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An interesting narative, but there are alternative perspectives to consider as well. It's not necessarily a matter of whether or not the UK needs Apple to break
by submeta 3y ago
An interesting narative, but there are alternative perspectives to consider as well. It's not necessarily a matter of whether or not the UK needs Apple to break their encryption. In fact, they may not need to do so at all. Companies like certain Israel-based firms specialize in selling a myriad of cyber tools, often at quite reasonable prices, that can potentially bypass the need for direct encryption breaking.
It often feels like these public back-and-forths could be theatrical performances, designed to shape public perception more than anything else. State-level actors generally operate with a much wider set of tools and resources at their disposal than what is commonly understood. The fact that the UK is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance is also noteworthy here. This alliance allows for expansive information and resource sharing. The reach and depth of these resources can often surpass the need for individual corporate cooperation.
It's essential to look beyond surface narratives and remember the complexity of global surveillance practices and cyber strategies. Yes, a company's commitment to privacy is admirable and crucial, but it's equally important to stay aware of the many other methods that state actors have at their disposal for obtaining information.
Edit: Fixed typo
- mynameisvlad 3y agoThis isn’t about targeted attacks, though. This is about a blanket bill to monitor everyone’s communications. The tools you mention still generally require either physical access to the device, or are in some way targeted. You’ll likely never be able to stop these, but a blanket communication encryption ban both serves an entirely different purpose and can much more easily be stopped.