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Absolute worst spec I've ever seen. Google needs to be loaded into a cannon and fired into the sun. > How does this affect browser modifications and extensions
by jchw 3y ago
Absolute worst spec I've ever seen. Google needs to be loaded into a cannon and fired into the sun.
> How does this affect browser modifications and extensions?
> Web Environment Integrity attests the legitimacy of the underlying hardware and software stack, it does not restrict the indicated application’s functionality: E.g. if the browser allows extensions, the user may use extensions; if a browser is modified, the modified browser can still request Web Environment Integrity attestation.
Then what's the point? I can make modified bot browser that commits ad fraud as long as I don't use a rooted Android phone?
I don't believe they're being honest with how this will be used. We need to legally regulate remote attestation.
> As new browsers are introduced, they would need to demonstrate to attesters (a relatively small group) that they pass the bar, but they wouldn't need to convince all the websites in the world.
It speaks for itself. Horrid.
- hooverd 3y agoTrusted computing is all about ensuring that your machine is trusted to run payloads and you can't observe or interact with them. Sad! I see why the free software people call it treacherous computing
- gjsman-1000 3y agoShameless plug for the article I wrote 1 year ago now, "Remote Attestation Is Coming Back," which warned that this was coming to the web and had quite a discussion about that idea: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32282305 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32282305
- howinteresting 3y agoThank you for writing this. Remote attestation for consumer software is such a disturbing idea. In the past the main adversarial pressure has been exploiting security vulnerabilities ("jailbreaking"), but the software industry is getting its act together re that.
- jchw 3y agoI remember this article! And of course, nothing has improved. It's ironic that in 1992, software publishers proclaimed that piracy would be the end of the computer age in the classic "Don't Copy That Floppy!" campaign. To me, it seems like nearly the opposite thing is going to end the computer age: integrity checking. Most computers are toys that we lease from companies that are bigger and more influential than governments, and using it in ways they don't like is against the law.
- mike_hearn 3y agoTC is value neutral so the FSF slurs don't make sense. Consider what happens when the machine in question is a cloud VM. Then you can run workloads on a rented machine without the risk of the cloud vendor spying on or tampering with your server. Likewise if the machine gets hacked. These are highly desirable properties for many people. For example Signal uses TC so the mobile apps can verify the servers before doing contact list intersection, keeping the contacts private from the Signal operators. Another use case is multiparty computation. Three people wish to compare some values without a risk that anyone will see the combined data. TC can do this with tractable compute overhead, unlike purely cryptographic techniques. Observe what this means for P2P applications. A major difficulty in building them is that peers can't trust each other, so you have to rely on complex and unintuitive algorithms (e.g. block chains) or duplication of work (e.g. SETI@Home) or benign dictators (e.g. Tor) to try and stop cheating. With TC peers can attest to each other and form a network with known behavior, meaning devs can add features rather than spend all their time designing around complicated attacks. These uses require you have a computer that you do trust which can audit the remote server before uploading data to it. But you can compile and/or run that program on your laptop or smartphone, the verification process is easy. But exactly because TC is general it doesn't distinguish based on who owns the machine. It doesn't see your PC as morally superior to a remote server, they're all just computers. So yes, in theory a remote server could demand you run something locally and then do a HW remote attestation for it. In practice though this never happens anymore outside of games consoles (as far as I'm aware), because most consumer devices don't have the right hardware for it, and even if they did you can't do much hardware interaction inside attested code.
- dhx 3y agoWhy should anyone trust a remote server providing a signed statement of authenticity when Intel[1], MSI[2], Lenovo[3], NVIDIA[4], Microsoft and others keep losing their keys? Even if they haven't lost their keys recently, technology companies don't have a great track record of producing foolproof hardware designs (e.g. recent case of [5]), if foolproof was ever a reasonable expectation. For starters, it's assuming technology such as ptychographic X-ray computed tomography and focused ion beam machining won't become more commonplace and commercially viable to readily break TPM attestation schemes. Or that with wider use of TPM attestation, more effort will be expended into breaking it whereas for the current state with minimal adoption, few people care. The issue client-side is that if a single vendor or TPM design is compromised, threat actors have ample motive, resources and ability to exploit this compromised hardware, whilst everyone else has few choices, such as dumping at great expensve some more e-waste. And critically, you as a user are blocked by your acceptance of TPM attestation technology from discovering attacks and auditing your own system security, as you ceded control of your own systems. Instead, your systems are controlled by a few technology companies that have a proven terrible track record of fulfilling their alleged intent of keeping your systems and data secure. And why should they care if it doesn't lead to a higher profit at the end of the year? [1] https://github.com/binarly-io/SupplyChainAttacks/blob/main/MSI/IntelOemKeyImpactedDevices.md https://github.com/binarly-io/SupplyChainAttacks/blob/main/M... [2] https://github.com/binarly-io/SupplyChainAttacks/blob/main/MSI/MsiImpactedDevices.md https://github.com/binarly-io/SupplyChainAttacks/blob/main/M... [3] https://github.com/binarly-io/SupplyChainAttacks/blob/main/Lenovo%3ALCFC/IntelKeysImpactedDevices.md https://github.com/binarly-io/SupplyChainAttacks/blob/main/L... [4] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30565985 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30565985 [5] https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.14717 https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.14717
- josephcsible 3y agoExactly. Trusted Computing means that the FAANGs and the MAFIAA can trust that your computer will put their interests ahead of your interests. There is zero benefit to you.
- thesuperbigfrog 3y ago>> I don't believe they're being honest with how this will be used. Getting browsers to adopt and implement Web Environment Integrity is Step 1. Step 2 is where all Google web sites start requiring Web Environment Integrity to be used or they lock you out of the site. Step 3 is where all websites serving Google ads require Web Environment Integrity to be used. Step 4 Profit! This is the beginning of the further DRM-ification and enshittification of the Web.
- Aerbil313 3y agoNo one can control the web unless every personal computing device on earth is closed source down to the hardware. Digital technology is a double edged sword. I agree that Google would definitely want complete control, but they just can’t do that. We’ll most likely rather see deglobalization of the web with trust shifting from FAANG to states.
- thesuperbigfrog 3y ago>> No one can control the web unless every personal computing device on earth is closed source down to the hardware. It happens one step at a time: https://gabrielsieben.tech/2022/07/29/remote-assertion-is-coming-back-how-much-freedom-will-it-take/ https://gabrielsieben.tech/2022/07/29/remote-assertion-is-co...
- Aerbil313 3y agoHell. Heck. Shit. That piece is really scary. I did NOT expect that. Remote attestation really is coming. What will happen to Linux? My beloved NixOS? New OSes, Theseus OS? What is the solution? Don't nation states see that this will give American companies too much power, even more than now, too much to really significantly matter? I see no solution beyond the deglobalization of the entire tech stack (down to the very OSes) and multiple sources of trust in the form of multiple nation states. Maybe my government will make an official Linux distro and make it mandatory, so we can escape this coming shit.
- ollien 3y ago> I can make modified bot browser that commits ad fraud as long as I don't use a rooted Android phone? Yeah, this just incentivizes spammers to copy the parts of Chromium that do the attestation (or whatever browser has source available), and use that to pretend they're Chromium. There will always be workarounds. This seems to kill innovation and allow spammers to flourish. I suppose I can understand an argument that they want to prevent scraping, but this is absolutely not going to stop that.
- josephcsible 3y ago> We need to legally regulate remote attestation. I'd go a step further. We need to ban it. It should be illegal to sell devices to consumers that already contain private keys, unless all of said keys are provided to the consumer at the time of purchase.
- gjvnq 3y agoI would do it differently: I would ban remote attestation on all general-purpose electronic devices and for all devices that are meant to be part of the home and run third party software. So computers, phones, and game consoles cannot have remote attestation but home security systems, ATMs, e-Readers, medical devices, water/electricity usage meters can do remote attestation.