9 ms·

While it's encouraging to see such a thorough debunking of the latest security theater technology, it's always been security theater... Allow me a few quick ane

While it's encouraging to see such a thorough debunking of the latest security theater technology, it's always been security theater... Allow me a few quick anecdotes: My family is friends with a gentleman who was a green beret medic during Viet Nam, and later worked for the CIA. Once, when I was younger (and metal detectors were the norm), we had the opportunity to fly with him. He entered the metal detector before me, and was waved along. Once we were past the detectors, he turned to me and said, "Guess how many blades I have on me?" He then proceded to produce seven blades. They were a combination of ceramic blades (undetectable by the metal detector and sharper than most metal as well) and traditional blades held or placed on him so that they would not set off the detector. It was part of his CIA training to be able to do that. I went to college at Stevens Institute of Technology. The Chemical Engineering department there has a lab known as the Highly Filled Materials Institute. When I was an undergraduate, I got a tour of the lab. They informed me that they had been working on an extruder that they were selling simultaneously to Picatinny Arsenal and Hersey. It turns out that C4 and Chocolate are both colloidal suspensions with nearly identical properties. A consequence of this is that in the X-ray machines used in airports, plastic explosives are indistinguishable from chocolate. Shortly after 9/11 my father, a very frequent traveler, had forgotten his nail clippers in his carry-on luggage. Predictably, they were confiscated. When I greeted him at the airport, he remarked on how ridiculous that was, as he produced his fountain pen from his jacket pocket. "They let me on with this," he said. "I could have stabbed anyone in the eye with this and they'd be dead. What was I going to do with nail clippers?" ...I could go on, but why?

tsaoutourpants 15y ago
You remind me of the occasional TSA "good catch" where they find some weed stashed in a jar of peanut butter. Peanut butter and C4 have the same density. Not a good place to hide your weed. ;)
- zotz 15y ago
  It seems like your metal container would be a good spot to hide a doob.
  - seanp2k2 15y ago
    They walk around airports with drug dogs too, so the safest way would be to send it USPS since packages require a warrant to search. REF: http://forums.steroid.com/archive/index.php/t-171885.html http://forums.steroid.com/archive/index.php/t-171885.html
    - jrockway 15y ago
      And, a package doesn't prove much. The return address can be fake, and the recipient can be unaware that he was mailed pot. The perfect crime!
      - SoftwareMaven 15y ago
        Until the SWAT team breaks through your door and shoots your dogs dead in front of your kids. Oh, wait, it wasn't your pot? Oh, sorry, Mayor... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights,_Maryland_mayors_residence_drug_raid http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights,_Maryland_mayors...
        DanBC 15y ago
        The apostrophe has been stripped from mayor's. Experimenting with URLs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights,_Maryland_mayor's_residence_drug_raid) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights,_Maryland_mayor's_residence_drug_raid (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights,_Maryland_mayors_residence_drug_raid http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights,_Maryland_mayors...)
        icebraining 15y ago
        You have to encode it properly: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights%2C_Maryland_mayor%27s_residence_drug_raid http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights%2C_Maryland_mayo...
physcab 15y ago
I used to build a detector for explosives in academia that is now being marketed to the TSA. To get funding for these projects, its pretty standard to rip another technology apart, point out all of its flaws, then argue why yours is better. But every technology has their drawbacks and ways of skirting around it. Today, most technology deployed is more as a deterrent and less as a counter-measure. You want to know another way to hide illicit items in those body scanners? Surround the items in water. There are also certain materials that give off false positives and most likely the software will scan the image response against a bank of known materials. I wrote pattern detection software that did just this. Oddly enough, cheese is one of them. So stick your knife in a nice big piece of cheddar and you might make it through just fine.
- hessenwolf 15y ago
  It's also a good way to store your knife in your backpack, when you are taking a picnic lunch.
  - plaes 15y ago
    Isn't it only one-way solution?
    - phil 15y ago
      Bring extra cheddar.
- deleted 15y ago
  [deleted]
finnw 15y ago
There's a simple explanation - the authorities' main priority is to prevent copycat attacks. The most embarassing thisg possible for TSA would be an exact repeat of 9/11 - same weapons (wasn't it box cutters?) etc. So that's what they target first. A new kind of attack is harder to predict and easier for the authorities to explain by saying "nothing like this has ever happened before, there was no way we could have prepared for it." And there's no way they could cover all possibilities anyway. And to be fair, copycat attacks do happen (e.g. July 21, 2005 in London) so it is not a total waste.
- newman314 15y ago
  You say preventing copycat attacks, I say it's a purely reactive approach towards security, which does not work.
  - bo1024 15y ago
    It's not supposed to work, it's supposed to provide job security.
    - jrockway 15y ago
      Why can't the TSA rent-a-thugs be cops or something? At least they'd be deterring crimes that actually happen.
      - arohner 15y ago
        You want those imbeciles to have guns? And what crimes happen in the vicinity of their screening area that could be prevented?
        lloeki 15y ago
        > You want those imbeciles to have guns? No, he wants real cops. In France, in public places like railway stations, the "plan Vigipirate" makes use of the military (including gendarmerie)
Steko 15y ago
I used to work at the airport and one of the odder duties was to test the screeners every few days with metal gun, grenade and bomb shaped items. The guy who trained me had a couple ways of getting them past without fail if he wanted to (usually he didn't care because they failed enough if they were put through normally on the belt). The sad thing is these are the exact items they are supposed to be looking for and the things they are best equipped to detect and still a 20%+ failure rate.
- gee_totes 15y ago
  Was there any financial bonus for the screeners to find the fake guns and bombs? For example, would a screener get $100 if they found one of these planted items? I would think that would be a good way to reduce the failure rate. Or does the failure rate have more to do with limitations in equipment, rather than screening being a mundane job?
  - toyg 15y ago
    You start from the assumption that it's in anybody's interest that these machines do actually work. It isn't. The real interest is for well-connected companies to sell equipment; for the approving bureaucrat to get his kickback while not being seen as abusing his position; and for the low-level unskilled TSA employee to keep quiet and keep cashing his salary. The suggestion you give would mean the above-mentioned bureaucrat should spend additional money (which would require a lengthy fight with his superiors in order to get additional budget, possibly even triggering a review of previous expenditure) in order to push his underlings to point out flaws in the equipment he bought, so that... he can be made a fool of ? So you see why it isn't going to happen any time soon.
  - megablast 15y ago
    I doubt it, minimum wage jobs don't usually have bonuses. Have you ever worked in one? Walmart has no bonuses either.
  - jonhendry 15y ago
    "Was there any financial bonus for the screeners to find the fake guns and bombs? For example, would a screener get $100 if they found one of these planted items?" In about 5 seconds after such a bonus program was initiated, screeners would be offering kickbacks to the testers in return for being given advance notice of the test.
CulturalNgineer 15y ago
It really is all just security theater... keeping the peanut gallery scared, entertained... and at the same time self-satisfied about their unearned 'exceptionalism'... BTW, has it occurred to anyone that someone intending a terrorist act could just blow up a carry-on before ever getting to the ridiculous scanner... It'll shut down the airport for sure... and do it at a couple of airports simultaneously and you'll shut down the whole network for a day or two... Stop letting government treat us like childish idiots... yes... things could happen... reasonable precautions should be taken. But this isn't a smart approach.
- jballanc 15y ago
  What you're referring to is a "soft target". You have to pay rather close attention, but terrorists have long recognized the opportunity presented by soft targets: malls, hotels, and yes, the TSA waiting line. Interestingly enough, it's the real security machinations of the US that have been preventing attacks of this form. Which raises the question further: if we already have real security, why do we even need security theater?
  - DanBC 15y ago
    In theory you need cheap security theatre to distract people from the very expensive, secretive, and sometimes unconstitutional (or nearly so) real security work. In practice, security theatre turns out to be pretty expensive.
- keithnoizu 15y ago
  Well more than that CulturalNgineer, if you do this in multiple locations thanks the congestion caused by the TSA you can get similiar death counts as the original attacks. Atleast low thousands.
unknsldr 15y ago
I cannot speak to the CIA training but I've received some concealed weapon scenario training mostly developed from lessons learned at penitentiaries. It is a terrible thing to be impressed by but inmate ingenuity staggers the mind. You've likely had several items in your carry on that could do much worse than the pen to eye (which I don't think would be fatal). In the attack tree, a shiv smuggled past the checkpoint would need to have the potential to coerce the cockpit before it would factor in to a risk matrix for the plane. I served in Special Forces before and after 9/11. The 'security theater' points that many of you make are valid. I don't, however, believe the reactionary measures were to calm the fears of the American people. The severe restriction placed on travelers is similar to a trend of restrictions placed upon soldiers following 9/11. The reaction is CYA for senior leadership/command. Accountability became a tremendous focus following the early campaigns following 9/11. A single casualty was regarded as a devastating loss. Clearing buildings early in the bloodshed of Iraq taught many commanders that the peacetime tactics largely learned from SWAT were not as effective in combat. The procedure was too slow for such a dynamic and hostile environment. Too many soldiers died because the common procedure for clearing a building broke down in structures of irregular layout and in cities crawling with hostiles. Before commanders and NCOs were prepared to blame the procedures, however, they were taking accountability for the loss. An after action review (AAR) follows every mission and leaders are encouraged to highlight their mistakes before someone else must do it for them. An atmosphere of blame settled in while civilians back CONUS were tiring of the involvement. Casualties were frequent enough that many ODAs had suffered through a few. For most, it was their first time facing a grieving widow with a young child hugging her leg. Those stories, coupled with the blame, changed the landscape of command. CONOPS that were once routinely approved were rejected for increasingly vague reasons. Ultimately, the tone was that the risk was too great compared with the operational gain- almost like the soldier was too valuable to put in harm's way. But we signed up for that. The truth, I suspect, was that the appetite for risk taking at the senior levels was shrinking. If an ODA lost a man, the mission's CONOP would be scrutinized for evidence that all of the risks were accounted for, that the courses of action reflected sound decision making when assuming risk, that the operational gain justified the risk, and that good faith efforts were made to mitigate perceived risks. The AAR became a trial. While I was working through these challenges during deployments, I believe something similar was happening with security measures and leadership back home. Creating an illusion of safety seems less likely the hope than creating an exemption from accountability. Negligence would be too likely the charge if tight restrictions were not put in place.
perlpimp 15y ago
these measures are hit and miss. I always carry clippers and never are confiscated.
- jballanc 15y ago
  The weeks immediately following 9/11 were much worse than what we have now. I remember flying home for Thanksgiving, and literally everyone was setting off the metal detectors they had them tuned so high. The only reason I didn't was I had prepared by wearing sweatpants and a T-shirt and I had put everything from my pockets, except my ID and boarding pass, into my backpack.
  - roguecoder 15y ago
    My girlfriend still complains about having to go out and buy bras without underwires so she could fly without having her boobs groped.
nikcub 15y ago
after being sick of trying to find a light for a cigarette after getting off a flight I started smuggling lighters with me onto flights. Over 30 international flights now and not once have they found the lighter. it took me two flights of trial and error to work out the right method to smuggle it through. security theatre indeed.
- eurleif 15y ago
  But lighters are permitted? http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/sop/index.shtm http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/sop/index.shtm
mdc 15y ago
>It was part of his CIA training to be able to do that. In the '90s, long before 9/11, I was traveling with a girlfriend. She didn't want to remove her belt with a big metal buckle so she just went through the metal detector with it on. The machine buzzed and the agent sent her through again. A female agent looked sympathetic and told her to twist her belt buckle horizontally so it wouldn't set off the machine. That was my intro to security theater. Moral of the story is that if you're a pretty white girl, you don't need CIA training to learn security secrets from lazy guards.

tsaoutourpants 15y ago

You remind me of the occasional TSA "good catch" where they find some weed stashed in a jar of peanut butter. Peanut butter and C4 have the same density. Not a good place to hide your weed. ;)

zotz 15y ago
It seems like your metal container would be a good spot to hide a doob.
- seanp2k2 15y ago
  They walk around airports with drug dogs too, so the safest way would be to send it USPS since packages require a warrant to search. REF: http://forums.steroid.com/archive/index.php/t-171885.html http://forums.steroid.com/archive/index.php/t-171885.html
  - jrockway 15y ago
    And, a package doesn't prove much. The return address can be fake, and the recipient can be unaware that he was mailed pot. The perfect crime!
    - SoftwareMaven 15y ago
      Until the SWAT team breaks through your door and shoots your dogs dead in front of your kids. Oh, wait, it wasn't your pot? Oh, sorry, Mayor... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights,_Maryland_mayors_residence_drug_raid http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights,_Maryland_mayors...
      - DanBC 15y ago
        The apostrophe has been stripped from mayor's. Experimenting with URLs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights,_Maryland_mayor's_residence_drug_raid) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights,_Maryland_mayor's_residence_drug_raid (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights,_Maryland_mayors_residence_drug_raid http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights,_Maryland_mayors...)
        icebraining 15y ago
        You have to encode it properly: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights%2C_Maryland_mayor%27s_residence_drug_raid http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berwyn_Heights%2C_Maryland_mayo...

physcab 15y ago

I used to build a detector for explosives in academia that is now being marketed to the TSA. To get funding for these projects, its pretty standard to rip another technology apart, point out all of its flaws, then argue why yours is better. But every technology has their drawbacks and ways of skirting around it. Today, most technology deployed is more as a deterrent and less as a counter-measure. You want to know another way to hide illicit items in those body scanners? Surround the items in water. There are also certain materials that give off false positives and most likely the software will scan the image response against a bank of known materials. I wrote pattern detection software that did just this. Oddly enough, cheese is one of them. So stick your knife in a nice big piece of cheddar and you might make it through just fine.

hessenwolf 15y ago
It's also a good way to store your knife in your backpack, when you are taking a picnic lunch.
- plaes 15y ago
  Isn't it only one-way solution?
  - phil 15y ago
    Bring extra cheddar.
deleted 15y ago
[deleted]

finnw 15y ago

There's a simple explanation - the authorities' main priority is to prevent copycat attacks. The most embarassing thisg possible for TSA would be an exact repeat of 9/11 - same weapons (wasn't it box cutters?) etc. So that's what they target first. A new kind of attack is harder to predict and easier for the authorities to explain by saying "nothing like this has ever happened before, there was no way we could have prepared for it." And there's no way they could cover all possibilities anyway. And to be fair, copycat attacks do happen (e.g. July 21, 2005 in London) so it is not a total waste.

newman314 15y ago
You say preventing copycat attacks, I say it's a purely reactive approach towards security, which does not work.
- bo1024 15y ago
  It's not supposed to work, it's supposed to provide job security.
  - jrockway 15y ago
    Why can't the TSA rent-a-thugs be cops or something? At least they'd be deterring crimes that actually happen.
    - arohner 15y ago
      You want those imbeciles to have guns? And what crimes happen in the vicinity of their screening area that could be prevented?
      - lloeki 15y ago
        > You want those imbeciles to have guns? No, he wants real cops. In France, in public places like railway stations, the "plan Vigipirate" makes use of the military (including gendarmerie)

Steko 15y ago

I used to work at the airport and one of the odder duties was to test the screeners every few days with metal gun, grenade and bomb shaped items. The guy who trained me had a couple ways of getting them past without fail if he wanted to (usually he didn't care because they failed enough if they were put through normally on the belt). The sad thing is these are the exact items they are supposed to be looking for and the things they are best equipped to detect and still a 20%+ failure rate.

gee_totes 15y ago
Was there any financial bonus for the screeners to find the fake guns and bombs? For example, would a screener get $100 if they found one of these planted items? I would think that would be a good way to reduce the failure rate. Or does the failure rate have more to do with limitations in equipment, rather than screening being a mundane job?
- toyg 15y ago
  You start from the assumption that it's in anybody's interest that these machines do actually work. It isn't. The real interest is for well-connected companies to sell equipment; for the approving bureaucrat to get his kickback while not being seen as abusing his position; and for the low-level unskilled TSA employee to keep quiet and keep cashing his salary. The suggestion you give would mean the above-mentioned bureaucrat should spend additional money (which would require a lengthy fight with his superiors in order to get additional budget, possibly even triggering a review of previous expenditure) in order to push his underlings to point out flaws in the equipment he bought, so that... he can be made a fool of ? So you see why it isn't going to happen any time soon.
- megablast 15y ago
  I doubt it, minimum wage jobs don't usually have bonuses. Have you ever worked in one? Walmart has no bonuses either.
- jonhendry 15y ago
  "Was there any financial bonus for the screeners to find the fake guns and bombs? For example, would a screener get $100 if they found one of these planted items?" In about 5 seconds after such a bonus program was initiated, screeners would be offering kickbacks to the testers in return for being given advance notice of the test.

CulturalNgineer 15y ago

It really is all just security theater... keeping the peanut gallery scared, entertained... and at the same time self-satisfied about their unearned 'exceptionalism'... BTW, has it occurred to anyone that someone intending a terrorist act could just blow up a carry-on before ever getting to the ridiculous scanner... It'll shut down the airport for sure... and do it at a couple of airports simultaneously and you'll shut down the whole network for a day or two... Stop letting government treat us like childish idiots... yes... things could happen... reasonable precautions should be taken. But this isn't a smart approach.

jballanc 15y ago
What you're referring to is a "soft target". You have to pay rather close attention, but terrorists have long recognized the opportunity presented by soft targets: malls, hotels, and yes, the TSA waiting line. Interestingly enough, it's the real security machinations of the US that have been preventing attacks of this form. Which raises the question further: if we already have real security, why do we even need security theater?
- DanBC 15y ago
  In theory you need cheap security theatre to distract people from the very expensive, secretive, and sometimes unconstitutional (or nearly so) real security work. In practice, security theatre turns out to be pretty expensive.
keithnoizu 15y ago
Well more than that CulturalNgineer, if you do this in multiple locations thanks the congestion caused by the TSA you can get similiar death counts as the original attacks. Atleast low thousands.

unknsldr 15y ago

I cannot speak to the CIA training but I've received some concealed weapon scenario training mostly developed from lessons learned at penitentiaries. It is a terrible thing to be impressed by but inmate ingenuity staggers the mind. You've likely had several items in your carry on that could do much worse than the pen to eye (which I don't think would be fatal). In the attack tree, a shiv smuggled past the checkpoint would need to have the potential to coerce the cockpit before it would factor in to a risk matrix for the plane. I served in Special Forces before and after 9/11. The 'security theater' points that many of you make are valid. I don't, however, believe the reactionary measures were to calm the fears of the American people. The severe restriction placed on travelers is similar to a trend of restrictions placed upon soldiers following 9/11. The reaction is CYA for senior leadership/command. Accountability became a tremendous focus following the early campaigns following 9/11. A single casualty was regarded as a devastating loss. Clearing buildings early in the bloodshed of Iraq taught many commanders that the peacetime tactics largely learned from SWAT were not as effective in combat. The procedure was too slow for such a dynamic and hostile environment. Too many soldiers died because the common procedure for clearing a building broke down in structures of irregular layout and in cities crawling with hostiles. Before commanders and NCOs were prepared to blame the procedures, however, they were taking accountability for the loss. An after action review (AAR) follows every mission and leaders are encouraged to highlight their mistakes before someone else must do it for them. An atmosphere of blame settled in while civilians back CONUS were tiring of the involvement. Casualties were frequent enough that many ODAs had suffered through a few. For most, it was their first time facing a grieving widow with a young child hugging her leg. Those stories, coupled with the blame, changed the landscape of command. CONOPS that were once routinely approved were rejected for increasingly vague reasons. Ultimately, the tone was that the risk was too great compared with the operational gain- almost like the soldier was too valuable to put in harm's way. But we signed up for that. The truth, I suspect, was that the appetite for risk taking at the senior levels was shrinking. If an ODA lost a man, the mission's CONOP would be scrutinized for evidence that all of the risks were accounted for, that the courses of action reflected sound decision making when assuming risk, that the operational gain justified the risk, and that good faith efforts were made to mitigate perceived risks. The AAR became a trial. While I was working through these challenges during deployments, I believe something similar was happening with security measures and leadership back home. Creating an illusion of safety seems less likely the hope than creating an exemption from accountability. Negligence would be too likely the charge if tight restrictions were not put in place.

perlpimp 15y ago

these measures are hit and miss. I always carry clippers and never are confiscated.

jballanc 15y ago
The weeks immediately following 9/11 were much worse than what we have now. I remember flying home for Thanksgiving, and literally everyone was setting off the metal detectors they had them tuned so high. The only reason I didn't was I had prepared by wearing sweatpants and a T-shirt and I had put everything from my pockets, except my ID and boarding pass, into my backpack.
- roguecoder 15y ago
  My girlfriend still complains about having to go out and buy bras without underwires so she could fly without having her boobs groped.

nikcub 15y ago

after being sick of trying to find a light for a cigarette after getting off a flight I started smuggling lighters with me onto flights. Over 30 international flights now and not once have they found the lighter. it took me two flights of trial and error to work out the right method to smuggle it through. security theatre indeed.

eurleif 15y ago
But lighters are permitted? http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/sop/index.shtm http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/sop/index.shtm

mdc 15y ago

>It was part of his CIA training to be able to do that. In the '90s, long before 9/11, I was traveling with a girlfriend. She didn't want to remove her belt with a big metal buckle so she just went through the metal detector with it on. The machine buzzed and the agent sent her through again. A female agent looked sympathetic and told her to twist her belt buckle horizontally so it wouldn't set off the machine. That was my intro to security theater. Moral of the story is that if you're a pretty white girl, you don't need CIA training to learn security secrets from lazy guards.