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> No, the best indicator is, "does this rhetoric serve to promote an agenda more than it serves to explain a phenomenon we did not understand previously?" That

> No, the best indicator is, "does this rhetoric serve to promote an agenda more than it serves to explain a phenomenon we did not understand previously?" That’s not a good indicator of “what is a conspiracy theory”. All movements for social change are positively brimming with “rhetoric that serves to promote an agenda”, and isn’t trying to “explain a phenomenon that we didn’t understand previously”-it is a persuasive discourse not an explanatory one. On the contrary, activists often resist complex explanations for phenomena relevant to their cause, because many of them see nuance and complexity as a distraction from persuading the masses to support them, and simple messages do that best. None of that makes such movements a conspiracy theory - conspiracy theories exist in such movements too, but most of their leaders are smart enough to view those theories as baggage holding the movement back, and hence discourage them rather than encourage them. Conspiracy theories are found all over the political spectrum-both on the far left and the far right, and everywhere in-between. They can serve any political agenda-including agendas you or I support. The problem with defending your agenda using a conspiracy theory, is that even if your agenda is correct, arguing for it on the basis of an unfalsifiable theory is almost always irrational, and it is irrational to defend even a correct agenda using an irrational argument.

maxbond 3y ago
> All movements for social change are positively brimming with “rhetoric that serves to promote an agenda”, and isn’t trying to “explain a phenomenon that we didn’t understand previously”... Then it doesn't meet my criteria and I have no problem with it? I don't think we disagree. I'm not trying to say every argument for an ideology is a conspiracy theory. I don't have a problem with ideology (though I have problems with particular ideologies), and I don't have a problem with making a case for an ideology. I have a problem with "justifying ideology by stealth" as I called it, deceptive framing which seeks not to argue by presupposing your conclusions in your unstated assumptions. (The same goes for related concepts like "agenda".) I guess I neglected to include the requirement, "...and it is represented as theory to understand a phenomenon, rather than a set of normative ideas." If I could have expressed myself in a less confusing way, I'm open to suggestions. Based on the responses I didn't explain myself that well.
- skissane 3y ago
  > I'm not trying to say every argument for an ideology is a conspiracy theory. I don't have a problem with ideology (though I have problems with particular ideologies), and I don't have a problem with making a case for an ideology. I have a problem with "justifying ideology by stealth" as I called it, deceptive framing which seeks not to argue by presupposing your conclusions in your unstated assumptions. (The same goes for related concepts like "agenda".) That's a different issue from conspiracy theories. For example, a traditional conspiracy theory in left-wing Australian politics, is that the centre-right Australian government intentionally timed the April 1954 defection of KGB agent Vladimir Petrov (based at the Soviet Embassy in Canberra), to maximise the political damage to the centre-left opposition in the next month's election. It wasn't until 30 years later that the release of secret government records proved the conspiracy theory false (although who knows, maybe there are some left-wing diehards out there who still believe in it: how can we be sure those secret records weren't faked or tampered with prior to their release?). That was a conspiracy theory, but it had nothing to do with "justifying ideology by stealth". > I guess I neglected to include the requirement, "...and it is represented as theory to understand a phenomenon, rather than a set of normative ideas." In practice almost all normative disputes sooner or later become factual disputes as well. An ideal model of human rationality might suggest "we are never going to agree on values, but at least we can agree on facts", but in practice humans rarely work that way. Everybody does it, at least to some degree, nobody is entirely innocent of the temptation to read the data in the way which best supports their normative biases.
  - maxbond 3y ago
    I don't know anything about Australian politics in 1954 so I can't comment on that example. I can tell you that I can identify an ideology for every conspiracy that I am familiar with. Off the top of my head: - Flat Earth conspiracism is about an anti-intellectual pan-Christian traditionalist ideology - QAnon is about a similar pan-Christian ideology, and a sort of radical personal responsibility - Antisemitic conspiracy theories are about an ideology of white supremacy, and of mythic struggle among "races". It's an ideology of strict good and evil, defined not by actions or outcomes but by alignment in a sort of cosmic conflict. Factual and normative disputes are both fine, I'm arguing against a form of bad faith. May I ask if you've ever had an extended conversation with a conspiracy theorist?

maxbond 3y ago

> All movements for social change are positively brimming with “rhetoric that serves to promote an agenda”, and isn’t trying to “explain a phenomenon that we didn’t understand previously”... Then it doesn't meet my criteria and I have no problem with it? I don't think we disagree. I'm not trying to say every argument for an ideology is a conspiracy theory. I don't have a problem with ideology (though I have problems with particular ideologies), and I don't have a problem with making a case for an ideology. I have a problem with "justifying ideology by stealth" as I called it, deceptive framing which seeks not to argue by presupposing your conclusions in your unstated assumptions. (The same goes for related concepts like "agenda".) I guess I neglected to include the requirement, "...and it is represented as theory to understand a phenomenon, rather than a set of normative ideas." If I could have expressed myself in a less confusing way, I'm open to suggestions. Based on the responses I didn't explain myself that well.

skissane 3y ago
> I'm not trying to say every argument for an ideology is a conspiracy theory. I don't have a problem with ideology (though I have problems with particular ideologies), and I don't have a problem with making a case for an ideology. I have a problem with "justifying ideology by stealth" as I called it, deceptive framing which seeks not to argue by presupposing your conclusions in your unstated assumptions. (The same goes for related concepts like "agenda".) That's a different issue from conspiracy theories. For example, a traditional conspiracy theory in left-wing Australian politics, is that the centre-right Australian government intentionally timed the April 1954 defection of KGB agent Vladimir Petrov (based at the Soviet Embassy in Canberra), to maximise the political damage to the centre-left opposition in the next month's election. It wasn't until 30 years later that the release of secret government records proved the conspiracy theory false (although who knows, maybe there are some left-wing diehards out there who still believe in it: how can we be sure those secret records weren't faked or tampered with prior to their release?). That was a conspiracy theory, but it had nothing to do with "justifying ideology by stealth". > I guess I neglected to include the requirement, "...and it is represented as theory to understand a phenomenon, rather than a set of normative ideas." In practice almost all normative disputes sooner or later become factual disputes as well. An ideal model of human rationality might suggest "we are never going to agree on values, but at least we can agree on facts", but in practice humans rarely work that way. Everybody does it, at least to some degree, nobody is entirely innocent of the temptation to read the data in the way which best supports their normative biases.
- maxbond 3y ago
  I don't know anything about Australian politics in 1954 so I can't comment on that example. I can tell you that I can identify an ideology for every conspiracy that I am familiar with. Off the top of my head: - Flat Earth conspiracism is about an anti-intellectual pan-Christian traditionalist ideology - QAnon is about a similar pan-Christian ideology, and a sort of radical personal responsibility - Antisemitic conspiracy theories are about an ideology of white supremacy, and of mythic struggle among "races". It's an ideology of strict good and evil, defined not by actions or outcomes but by alignment in a sort of cosmic conflict. Factual and normative disputes are both fine, I'm arguing against a form of bad faith. May I ask if you've ever had an extended conversation with a conspiracy theorist?