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You can opt out. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212520 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212520 Although, I don't think that was accurate for iCloud Keycha
by astrange 3y ago
You can opt out.
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212520 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212520
Although, I don't think that was accurate for iCloud Keychain anyway.
- lxgr 3y agoI don't think this actually opts you out of key escrow these days. It only replaces SMS-OTP with the recovery key, as far as I understand. It's impossible to tell, though – Apple's platform security guide has been last updated in April 2022, which predates Advanced Data Protection. (Weirdly they do mention it in the document [1], though, so the date might also be incorrect and they might have added that information since I last looked a year ago.) At least according to [2], it seems possible to gain access to the encrypted data using the iCloud account password and the passcode/login password of one other device on the iCloud account in any case. [1] https://help.apple.com/pdf/security/en_US/apple-platform-security-guide.pdf https://help.apple.com/pdf/security/en_US/apple-platform-sec... [2] https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
- ramesh31 3y ago>At least according to [2], it seems possible to gain access to the encrypted data using the iCloud account password and the passcode/login password of one other device on the iCloud account in any case. But iCloud access is forced to 2FA with one of your signed in devices, which requires the local password (pin, touch id, or face id, all of which never leave the enclave) to approve. There's really no way to get something covered by ADP short of physical device access + a stolen/coerced pin number.