4 ms·

I thought BeyondCorp zero trust was supposed to completely and totally solve all of this such that air-gaps and network compartments are a thing of the past. A

I thought BeyondCorp zero trust was supposed to completely and totally solve all of this such that air-gaps and network compartments are a thing of the past. Air-gapping is creating a system-low zero access enclave. No different architecturally than running a separate access gateway. Or is this a case of "yeah nobody ever actually believed that?" Having run classified networks there's absolutely a need for compartmentalized system-high networks

TheNewsIsHere 3y ago
I always thought BeyondCorp was intended to replace the VPN infrastructure with (effectively) a TLS reverse proxy gated by rules, SSO, device posture inspection, etc. That’s how I always interpreted the marketing and technical documentation anyway. I would be surprised if they’re not already running PAWs for things like administrative access to production GCP primitives and similar, even if they’re also running PAM, hardware authentication, and so on. I know Microsoft does for admin privileges to the Azure fabric.
- AndrewKemendo 3y ago
  I'm simply responding to Google's own language: "We are removing the requirement for a privileged intranet and moving our corporate applications to the Internet." That's from the original ZT paper and is making a HUGE claim that all access in computing is more secure if you use ZT over physically (not just logically) separated networks.
  - anon84873628 3y ago
    I think "corporate applications" are different from "production infrastructure" and "developer tooling"
  - TheNewsIsHere 3y ago
    I see what you’re saying. I agree.
konschubert 3y ago
My interpretation of beyond corp is about creating a very small inner parameter where only the prod machines have access - and those “airgapped” super-admin laptops that the article talks about. 99% of dev and admin work then takes place outside that perimeter, outside the VPN, by authenticating machines and encrypting traffic with TLS. Since you will always expect compromised machines and bad actors in this area outside the inner perimeter, a four-eyes principle for any critical actions, such as code changes and configuration changes, is necessary.

TheNewsIsHere 3y ago

I always thought BeyondCorp was intended to replace the VPN infrastructure with (effectively) a TLS reverse proxy gated by rules, SSO, device posture inspection, etc. That’s how I always interpreted the marketing and technical documentation anyway. I would be surprised if they’re not already running PAWs for things like administrative access to production GCP primitives and similar, even if they’re also running PAM, hardware authentication, and so on. I know Microsoft does for admin privileges to the Azure fabric.

AndrewKemendo 3y ago
I'm simply responding to Google's own language: "We are removing the requirement for a privileged intranet and moving our corporate applications to the Internet." That's from the original ZT paper and is making a HUGE claim that all access in computing is more secure if you use ZT over physically (not just logically) separated networks.
- anon84873628 3y ago
  I think "corporate applications" are different from "production infrastructure" and "developer tooling"
- TheNewsIsHere 3y ago
  I see what you’re saying. I agree.

konschubert 3y ago

My interpretation of beyond corp is about creating a very small inner parameter where only the prod machines have access - and those “airgapped” super-admin laptops that the article talks about. 99% of dev and admin work then takes place outside that perimeter, outside the VPN, by authenticating machines and encrypting traffic with TLS. Since you will always expect compromised machines and bad actors in this area outside the inner perimeter, a four-eyes principle for any critical actions, such as code changes and configuration changes, is necessary.