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Https works because there is a destination address that goes to a physical network card. Over the air, there is no 'routing'. Alice can intercept my transmissio

Https works because there is a destination address that goes to a physical network card. Over the air, there is no 'routing'. Alice can intercept my transmission, then literally, just use a more powerful radio to 'talk over me' with her keys. Ergo, MITM. I worked with guys in the military who did this for a living... Radio is like being able to packet sniff (and modify) packets from anywhere.

jiggawatts 3y ago
HTTPS is secure against man in the middle attacks and will protect transmissions even over radio.
- withinboredom 3y ago
  Yes, once you form the connection it is secure. The handshake is the part that isn't secure on open airwaves. This is how 'evil middle boxes' mitm connections from corporate networks. Edit to add: yes, there are CA's to sign the bits on a network. There is no CA for the radio, only proprietary ones. These can be reverse engineered, subpoenaed, or bought by state actors. Chances are, if you're broadcasting loud enough to be heard by them, they're going to start listening.
  - uw_rob 3y ago
    I think there is some confusion here. HTTPS is secure. Even with MITM attacks. This is because the MITM will not have a valid certificate to provide authenticity for the public key returned. The reason why middle boxes in corp networks can MITM is because the the corp owns the device and has installed their own domain trust to the device. This means the MITM can return a cert and public key that your device will trust. This is because the cert returned will be signed by the installed domain trust. Another way to think about why HTTPS is secure over radio: HTTPS is at the highest level of the OSI networking model. You could do HTTPS with pen and paper and the mail if you wanted. Think about starlink! The internet today is literally going over radio waves. This is likely why there isn't progress on encrypting old fashion radios! There is no need to encrypt old fashioned radios -- you'll just use internet over radio instead if you wanted encryption. You bring a good point through. Since it's radio, anyone can jam your transmissions, but, they won't be able to spoof your intended friend if you are using https via radio.
    - withinboredom 3y ago
      HTTPS is only as secure as the CA that signs the certificate. My point is, at some point you have to bootstrap the trust. That is the single most vulnerable point (and why becoming a trusted CA is quite complex and easy to lose if you mess it up)! Without the CA, HTTPS is insecure (try self-signed certs and you'll see your browser agree with me). If you try and bootstrap a CA over the radio, it is vulnerable to MITM attacks. There is absolutely nothing inherently secure about HTTPS without a secure CA.
      - quonn 3y ago
        Even after adjusting this statement three times it‘s still wrong. Certificate transparency has severely limited what CAs can do without being found out.
        withinboredom 3y ago
        I have no idea what you're talking about. There is no "radio CA" in existence to adhere to "certificate transparency."
thrashh 3y ago
No, https works because we already agreed upon on one authority and one protocol and it’s called ICANN and DNS respectively. This could be done with radio too but we don’t because a typical website transfers hundreds of megabytes and the traffic involved in negotiating an encrypted connection is a drop in the bucket, whereas with most radio traffic, it would comprise a much higher percentage of all your radio traffic. Plus your average radio equipment has a tiny CPU (although this is changing) whereas your phone or desktop computer has hundreds of gigaflops to do all the encryption and decryption math that you want and then still draw a gif.
rokkitmensch 3y ago
If one treats pubkeys as handles, without any of the theatrics of "real person identity", this entire branch of objections disappears.
ArnoVW 3y ago
https works because you have previously agreed on a key. The key of the Certificate Authority that signs certificates. Https (or IP for that matter) does not use the physical card to authenticate. That wouldn't make sense, except for very local networks. And since IP relies on ARP for the physical network addreess, even local IP networks can suffer MITM, by way of ARP spoofing.
- withinboredom 3y ago
  A radio "hears" only the loudest signal (due to necessary filters). A packet is directed via routes; a network interface only picks up packets on that physical route. It's the equivalent of using a directional antennae ... kinda. At the beginning of the connection, you must establish some sort of "trust" between your radio and the other radio (if you want to use encryption). Your wifi does this with a Pre-Shared Secret (PSK). Your https connection does this with CA certificates. This 'baseline trust' allows you to know the other end is who you expect it to be. With traditional radios, there's not much of that. There's just: - something you have (the radio characteristics) - something shared (past experiences/conversations) - something you are (your voice) If you don't squint that hard, that's the basis of any kind of authentication. Thus we have that covered. So, I can "authorize" myself as my person. Then I can send my keys over the air so we can have a private conversation. Here's the issue, as soon as I broadcast my keys, someone with a "louder" (technically, brighter) radio broadcasts my voice with different keys. Next, they do the same thing when you broadcast your keys. Bam, we've been MITM'd without even realizing it. So, ok, you say. Maybe we'll snail mail our keys to each other. Sure, that'll work. Yet still, even then, we'd only be able to talk to each other. At that point, why not just pick up a phone or start up a telegram chat? The weakest link in any kind of encryption is always during the key exchange. Always. Mostly because we are human... we click through warnings, get our mail stolen, misstype things, and all kinds of dumb things. My other point about code: we can agree on a dictionary. It's virtually uncrackable and fluent to have a coded conversation. For example, there's 0% chance you'd have any idea what this actual phrase from Afganistan means: "the dust is blowing in, so we'll need about 5 mins to pick up my sister and head home" spoiler: "the americans are here, so we'll need about 5 mins to set up the guns and be the rendezvous." Code is always better than encryption. Always. The issue is the "dictionary" and the fact that it can be leaked. Encryption gives better guarantees in that regard. But when you already have 'authentication and authorization' via the things I mentioned above, code does quite well...

jiggawatts 3y ago

HTTPS is secure against man in the middle attacks and will protect transmissions even over radio.

withinboredom 3y ago
Yes, once you form the connection it is secure. The handshake is the part that isn't secure on open airwaves. This is how 'evil middle boxes' mitm connections from corporate networks. Edit to add: yes, there are CA's to sign the bits on a network. There is no CA for the radio, only proprietary ones. These can be reverse engineered, subpoenaed, or bought by state actors. Chances are, if you're broadcasting loud enough to be heard by them, they're going to start listening.
- uw_rob 3y ago
  I think there is some confusion here. HTTPS is secure. Even with MITM attacks. This is because the MITM will not have a valid certificate to provide authenticity for the public key returned. The reason why middle boxes in corp networks can MITM is because the the corp owns the device and has installed their own domain trust to the device. This means the MITM can return a cert and public key that your device will trust. This is because the cert returned will be signed by the installed domain trust. Another way to think about why HTTPS is secure over radio: HTTPS is at the highest level of the OSI networking model. You could do HTTPS with pen and paper and the mail if you wanted. Think about starlink! The internet today is literally going over radio waves. This is likely why there isn't progress on encrypting old fashion radios! There is no need to encrypt old fashioned radios -- you'll just use internet over radio instead if you wanted encryption. You bring a good point through. Since it's radio, anyone can jam your transmissions, but, they won't be able to spoof your intended friend if you are using https via radio.
  - withinboredom 3y ago
    HTTPS is only as secure as the CA that signs the certificate. My point is, at some point you have to bootstrap the trust. That is the single most vulnerable point (and why becoming a trusted CA is quite complex and easy to lose if you mess it up)! Without the CA, HTTPS is insecure (try self-signed certs and you'll see your browser agree with me). If you try and bootstrap a CA over the radio, it is vulnerable to MITM attacks. There is absolutely nothing inherently secure about HTTPS without a secure CA.
    - quonn 3y ago
      Even after adjusting this statement three times it‘s still wrong. Certificate transparency has severely limited what CAs can do without being found out.
      - withinboredom 3y ago
        I have no idea what you're talking about. There is no "radio CA" in existence to adhere to "certificate transparency."

thrashh 3y ago

No, https works because we already agreed upon on one authority and one protocol and it’s called ICANN and DNS respectively. This could be done with radio too but we don’t because a typical website transfers hundreds of megabytes and the traffic involved in negotiating an encrypted connection is a drop in the bucket, whereas with most radio traffic, it would comprise a much higher percentage of all your radio traffic. Plus your average radio equipment has a tiny CPU (although this is changing) whereas your phone or desktop computer has hundreds of gigaflops to do all the encryption and decryption math that you want and then still draw a gif.

rokkitmensch 3y ago

If one treats pubkeys as handles, without any of the theatrics of "real person identity", this entire branch of objections disappears.

ArnoVW 3y ago

https works because you have previously agreed on a key. The key of the Certificate Authority that signs certificates. Https (or IP for that matter) does not use the physical card to authenticate. That wouldn't make sense, except for very local networks. And since IP relies on ARP for the physical network addreess, even local IP networks can suffer MITM, by way of ARP spoofing.

withinboredom 3y ago
A radio "hears" only the loudest signal (due to necessary filters). A packet is directed via routes; a network interface only picks up packets on that physical route. It's the equivalent of using a directional antennae ... kinda. At the beginning of the connection, you must establish some sort of "trust" between your radio and the other radio (if you want to use encryption). Your wifi does this with a Pre-Shared Secret (PSK). Your https connection does this with CA certificates. This 'baseline trust' allows you to know the other end is who you expect it to be. With traditional radios, there's not much of that. There's just: - something you have (the radio characteristics) - something shared (past experiences/conversations) - something you are (your voice) If you don't squint that hard, that's the basis of any kind of authentication. Thus we have that covered. So, I can "authorize" myself as my person. Then I can send my keys over the air so we can have a private conversation. Here's the issue, as soon as I broadcast my keys, someone with a "louder" (technically, brighter) radio broadcasts my voice with different keys. Next, they do the same thing when you broadcast your keys. Bam, we've been MITM'd without even realizing it. So, ok, you say. Maybe we'll snail mail our keys to each other. Sure, that'll work. Yet still, even then, we'd only be able to talk to each other. At that point, why not just pick up a phone or start up a telegram chat? The weakest link in any kind of encryption is always during the key exchange. Always. Mostly because we are human... we click through warnings, get our mail stolen, misstype things, and all kinds of dumb things. My other point about code: we can agree on a dictionary. It's virtually uncrackable and fluent to have a coded conversation. For example, there's 0% chance you'd have any idea what this actual phrase from Afganistan means: "the dust is blowing in, so we'll need about 5 mins to pick up my sister and head home" spoiler: "the americans are here, so we'll need about 5 mins to set up the guns and be the rendezvous." Code is always better than encryption. Always. The issue is the "dictionary" and the fact that it can be leaked. Encryption gives better guarantees in that regard. But when you already have 'authentication and authorization' via the things I mentioned above, code does quite well...