns), and generally a gov't that ignores folks - until they come down with unstoppable force on specific targets. There is not (yet) pervasive oppression like a Stasi/East Germany, China/Hong Kong, Gestapo/Reich Era Germany, Franco/Spain, etc. Notably, European and Asian residences have dramatically higher lock standards and stronger doors. Both regions are denser, and also have significant history of gov't unrest and a history of much more, shall we say, 'uncomfortable' relations between the gov't and the population. Doing a 'no knock raid' on a residence in any European or Asian city is going to look a lot more like this [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wqN7KpcpBLU https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wqN7KpcpBLU] for instance than in the US where it's a solid kick and they're in. (random click-baity youtube video, you've been warned!) I suspect both regions have real, practical security concerns + the population is willing to pay for them because culturally they've learned. Most American ones at the moment, haven't/don't have those concerns yet. And that is convenient for many parties.
  - mrguyorama 3y ago
    Americans also have a stupid amount of faith in the words on the box. Every lock says it is secure, so most people buying locks think they are secure. There's no real legal definition that contradicts the "secure" on the box, because Masterlock can very well deem "Pickable by a novice and drillable in seconds" as "secure"
FreshStart 3y ago
Never Says Anybody : Never roll your own crypto, as a large org.
pravus 3y ago
No, this is different. What you are talking about are things like bump keys which exploit known physical limitations in those types of locks in general. There is no way to fix this other than switching to an entirely different internal mechanism. What is being discussed here is the intentional disabling of existing security features within a locking mechanism which further reduces its effectiveness. This is regardless of the effectiveness of the class of lock overall. An example would be going to the hardware store and buying a 7-pin tumbler lock but only 5-pins are installed. Yes, all tumbler locks are vulnerable to bump keys but an additional hidden (and fraudulent) act was performed which further compromised my wishes for a "more secure" tumbler lock. In the case of cryptography, the locks are much stronger and there is vastly more at stake so it's important not to be too casual with the analysis. The 'fix' is to remove all doubt that any such malfeasance ever took place.
- lazide 3y ago
  Eh. I'm not sure it's so different. For instance, security pins are inexpensive and dramatically increase picking difficulty while not impacting costs by more than a few cents/unit (at most!) or maintenance concerns by any noticable amount. The all plastic logout/tagout masterlock [https://www.amazon.com/Government-Safety-Lockout-Padlock-Zenex/dp/B00192092C/ref=sr_1_1?crid=PCAE426Z5GIB&keywords=masterlock%2Blockout%2Btagout%2Block&qid=1690218938&sprefix=masterlock%2Blockout%2Btagout%2Bloc%2Caps%2C135&sr=8-1&th=1 https://www.amazon.com/Government-Safety-Lockout-Padlock-Zen...] for instance has all security pins and is a real challenge to pick for most folks (including myself!), and makes it much harder to bump too. It isn't sold as high security. It's cheap, but also has a brass core and brass security pins, etc. so it's not like the core is skimping on things, or could be a major cost. The total (retail!) cost of the lock is a fraction of the 'high security' locks, even though those locks are much much easier to pick and bypass. The masterlock 'high security' pro series locks didn't have any security pins at ALL and were super easy to pick (or bump, likely) up until VERY recently. By very recently, I mean I just saw it when I checked out their current lineup - and a year or two ago they definitely did not have it!. It looks to have a SINGLE spool pin in it. They're now heavily promoting it as 'bumpstop' tech. I'm guessing LPL or similar finally made some sort of impact, or maybe word of mouth after contractors have all their shit stolen. Similar locks sold by the 'American Lock' brand (same ownership now) has always had at least one security pin, usually 3 in even their most basic padlocks for as long as they've existed I believe. 100 years? And that isn't even talking about bypasses which maybe fit what you're describing better. Many of the common commercial and residential locks sold today still have trivial bypasses or decoding that can be done with some practice in seconds by tools sold online. Such as this bad boy [https://www.amazon.com/Master-Lock-M40EURDNUM-Combination-M40EURDNUM-Best/dp/B00HUWZRS6/ref=sr_1_5?crid=2Q3JM32Z9LT96&keywords=masterlock+combination+lock+high+security&qid=1690219317&sprefix=masterlock+combination+lock+high+securit%2Caps%2C126&sr=8-5 https://www.amazon.com/Master-Lock-M40EURDNUM-Combination-M4...] And that is just the tip of the iceberg. Is it fraudulent? Eh... there is no real concrete definition for 'high security'! And fraud doesn't include 'mere fluffery' either. Masterlock certainly isn't claiming TR/TL-30 ratings on any of their stuff! These issues however have been widely known about in some cases for 50-100 years or more. For instance, doing some random googling I ran across this patent [https://patents.google.com/patent/US917365A/en https://patents.google.com/patent/US917365A/en] for pin within sleeve technology to work around that whole basic pin-tumbler picking issue (from 1908!), and at least according to this random website, spool pins were invented in 1865 by Yale himself, shortly after the first pin/tumbler locks were invented [https://www.art-of-lockpicking.com/security-pins/ https://www.art-of-lockpicking.com/security-pins/]! The patent expired so long ago, it is absolutely laughable to not use them, and it's definitely ridiculous for a pin-tumbler lock to not have at least ONE! If not have all but one of them spool or similar! I have a hard time seeing how that is any different than selling a secure system with an 80 bit crypto key where the 'secret algorithm' nukes all but a handful of the bits in a predictable way. Or like in the case of well known lock bypass exploits, where there isn't a way to poke the low level protocol to get it to set a known key value and let you take over. I think what you're getting at cryptography wise, is that unlike most physical locks, the vast majority of cryptographic usage is for data that there is no plausible way to have any confidence the cyphertext wasn't read by some unknown (and actively malicious) party. Bits can be copied perfectly, and stored essentially indefinitely without degradation and at low cost. And often, where the data is even public (or public like - with no way to control access). And no plausible way to have confidence that it hasn't been copied and someone isn't working on it right now. And no plausible way to have confidence that this wasn't being done on a massive scale, to nearly everyone, all at once. Even if someone picks a lock to an ATM, for instance, someone has to physically be there and spend actual time when they are at risk to pick it. And there are security cameras and usually some kind of guard or bystanders that can visually identify when something weird might be happening and intervene. That dramatically changes the actual risk profile and ability to extract value. The majority of situations tech wise, there is no equivalent. It's relatively easy to splice into an underground fiber link going into/out of a datacenter with no one noticing and 'pick' every lock going by and extract whatever you want from it with no one being able to tell for years. If ever. Frankly, there are also many reasons to be suspicious (or even know for sure!) that is actually being done, right now, by many parties. Some of which definitely don't have the data's 'owners' interests in mind. Most/All, if we're being honest, at least for them as individuals. Luckily, most of us don't seem to have anything worth stealing (individually), though in aggregate is another matter. And it would be a VERY tempting and VERY difficult to pass up target to not 'steal' all the interesting secrets from Congress and other powerful parties 'in the interest of national security' for instance. Especially the things not on official government computers. So I guess what I'm saying is - yes, it is absolutely critical to have good crypto. And yes, unlike a padlock guarding a shed, it has dramatically higher risks if it isn't actually a good lock - especially as we use it for banking, commerce, gov't, identity, etc). Especially since we need to be sure it will be good for the foreseeable future, because unlike a cheap padlock we decide to swap out when we figure out it's shit, someone can attack it and get what it was protecting potentially years or decades in the future. It's also in many parties interests to come up with reasons why people shouldn't have it (at least unless they're friendly/they like them), and there are a lot of market reasons why people won't notice or won't care until the problem is impossible to ignore and the damage is already occurring.

mcpackieh 3y ago

> #PC_era That section of the wikipedia page mainly concerns the US, but TEA came out of Cambridge. This section seems more relevant: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars#Export_of_cryptography_from_Britain https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars#Export_of_cryptogr...