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I don't really buy their approach to security honestly. Trying to fix all bugs is great, but they provide little to prevent unknown bugs bing exploited (pledge

I don't really buy their approach to security honestly. Trying to fix all bugs is great, but they provide little to prevent unknown bugs bing exploited (pledge is nice for software that opts in to use it, but otherwise not so much). I'd love to see them implement something like AppArmor with their approach, it would probably be amazing. I actually think NetBSD is a pretty interesting alternative, it has some nice security features like veriexec that don't get talked about much.

deleted 3y ago
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binkHN 3y ago
I think in the past they tried to fix all the bugs, and realized they couldn't, so they started to build all sorts of mitigations in the same vein as the one you see posted here today. As for pledge, and the related mitigations, yes, they're not useful if you don't use them, but I see this as them innovating in the space and giving application developers more tools to build hardened applications. I see tools like AppArmor as band-aids to fix problems that shouldn't exist in the first place. The problem with these approaches are the band-aids tend to break things in unexpected ways and when that happens they simply get removed and unused.
- PrimeMcFly 3y ago
  > I see tools like AppArmor as band-aids to fix problems that shouldn't exist in the first place. I fundamentally disagree on that. I think tools like that are amazing at protecting against unknown threats/exploits. They let you lock down software and protect against future unknown exploits, badly behaving software, malicious employees etc. I think something similar should be a part of any OS claiming to be security focused. Basic DAC is woefully insufficient. On the other hand, the industry has largely found other solutions like sandboxing, but I still think MAC or RBAC or whichever has a place, certainly as art of a defense in depth strategy.
anthk 3y ago
OpenBSD has these on while on compiling.
carlosrg 3y ago
> they provide little to prevent unknown bugs bing exploited They provide plenty of mitigations (https://www.openbsd.org/innovations.html https://www.openbsd.org/innovations.html). In fact OP's article is for preventing unknown bugs from being exploited.
- PrimeMcFly 3y ago
  They don't provide any mitigations of the sort I was clearly referencing. Specifically, for restricting malicious code or users that already has access to the system, exploiting insecure software that was not compiled with pledge support.
  - saagarjha 3y ago
    What kind of mitigations would help here?
    - PrimeMcFly 3y ago
      SELinux/RSBAC/AppArmor/grsecurity and similar.
      - saagarjha 3y ago
        These largely require buy-in from applications just like pledge.
        PrimeMcFly 3y ago
        They absolutely don't, that's the key difference. What makes you think otherwise?
        saagarjha 3y ago
        You can’t just stick sandboxing around arbitrary apps without them breaking.

deleted 3y ago

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binkHN 3y ago

I think in the past they tried to fix all the bugs, and realized they couldn't, so they started to build all sorts of mitigations in the same vein as the one you see posted here today. As for pledge, and the related mitigations, yes, they're not useful if you don't use them, but I see this as them innovating in the space and giving application developers more tools to build hardened applications. I see tools like AppArmor as band-aids to fix problems that shouldn't exist in the first place. The problem with these approaches are the band-aids tend to break things in unexpected ways and when that happens they simply get removed and unused.

PrimeMcFly 3y ago
> I see tools like AppArmor as band-aids to fix problems that shouldn't exist in the first place. I fundamentally disagree on that. I think tools like that are amazing at protecting against unknown threats/exploits. They let you lock down software and protect against future unknown exploits, badly behaving software, malicious employees etc. I think something similar should be a part of any OS claiming to be security focused. Basic DAC is woefully insufficient. On the other hand, the industry has largely found other solutions like sandboxing, but I still think MAC or RBAC or whichever has a place, certainly as art of a defense in depth strategy.

anthk 3y ago

OpenBSD has these on while on compiling.

carlosrg 3y ago

> they provide little to prevent unknown bugs bing exploited They provide plenty of mitigations (https://www.openbsd.org/innovations.html https://www.openbsd.org/innovations.html). In fact OP's article is for preventing unknown bugs from being exploited.

PrimeMcFly 3y ago
They don't provide any mitigations of the sort I was clearly referencing. Specifically, for restricting malicious code or users that already has access to the system, exploiting insecure software that was not compiled with pledge support.
- saagarjha 3y ago
  What kind of mitigations would help here?
  - PrimeMcFly 3y ago
    SELinux/RSBAC/AppArmor/grsecurity and similar.
    - saagarjha 3y ago
      These largely require buy-in from applications just like pledge.
      - PrimeMcFly 3y ago
        They absolutely don't, that's the key difference. What makes you think otherwise?
        saagarjha 3y ago
        You can’t just stick sandboxing around arbitrary apps without them breaking.