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> It's powerful to have investigative powers not be hard-tied to regulatory powers The idea being that they'll have purer incentives to get the truth? And mayb

> It's powerful to have investigative powers not be hard-tied to regulatory powers The idea being that they'll have purer incentives to get the truth? And maybe get better cooperation? I'm sensing the outline of how this arrangement is "powerful", but having trouble with the full picture and details. And per your sibling comment, it might still be good to have a formal process for enforcers to have a look at their results...

ajdlinux 3y ago
- they're able to investigate whether the regulators did their job properly in regulating, while being organisationally at least somewhat distant from the regulator they're looking at (obviously they tend to maintain close relationships with the appropriate regulators but at least they're not literally in the same building) - people will be more willing to talk to investigators if they know that their evidence won't be used against them in court or used for a licence suspension - you can grant non-regulatory investigators greater powers to compel testimony and documentary evidence, perhaps even if it's self-incriminating (I can't speak for the US but it's common here in Australia where we don't have a 5th Amendment entrenched guarantee), without running into as many ethical issues as when you give coercive information-gathering powers to regulators - you ban such compelled testimony from being used as evidence in court or in regulatory proceedings - you don't need as high a standard of proof to make an investigatory finding as if you're taking punitive action against a specific individual - the overall purpose of the investigation is aimed at systemic safety, rather than getting a successful prosecution None of this prevents the regulators from running a parallel investigation with the aim of regulatory punishment - and indeed, two sets of independent eyes on complex scenarios is good too.
- solidsnack9000 3y ago
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ajdlinux 3y ago

- they're able to investigate whether the regulators did their job properly in regulating, while being organisationally at least somewhat distant from the regulator they're looking at (obviously they tend to maintain close relationships with the appropriate regulators but at least they're not literally in the same building) - people will be more willing to talk to investigators if they know that their evidence won't be used against them in court or used for a licence suspension - you can grant non-regulatory investigators greater powers to compel testimony and documentary evidence, perhaps even if it's self-incriminating (I can't speak for the US but it's common here in Australia where we don't have a 5th Amendment entrenched guarantee), without running into as many ethical issues as when you give coercive information-gathering powers to regulators - you ban such compelled testimony from being used as evidence in court or in regulatory proceedings - you don't need as high a standard of proof to make an investigatory finding as if you're taking punitive action against a specific individual - the overall purpose of the investigation is aimed at systemic safety, rather than getting a successful prosecution None of this prevents the regulators from running a parallel investigation with the aim of regulatory punishment - and indeed, two sets of independent eyes on complex scenarios is good too.

solidsnack9000 3y ago
[flagged]
- deleted 3y ago
  [deleted]