4 ms·
No, the best indicator is, "does this rhetoric serve to promote an agenda more than it serves to explain a phenomenon we did not understand previously?" Lots o
by maxbond 3y ago
No, the best indicator is, "does this rhetoric serve to promote an agenda more than it serves to explain a phenomenon we did not understand previously?"
Lots of conspiracy theories are plausible. With the sheer number of them, some of them will have strong elements of truth, even.
Conspiracy theory isn't an epistemological designation, it's a political and rhetorical one. [ETA: To clarify, by political, I mean "within political science" not "for political ends". That also happens, of course, it's just not what I refer to here.] A conspiracy theory purports to explain something, but actually serves to justify an ideology by stealth.
Lots of anti-LGBTQ ideology disguises itself as concern about transhumanism ("they want to turn us into soy boy sheep plugged into virtual reality" sort of rhetoric).
- Pannoniae 3y ago"Conspiracy theories isn't an epistemological designation, it's a political and rhetorical one." Well, that's the problem. If the word was only used for baseless things, it would be taken seriously. But nowadays, "conspiracy theory" is mostly used to discredit legitimate opinions or ideologies just because the powers being don't like them.
- maxbond 3y ago"Political and rhetorical" does not mean "without substance." These are legitimate fields of inquiry, not dirty words. (The same goes for "ideology", which often gets this treatment as well.) ETA: I think I understand better the miscommunication here, I didn't mean "for political ends," I meant more, "within the context of political science." Like you might say, "it's a physical phenomenon as opposed to a chemical one."
- chriswarbo 3y ago"Conspiracy theory" is nothing more/less than attributing the cause of something to manipulation by some (usually secret) group, i.e. a conspiracy. Some are correct, some are wrong. Believing the Earth is flat isn't a conspiracy theory; believing that a secret organisation is suppressing this knowledge in favour of a false globe model is a conspiracy theory. Believing that certain social structures/institutions disadvantage the poor isn't a conspiracy theory; believing that these are consciously perpetuated by the richest, through media control, political influence, etc. is a conspiracy theory. There's also "conspiratorial thinking", which is distinct from any individual theory. This is a form of incorrect/irrational reasoning, whose chains of argument tend to produce conspiracy theories. A common example is getting logical implications the wrong way round, i.e. treating Theory -> Observation ("if atmospheric CO2 spontaneously condensed into dirty clothes, it would explain why my laundry basket keeps filling up") as if it were Observation -> Theory ("since my laundry basket does keep filling up, that means CO2 does condense into dirty clothes!"). Conspiratorial thinking is dangerous, since it allows any observations to be used as "proof" of basically any statement; including mutually-inconsistent ideas. Incorporating more and more of these into a single worldview requires adding epicycles and exceptions; more extraordinary, convoluted coincidences; requiring a state of affairs that is incredibly unlikely to occur by chance. The fixed-point of such reasoning is that it's not chance, but is instead engineered by someone. This is a stable solution, since any evidence to the contrary is just "proof" that it's a wider conspiracy; or involves more powerful people; or advanced secret technology; or aliens; or divine intervention; etc. PS: Whilst implications don't logically imply their inverse; they do provide statistical evidence of their inverse. In other words, a full laundry basket isn't proof of CO2 condensation, but it is evidence. The conspiratorial mistake is to avoid normalising this evidence by the theory's prior probability. Specifically, my belief in CO2 condensation after seeing a full laundry basket should be the probability that CO2 condensation would cause it (~100%), divided by the probability of seeing a full laundry basket regardless of cause (~90%), multiplied by my previous belief that CO2 condenses into dirty clothes (~0%). Whilst the division by 90% will slightly boost my belief, that final multiplication will dominate; ensuring it stays near zero. PPS: The conspiracy theory that the rich maintain societal systems that disadvantage the poor doesn't require conspiratorial reasoning; e.g. we can look at how much is donated to progressives/conservatives and their respective policies, etc. In contrast, maintaining a belief that the Earth is flat, despite all of the clear evidence to the contrary, requires some form of irrationality, such as conspiratorial thinking.
- skissane 3y ago> No, the best indicator is, "does this rhetoric serve to promote an agenda more than it serves to explain a phenomenon we did not understand previously?" That’s not a good indicator of “what is a conspiracy theory”. All movements for social change are positively brimming with “rhetoric that serves to promote an agenda”, and isn’t trying to “explain a phenomenon that we didn’t understand previously”-it is a persuasive discourse not an explanatory one. On the contrary, activists often resist complex explanations for phenomena relevant to their cause, because many of them see nuance and complexity as a distraction from persuading the masses to support them, and simple messages do that best. None of that makes such movements a conspiracy theory - conspiracy theories exist in such movements too, but most of their leaders are smart enough to view those theories as baggage holding the movement back, and hence discourage them rather than encourage them. Conspiracy theories are found all over the political spectrum-both on the far left and the far right, and everywhere in-between. They can serve any political agenda-including agendas you or I support. The problem with defending your agenda using a conspiracy theory, is that even if your agenda is correct, arguing for it on the basis of an unfalsifiable theory is almost always irrational, and it is irrational to defend even a correct agenda using an irrational argument.
- maxbond 3y ago> All movements for social change are positively brimming with “rhetoric that serves to promote an agenda”, and isn’t trying to “explain a phenomenon that we didn’t understand previously”... Then it doesn't meet my criteria and I have no problem with it? I don't think we disagree. I'm not trying to say every argument for an ideology is a conspiracy theory. I don't have a problem with ideology (though I have problems with particular ideologies), and I don't have a problem with making a case for an ideology. I have a problem with "justifying ideology by stealth" as I called it, deceptive framing which seeks not to argue by presupposing your conclusions in your unstated assumptions. (The same goes for related concepts like "agenda".) I guess I neglected to include the requirement, "...and it is represented as theory to understand a phenomenon, rather than a set of normative ideas." If I could have expressed myself in a less confusing way, I'm open to suggestions. Based on the responses I didn't explain myself that well.